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Foreword 
In this book, Jack E. Holmes has made a major contribution to the understand- 
ing of American foreign policy, by developing his mood/interest theory and 
relating it to other major approaches. His analysis helps Americans to under- 
stand themselves and other nations to understand America. 
American foreign policy has often seemed to be unpredictable and unde- 
pendable, especially to observers overseas. The American system has some- 
times been regarded as fickle, with sudden changes of policy. Often given is the 
example of President Woodrow Wilson's role as the chief architect of the League 
of Nations, followed quickly by the league's repudiation in the Senate in 1919. 
A common theory in the inter-World War period was that the United States 
was traditionally and powerfully isolationist, so that World War I appeared to be 
an aberration. After World War 11, it could be argued either that this second war 
could prove to be only another aberration, or that the American people had been 
forced by the war to drop political-military introversion (or isolationism) 
forever. 
My 1947 study of American diplomatic history showed that not only had 
the United States become deeply involved in world affairs from about 1893 to 
1919 and then "isolationist" from 1919 to 1940, but that such an alternation had 
occurred ever since 1776. When this theory was published in 1952, it was 
applied to the future to suggest that the American people would support a strong 
extrovert policy at least until the late 1960s, when they would be likely to revert 
again to a relative introversion (a leveling-off of political-military involvement). 
The theory was little noticed until 1967-1969, when it looked as if the 
predicted introversion was coming to pass. The State Department, some colum- 
nists, and some scholars discussed the idea in relation to the growing reaction 
against "Vietnam. " Holmes began work on the theory in 1969 and continued to 
develop and apply it in many ways, while presenting many professional papers 
on it. The present book is a most fruitful result of his research, as he took the 
mood theory and developed it into his "liberal mood/interestW theory. 
Holmes helps explain the fairly regular alternation of long-time foreign 
policy moods by positing America's basic liberal stance (whether "reform" 
liberal or "business" liberal) as the steady motivating force in inducing mood 
shifts. Since liberals tend to dislike the exercise of concentrated power, es- 
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pecially military, except when a crusading spirit takes hold, there is a fundamen- 
tal conflict between the liberal moods and America's political-military interests 
(which require the use of some degree of power). 
A new mood may originate with political leadership, Holmes writes, but 
once it is grasped by the people, it is they who dictate its continuation. In an 
introvert mood, one generation of Americans will underestimate the political- 
military factor until the security of the country appears to be endangered, 
inducing a shift to extroversion. In an extrovert mood, the next generation may 
stress the political-military factor so much as to finally violate America's liberal 
norms. 
%us, Dr. Holmes supports basic democratic pluralist theory, believing that 
the mass public has commendable intelligence, even though it may be lacking 
knowledge, and that it sets the parameters within which political leaders must 
act. He avers that the impact of public moods on foreign policy has been 
insufficiently identified and analyzed, since perhaps most scholars have sup- 
ported an "elitist" view of the determination of policy. At the very least, the 
public chooses which of the competing elites it desires to place in power. 
In Chapter 2, Professors Holmes and Robert E. Elder, Jr., evaluate and 
compare a number of behavioral or statistical studies to show that they lend 
general support to the theory. Then, in addition to analyzing the "elitist" 
approach, Dr. Holmes demonstrates how the "liberal mood/interest" theory of 
alternation tends to dominate or explain the application of other common 
theories, including pragmatism, moralism, conservatism, fortunate circum- 
stances and modem technology, and the recurrence of certain types of "events. " 
After applying the theory to America's whole historical development since 
1776 in Chapter 3, the author similarly clarifies United States policy in the six 
major regions of the world, enabling him to discuss America's current problems 
in all of them, including the role of nuclear weapons. 
In Chapter 4, there is a full analysis of the impact of the theory on the 
formulation of foreign policy by the United States government, as affected by 
pressure groups, business, the press, and the general public. Evidence is 
presented to show that the presidency has been strong during extrovert phases, 
while the influence of Congress and pressure groups has increased in introvert 
phases. The president indicates direction and is informed by the federal bu- 
reaucracy, but is normally guided by the public mood, particularly as delineated 
in the press. There is a good discussion of the "military-industrial complex," 
showing that its influence depends largely on the public mood. The author notes 
that the general American liberal spirit rather consistently supports economic 
and humanitarian activity on the world scene, so that only political-military 
actions are normally subject to the alternations of moods. 
With a full analysis of the current dominant mood of introversion, charac- 
terized in part by a lack of basic consensus, the book is up-to-date and projects 
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the theory onto the future, noting the possibility that America could again allow 
introversion to endanger its political-military interests in the world, and lead 
toward a major crisis. For example, other powers could try to take advantage of 
this introvert mood just when a new spirit of American extroversion would be 
ready to respond. The next mood of extroversion can be expected by the late 
1980s, if the historical pattern continues. 
Dr. Holmes sees a particular danger in the tendency of each of the 
alternating foreign policy moods to move to extremes and suggests ways in 
which these extremes might be prevented or minimized. Modem weapons of 
destruction, he writes, cannot be combined with the past degree of mood 
extremes. Educators have a special opportunity and responsibility, he believes, 
to help explain America's historical foreign policy in terms of these alternating 
moods, to prepare students and the public for coming shifts, and to try to 
develop a broader understanding of America's interests which could reduce 
these extremes and perhaps even help "break the pattern." The author also 
points out areas where further research would be helpful, such as in studying 
elitelmass interaction, the role of competing elites, legislative-executive com- 
petition in the light of the mood/interest theory, and the like. 
The book is well-written and convincing, with a balanced and fair point of 
view. A large number of American foreign policy studies are used and logically 
analyzed. This fresh and broad perspective and the coverage of all the basic 
topics affecting American foreign policy make the book suitable indeed for use 
as fascinating text or for general reading by students, policy makers, and the 
interested public. It is especially valuable for those who try to educate or mold 
public opinion. 
FRANK L. KLINGBERG 
Professor Emeritus of Political Science 
Southern Illinois University-Carbondale 
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Preface 
The mood/interest theory is a macroanalysis of United States foreign policy 
covering more than two hundred years of American independence. It advances a 
broad, regular pattern which can aid in the analysis of past, present, and future 
American foreign policy. 
This book presents and explores the mood/interest theory, in the process 
summarizing material researched and developed in a variety of settings over the 
course of a decade. Refinement could easily continue into future decades. The 
theory is presented at this time to encourage thinking about larger issues of 
American foreign policy. 
The author would like to thank students at Hope College who have aided his 
continuing efforts to develop and refine the moodlinterest theory. Charles W. 
Gossett, Daniel Blauw, and Scott Dwyer were most resourceful as summer 
research assistants. James Van Heest made valuable suggestions for improve- 
ment of the introductory chapter and diagrams and Robert Pocock made helpful 
contributions to some of the case studies, both as part of their senior seminar 
project. Paul Bolt, Brian Crisp, Peter Maassen, Stephen Muyskens, Ben Vonk, 
and Dirk Weeldreyer each spent a highly productive summer on editorial 
matters. William S. Graham made several significant contributions to Chapter 
2, did research, and offered editorial suggestions for the better part of three 
summers. Lee Bechtel, Kim Japinga, Gary Koops, Nancy Piersma, and Beth 
Van Hoeven helped in research for Chapter 2; useful background papers were 
prepared by Kim Duffy, Kirk Hoopingarner, Kathy Stratton, and George 
Wiszynski; and Professor James Zoetewey made a number of useful suggestions 
for improving this application. 
Billy Beaver, Patricia Cecil, and Dan Stid were very helpful in preparing the 
final copy of this manuscript. Sally Budd, Brian Gardner, and Lon McCollum 
worked diligently and efficiently on tables. Paul Bolt helped compile and edit 
the index. Sandy Tasma patiently and expertly typed many drafts of the text. 
Anne BucMeitner, Steve Cochrun, Jeff Fraser, and Dave Rhem kept the author's 
office in order so that he could have the time needed for this project. The Mellon 
Foundation and Hope College provided valuable assistance for conducting 
research and preparing the manuscript. Many excellent suggestions were made 
by reviewers. Responsibility for all matters of interpretation and fact is, of 
course, solely the author's. 
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Introduction 
The moodlinterest theory argues that alternating introvert and extrovert public 
moods, first identified by Frank L. Klingberg and manifested in American 
liberalism, regularly pass in and out of an interest zone established by the 
realities of international politics. Public mood, which can conflict with foreign 
policy interests, limits the feasible foreign policy actions of the United States 
government. The above concepts can be utilized to construct a two-hundred- 
year framework which aids in the analysis of American foreign policy. 
The moodlinterest analysis emphasizes the need for greater attention to 
long-range macroanalysis by making a strong case for one such framework. 
Often concepts are advanced on the basis of detailed study of a few current 
instances and can be disputed when applied to other instances. An interpretation 
valid in the context of the next few years might be invalid in the context of the 
next few decades. Optimum understanding requires attention to a number of 
concepts developed within various frames of reference. 
Differences between long- and short-term views of the same situation are 
important enough to indicate that long-range analysis deserves attention. A 
common explanation for the reassertion of congressional foreign policy pre- 
rogatives after 1968 is that the Congress could not abdicate its foreign policy 
responsibilities to the executive. From the long-term viewpoint, this reassertion 
might lead to excessive congressional power. The actions of presidents Wilson 
and Johnson in 1918-20 and 1966-1968, respectively, can be explained from the 
short-range viewpoint as efforts by presidents to sustain American involvement 
in two quite different situations. The long-range moodlinterest perspective 
identifies the end of two extrovert eras, with actions taken by the two presidents 
seen as setting the stage for reactions. From a short-range perspective, imme- 
diately following World War I1 the United States entered a new era of interna- 
t iokl  leadership largely divorced from its past history. The moodlinterest 
theory, evaluating the new situation from a long-range historical perspective, 
could imply that public enthusiasm for the new United States role would 
eventually wane. 
KLINGBERG'S FOUNDATION 
The moodlinterest theory starts with Frank L. Klingberg's 1952 article on 
American foreign policy moods. In that article Klingberg defined four "intro- 
vert" periods averaging twenty-one years and three "extrovert" periods averag- 
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ing twenty-seven years. Klingberg based his dates on analysis of State of the 
Union and inaugural addresses, major party platforms, election results, naval 
expenditures, treaties, diplomatic warnings, annexations, and wars. He specu- 
lated that a new introvert mood could begin in the late 1960s, since the fourth 
extrovert phase had started in 1940.' 
When, in fact, this took place in 1968, much attention was paid to 
Klingberg's article. This attention subsided gradually until a movement toward 
extroversion, which appeared to exist around 1980, became a questionable 
proposition a few years later. Accordingly, interest in Klingberg's 1952 article 
has again increased. In general, analyses of Klingberg have noted his contribu- 
tion and added a few speculations. Thus, analysts have generalized rather than 
explained the forces behind Klingberg's 1952 cycle.2 
This author was first exposed to Klingberg's work in 1969 and has found it a 
remarkable tool for looking at events in context. The mood/interest theory was 
formulated in order to promote knowledge about exactly how Klingberg's cycle 
might work in a more specific sense. This work uses Klingberg's dates until 
1940, identifies 1968 as the start of the current introvert phase, and formulates 
propositions to present a macrotheory of American foreign policy. 
In recent years, Klingberg has developed his introverVextrovert cycles as an 
international cycle in conjunction with a political cycle and a cultural cycle.3 
The moodlinterest theory applies the international cycle alone based on the 1952 
article and dates. In view of the significance of this endeavor, additional research 
on the other Klingberg cycles would be valuable. However, a study of how the 
international cycle alone might work proved to be a sufficient challenge for a 
single volume. 
MOODIINTEREST PROPOSITIONS 
The moodlinterest theory is built upon six sequential propositions, each of 
which can be argued independently; in fact, support for each can be documented 
in the literature. What is different in the mood/interest theory is the manner to 
which the several propositions are fit together into a macrotheory. 
Public Rule Proposition 
Public mood is a dominant force in American foreign policy and limits 
governmental actions. The mood/interest theory contends that, in the American 
system of government, the people set the parameters within which the political 
leadership must act. The theory does not contend that the American public 
determines the specific of individual issues, but rather that it guides the 
decision-making process by determining an allowable "channel" for policy 
makers, which can be illustrated graphically by two heavy parallel lines (Hgure 
1). This channel of proper action may have originated with the political lead- 
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Figure 1. American Public Opinion and Foreign Policy Parameters 
ership, but once grasped by the people, it is they who dictate a continuation 
along this path, regardless of new leadership decisions of what is best. 
Short-term public opinion on specific issues is shown as vertical lines 
varying in position and length and assumes adjustment for the intensity of 
opinion and the context within which the opinion is formed. Foreign policy 
movements within the parameters are acceptable to the public, although short- 
term public opinion fluctuates on various issues. Thus, the foreign policy mood 
parameters are more important to a macroanalysis than is public opinion on 
specific issues. 
Decisions made by foreign policy leaders are expected to be concentrated 
within the parameters set by the public. The foreign policy maker is not required 
to act within the parameters in every instance, but should aim toward results 
within the parameters, particularly on important issues. When foreign policy 
decisions regularly violate the general will of the public, the policy-making 
officials involved are removed through the electoral process, and important 
policies are altered to conform to public mood. Such removal and alteration 
could result from an unrecognized change in the public mood, as depicted in the 
Liberal Moods Proposition. 
Liberal Moods Proposition 
American foreign policy moods are expressed and channeled by American 
liberalism andfluctuate between extreme introversion and extreme extroversion 
with intervening periods of moderation. American foreign policy moods are 
subject to extreme fluctuations best expressed by liberalism and its dislike of 
concentrated powet4 When analyzing problems, Americans are primarily 
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Figure 2. The American Liberal Mood Curve 
reform liberals (often referred to simply as liberals), business liberals (often 
referred to in America as conservatives), or some combination thereof. 
Although often regarding domestic policy differently, both camps of Amer- 
ican liberals are constantly dissatisfied with the harsh realities of international 
politics and continually try to change them in one of two ways. One alternative is 
to minimize active United States participation while setting an example that the 
liberal would have other nations follow; this is a basic tendency toward introver- 
sion. The other alternative is to engage in active participation in an effort to 
change international politics; this is a basic tendency toward extroversion. Since 
1776, American foreign policy has regularly alternated between introvert and 
extrovert phases, reaching an unrealistic extreme in one orientation before 
abandoning it for the other. 
Figure 2 provides a rough representation of the regular alternation of 
underlying moods. As noted previously, Klingberg's dates are used until 1940, 
and 1968 is used as the start of the current introvert phase. This alternation is 
reflected by a change in the public mood parameters. On this and subsequent 
diagrams, the two parallel lines representing the public parameters in figure 1 
will be merged into one heavy line. 
In terms of figure 2, the preferred dichotomy for moods in this book is 
introvert/extrovert. The isolationisVinternationalist dichotomy is worded to 
favor the internationalist, just as the globalisVlimitationist is worded to favor the 
limitationist. All three dichotomies are included in the diagram to relate to 
pertinent literature. 
Interests Proposition 
The United States has generally definable foreign policy interests. The 
interests pursued by the United States in the international system must be 
defined before they can be analyzed. The discussion of how such interests relate 
to the moodJinterest theory centers on matters of a political and military nature. 
The theory acknowledges the secondary importance of economic and human- 
itarian concerns, but maintains that they are not directly subject to the shifting 
moods manifested in American liberalism. 
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Figure 3. United States Politico-Military Interests 
TIME 
The most basic United States interest is, of course, the preservation of its 
territorial integrity and well-being. On a global basis this interest has been 
reflected in two ways: attempting to maintain freedom of the seas and, since 
1945, ~ e n t i n g  a nuclear, chemical, or biological exchange. 
The moodlinterest theory rejects the argument that American interests are 
so global that regional variations are of minimal significance. On the contrary, it 
asserts that an early point in the identification of interests is the recognition of 
regional variations. American foreign policy necessarily treats certain geo- 
graphical areas as constituting a higher level of interest than others. These areas 
include Europe and East Asia, where the United States seeks to prevent one- 
nation dominance, and the Western Hemisphere, where the United States 
endeavors to preserve its dominance among major powers."e United States 
also seeks to keep other areas of the world, especially the Middle East, open to 
necessary United States activity. 
Figure 3 provides a representation of the United States politico-military 
interests as dictated by the realities of the international system. The reality1 
interest zone represents the approximate level of United States activity neces- 
sary to guarantee the satisfaction of its fundamental politico-military interests. 
The time dimension reflects the development of the international system and its 
relation to United States politico-military interests. As the international com- 
munity continually increases its ability to challenge United States interests, the 
level of United States activity necessary to guarantee national interests must rise 
accordingly This is not to say that United States activity will always necessarily 
increase. The rising level depicted could start downward if there were a decline 
in United States interests abroad. However, the current ever-rising line gives a 
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general picture of the United States' increasing role and commitments in the 
international arena thus far in its history. 
Mood/Interest Conflict Proposition 
There is a fundamental conflict between the moods manifested in the liberal 
American ideology and the dictates of United States politico-military interests. 
Achieving the interests determined by the harsh realities of the international 
system usually implies the use of some degree of power. 
However, the liberal American orientation to politics includes an aversion 
to power and, therefore, an aversion to the notion of pursuing politico-military 
interests. Yet, the extant international situation demands that America pursue its 
interests to some degree. 
Occasionally the United States does too much or too little in pursuit of its 
interests. Historically, each mood phase has concluded in unchecked excesses 
above or below the interest zone, resulting in a shift to the opposite phase. After 
the time required to correct previous excesses, each new phase passes through a 
middle range realitylinterest zone in which the liberal mood corresponds to 
politico-military interests. Eventually, however, the fluctuating mood results 
once more in excesses beyond realistic foreign policy interests, setting the stage 
for the next phase. 
This periodic tendency of public mood to deviate from national interest is 
roughly depicted in figure 4. This diagram takes the American liberal mood 
curve from figure 2 and adjusts it for the steadily rising reality/interest zone 
depicted in figure 3. When mood lies within the shaded zone, mood and interest 
are in relative harmony. The moodlinterest conflict is most apparent when mood 
is above or below the dictates of realistic national interest, represented by the 
vertical lines above and below the realitylinterest zone. An introvert or extrovert 
mood begins at a time when overall mood leans strongly in the opposite 
direction. 
ExecutivelLegislative Proposition 
Application of the consistent fluctuation in the moodlinterest theory can 
improve understanding of the executive and legislative roles in the determina- 
tion of American foreign policy. During extrovert phases the executive plays his 
strongest role in formulating foreign policy, while during introvert phases the 
legislature gains power. During extrovert phases, people are not only willing, 
but also anxious for the United States to assume an active role in international 
affairs, whether it be "Manifest Destiny7' or "Guarding the Free World." In 
such times, the sense of urgency implied by stirring slogans allows little 
patience with the ponderous workings of the legislature. Thus, foreign policy 
tends to be delegated to "the man in the best position to know," the chief 
executive. The Congress, the historical source of isolationist sentiment and 
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necessarily looking to be reelected, is often content during extrovert phases to let 
its power slide over to the White House, particularly since the public approves of 
decisive presidential action. 
Introvert phases feature a greater foreign policy role by the Congress. The 
congressional response to an introvert public mood is to place greater restric- 
tions on foreign policy activity. The Congress can best exercise its foreign policy 
muscle through its ability to say "no." The president can urge action, but he 
sometimes needs to accept a more introvert policy than he believes desirable in 
order to get along with the Congress. Indeed, given the divided structure of 
American government, a stalemate can lead to an introvert policy given the 
rising foreign policy interest zone. 
Extreme Introversion Proposition 
The possibility of a return to an extreme form of introversion is more likely 
than is commonly recognized. Most of the literature that accords some validity 
to the concept of mood change is optimistic that previous forms of excessive 
introversion will be avoided in the future. The mood/interest theory indicates, 
however, that avoidance of extreme introversion will be difficult at best, consid- 
ering the other propositions. The result could be that the United States may again 
fail to do enough to maintain its interests. 
Much of the American understanding of the dangers of extreme introver- 
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sion is based upon experience of forty to fifty years ago. Protection of American 
interests is now more complex simply because more American action is re- 
quired, a situation resulting in part from strong American action during the 
1940-1968 extrovert phase. Since extreme introversion occurs late in a mood 
phase, it is a very relevant matter now, while time might remain to avoid or 
mitigate the end-of-phase extremes of past mood fluctuations. 
Late 1983 featured a United States determination to keep Marine peace- 
keeping forces in Lebanon and place new missiles in Europe, as well as an active 
U.S. role in an invasion to restore order in the Caribbean island of Grenada. By 
early 1984, the pace of American activity slowed down. From a long-term 
perspective, these moves do not appear to represent a change of the type 
experienced at the beginning of past extrovert phases. The moves could be 
typical late introvert adjustments for previous weakness that has gradually 
promoted increased challenges to U.S. interests by other countries. It also is 
possible that they could herald a breakdown of past patterns or an earlier than 
expected return to extro~ersion.~ The passage of time will, in any event, tell 
which interpretation has the most validity. However, it is a misuse of long-range 
analysis to make a definitive judgment from events in the recent past until a 
long-term pattern is established; sets of events can be unique. For purposes of 
this theory the author will assume that the country is still in an introvert phase as 
is indicated by history. However, it must be emphasized that the purpose of this 
theory is to present one interpretation of American foreign policy to date and not 
to make definitive judgments on the long-term meaning of recent events or to 
predict the future. 
For the policy maker or scholar seeking relevancy in foreign policy liter- 
ature, this proposition may have the greatest value. 
METHODOLOGY AND VALUE 
American foreign policy can be analyzed in many ways, but traditional ap- 
proaches predominate. Gene Rainey has identified four American foreign policy 
"images": the liberal image, the realist image, right-wing revisionism, and left- 
wing re~isionism.~ Although it d&s not entirely reject any of these four 
ideological images, the moodlinterest theory fails to conform to any one of 
them. 
In agreement with the liberal image that foreign policy should be deter- 
mined by the people, the moodlinterest theory emphasizes a strong element of 
pluralism. The moodlinterest theory further argues that elite influence on 
American foreign policy exists, yet maintains that the elites regularly change 
according to the will of the public. Unlike the liberal image, however, this study 
views the forging of interests common to all nations as unrealistic and, hence, 
unachievable at present. 
Methodology and Value 9 
Similar to right-wing revisionism in that it views a considerable portion of 
American foreign policy problems as internal, this theory advances an argument 
that emphasizes internal causation. The public mood, an internal cause, pushes 
American action to the extreme of introversion or extroversion until the external 
realities of international affairs force the mood in the other direction. Contrary 
to right-wing revisionist views that the defeat and reformation of communism 
constitutes an underlying goal of American foreign policy, this study places the 
anticommunist objective within the perspective of realistic politico-military 
interests. 
This study concurs with the left-wing revisionist advocacy of the need for a 
changed perspective of American foreign policy. Although in agreement that 
change is necessary, the modinterest theory proposes a differing solution. 
Contrary to the left-wing revisionist image, this study does not emphasize 
economic causation, plots by American elites, or the need for an enlightened 
view of adversaries. 
In its emphasis upon national survival through the use of a balance-of- 
power philosophy, the modinterest theory is perhaps most similar to the realist 
image. However, unlike most realist analyses, this study asserts that the public 
ultimately decides American foreign policy questions and holds the key to the 
solution of foreign policy problems. Only in the long-term sense, after experi- 
encing extremes, does the United States adjust to power realities. 
The relation of the nontraditional, behaviorist approach to the mood/ 
interest analysis also should be considered. Some adherents to behaviorism are 
overly attentive to detail, yet their stress on data collection greatly benefits 
further studies which wish to build on a strong data base. All too often, however, 
scholars advance new material on specialized topics rather than categorizing or 
relating existing material. Herein lies the value of the moodlinterest analysis of 
American foreign policy. The author's macrointerpretation seeks to relate a 
number of existing theories within the framework of an historical analysis. 
Unfortunately, American social scientists are so wary of cyclical theories of 
history that Klingberg's study, however perceptive, has not achieved its deserved 
recognition. Analysts still concentrate on detailed studies of events, which 
indicate that each historical situation is unique and, therefore, of limited value to 
understanding the present. The price paid for this overly sensitive attention to 
detail is immense. The mood/interest theory seeks to redress past academic 
neglect by emphasizing, within the bounds of intellectual integrity, the role of 
moods in the foreign policy proce~s .~  
The historical perspective of the mood/interest theory improves under- 
standing of America's international stance more than do many conventional 
foreign policy studies which downplay the significance of history, long-range 
trends, and internal causation. Through the integration of six individual propo- 
sitions into a plausible, coherent interpretation of foreign policy behavior, the 
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theory advances a new framework for analysis. The theory asserts that, if 
changing public mood is acknowledged, America's interactions with other 
nations will be viewed less as random responses to world events and more as a 
pattern of responses conforming to mood. 
In order to incorporate two hundred years of American history into a 
manageable theory, the author must make generalizations. If the theory is 
applicable to actual situations, if it contains realistic suggestions for an im- 
proved view of its subject matter, and if it has been constructed with belief in its 
validity, then those generalizations are justifiable. An attempt at relating what is 
often seen as an entangled morass of details and circumstances will be made 
through the incorporation of some statistical data, further supporting and 
justifying those generalizations. This gives a better idea of what is known and 
what is unknown. A statement of one way in which moods operate may work to 
stimulate others to look for further approaches. The next step, of course, would 
be an extensive quantitative study. Such a study would be difficult to conduct 
without a greater consensus by the academic community, because academics 
often build on one another's work. This work is designed to stimulate moves in 
such a direction. 
The mood/interest theory as presented here thus argues that long-range 
cycles in American foreign policy can be placed in a framework that is 
meaningful to both scholar and policy maker. This framework, which relates 
Klingberg's mood analysis to American liberalism and foreign policy interests, 
cannot provide automatic answers to American foreign policy problems. It is 
only one prospect for a macroanalysis of American foreign policy and does not 
claim to be the sole and authoritative long-range study. The mood/interest 
theory can, however, demonstrate the necessity of learning from history and 
considering long-range moods, and it is the hope of the author that this study 
will inspire other macroanalyses. Indeed, the author would be pleased to see 
refinements and modifications of the mood/interest theory, or even an improved 
replacement. 
1. Liberalism, Moods, and 
American Foreign Policy 
T%e writings of John Locke articulate well the basic liberal ideological stance of 
almost all Americans. Locke, one of the early theorizers of liberalism, describes 
some characteristics of political and social human beings particularly relevant to 
American beliefs. Peace, not war, is the natural state. People are basically good, 
born free with natural rights to property and human equality. People enter 
society on their own accord to better secure their natural rights. Government 
must be limited to prevent it from reducing individualism more than is necessary 
to maintain the benefits offered the individual by society. Governmental au- 
thority should be divided. The powers of the government are subordinated to the 
people, who act as the ultimate judge. Problem-solving is left to the faith in 
human ability to rationally meet the needs of each new situation. These liberal 
ideological values are embraced by most Americam2 
That the vast majority of Americans are liberal is not a new assertion. Louis 
Hartz argued forcefully in this direction almost three decades ago, placing 
American history in the context of an all-embracing liberalism. His book, The 
Liberal Tradition in America, argues that the American business community, 
often thought of as conservative, is unquestionably liberal in the Lockean 
tradition. Other ideologies, Hartz maintains, have been ineffective in America 
simply because they were not formulated to address the dominant liberal 
situation in America. Hartz summarizes that "the outstanding thing about the 
American community in Western history ought to be . . . that the American 
community is a liberal community. "3 
The continuity of American liberalism has been a significant motivational 
force for action, particularly in the field of foreign policy. Even business 
liberals, those Americans currently called "conservative" in conventional 
American terminology, are, in reality, conveyors of American liberalism. Thus, 
"conservative" is not an entirely accurate term for business liberals in the 
American context. If Americans in general can be considered conservative in 
any way, it is in their tenacious protection of the liberal ideology as advanced by 
John Locke, not in their protection of traditional technology and methods in 
business dealings. For this reason, it is profitable to replace conventional liberal/ 
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conservative terminology and instead designate different kinds of liberals. The 
predominantly liberal American public is best divided into two major strands: 
business liberals and reform liberals. Business liberals want to change things by 
allowing individuals to pursue their own self-interests unencumbered by institu- 
tions. Reform liberals, on the other hand, generally want to change things by 
reforming institutions throughout Amer i~a .~  
In principle, reform liberals emphasize humanitarian improvement and 
business liberals emphasize economic improvement. The differing emphasis is 
often overshadowed when American liberals assume a unified stance, par- 
ticularly on American foreign policy issues. Both types of liberals believe that 
progress is necessary and leads to an ideal, that peace is the natural condition, 
and that individual rights, as described by Locke, are the most important rights. 
While both are distrustful of the politico-military power relationships that lie at 
the heart of international politics, both sometimes justify the use of power to 
achieve liberal objectives. 
Liberal beliefs are articulated in the 1801 inaugural address of reform liberal 
Thomas Jefferson, the 1969 inaugural address of business liberal Richard 
Nixon, the 1977 inaugural address of reform liberal Jimmy Carter, and the 1981 
inaugural address of business liberal Ronald Reagan. The similarities among the 
varieties of liberalism are striking. Jefferson expressed the following ideas: 
All . . . will bear in mind this sacred principle, that though the will of the majority is in 
all cases to prevail, that will to be rightful must be reasonable; that the minority possesses 
their equal rights, which equal law must protect, and to violate would be oppression. . . . 
Error of opinion may be tolerated where reason is left free to combat it . . . entertaining a 
due sense of our equal right to the use of our own faculties, to the acquisitions of our own 
industry . . . a wise and frugal Government, which shall restrain men from injuring one 
another, shall leave them otherwise free to regulate their own pursuits of industry and 
improvement, and shall not take from the mouth of labor the bread it has earned. . . . 
Equal and exact justice to all men, of whatever state or persuasion, religious or political; 
peace, commerce, and honest friendship with all nations . . . a jealous care of the right of 
election by the people . . . freedom of person under the protection of the habeas corpus, 
and trial by juries impartially selected.5 
Nixon's address includes these phrases: 
The greatest honor history can bestow is the title of peacemaker. . . . The American 
people are ready to answer this call. . . . We have given freedom new reach, and we have 
begun to make its promise real for black as well as for white. . . . But we are approaching 
the limits of what government alone can do. . . . What has to be done, has to be done by 
government and people together or it will not be done at all. The lesson of past agony is 
that without the people we can do nothing; with the people we can do everything. . . . 
Each of us shares in the shaping of his own destiny. . . . No man can be fully free while 
his neighbor is not. . . . As all are born equal in dignity before God, all are born equal in 
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dignity before man. As we learn to go forward together at home, let us also seek to go 
forward together with all mankind. . . . We seek an open world-open to ideas, open to 
the exchange of goods and people. . . . I know the heart of America is good.6 
Carter also emphasized basic tenets of American liberalism: 
We reject the prospect of failure or mediocrity or an inferior quality of life for any person. 
. . . We have already found a high degree of personal liberty, and we are now struggling 
to enhance equality of opportunity. Our commitment to human rights must be absolute, 
our laws fair . . . the powerful must not persecute the weak, and human dignity must be 
enhanced. . . . The passion for freedom is on the rise. Tapping this new spirit, there can 
be no nobler nor more ambitious task for America to undertake on this day of a new 
beginning than to help shape a just and peaceful world that is truly humane. . . . Because 
we are free we can never be indifferent to the fate of freedom elsewhere. . . . We do not 
seek to intimidate, but it is clear that a world which others can dominate with impunity 
would be inhospitable to decency and a threat to the well-being of all people. . . . I join in 
the hope that . . . people might say this about our Nation: . . . That we had tom down the 
barriers that separated those of different race and region and religion, and where there 
had been mistrust, built unity, with a respect for diversity; . . . That we had insured 
respect for the law, and equal treatment under the law, for the weak and the powerful, for 
the rich and the poor.7 
Strong support for the similarity of reform and business liberalism as twin 
offspring of dominant American liberalism can be seen by comparing reform 
liberal Carter's inaugural with the similar ideas found in business liberal 
Reagan's address: 
We are a united people pledged to maintaining a political system which guarantees 
individual liberty . . . . We as Americans have the capacity . . . to do whatever needs to 
be done to preserve this . . . bastion of freedom. . . . From time to time we've been 
tempted to believe that . . . government by an elite group is superior to government for, 
by, and of the people. But, if no one among us is capable of governing himself, then who 
among us has the capacity to govern someone else. . . . lhis  administration's objective 
must be a healthy, vigorous, growing economy that provides equal opportunities for all 
Americans with no barriers born of bigotry or discrimination. . . . We are a nation that 
has a government-not the other way around. . . . Our government has no special power 
except that granted it by the people. It is time to check and reverse the growth of 
govenunent which shows signs of having grown beyond the consent of the governed. . . . 
we unleashed the energy and individual genius of man. . . . Freedom and the dignity of 
the individual have been more available and assured here than in any other place on earth. , 
. . . We, the Americans of today are ready . . . to do what must be done to ensure 
happiness and liberty for ourselves, our children, and our children's children. . . . No 
arsenal or no weapon in the arsenals of the world is so formidable as the will and moral 
courage of free men and women. . . . ?he crisis we are facing today does. . . require. . . 
our willingness to believe in ourselves and to believe in our capacity to perform great 
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deeds; to believe that together and with God's help we can and will resolve the problems 
which now confront us.8 
Other studies have also noted that Reagan displays liberal tendencies, despite 
the common belief that his position is "conservative." For example, W. Wayne 
Shannon writes that aspects of Reagan's inaugural are "deeply Lockean," and 
that, "Aside from 'supply-side' economics, there is nothing whatever in it [the 
Reagan perspective] that anyone with a decent memory or any knowledge of 
American history ought to regard as new."9 So liberalism has been a great 
unifying and pervasive force in American history, spanning more than two 
hundred years and strongly bringing together both business liberals and reform 
liberals in pursuit of common, transcendent liberal goals. 
Although liberalism has been the focus of American ideology, there have 
been two prominent, relatively conservative forces in American history: the 
Federalists, who had some fear of the masses, and the Antebellum Southerners, 
who were motivated by the desire to maintain their lifestyle and their peculiar 
institution of slavery. These two groups came close to putting more emphasis 
upon the "wisdom of the ages," as embodied in tradition, than upon individual 
judgment. The Federalists were dealt a severe blow with the bloodless Jefferso- 
nian revolution of 1800, which proved their fear of the masses to be unfounded, 
and they were finally laid to rest after their ill-fated opposition to the War of 
1812. The conservatism of the Antebellum South as a force in foreign policy 
existed until the Civil War, when its desires were actively frustrated by the rest of 
American society. In time, both conservative forces were destroyed by the 
dominant liberalism in America. The behavior of liberals had been modified 
only slightly by conservatives, and after 1865 this tempering force was weak, 
although it has occasionally played a part in American policy because of the 
deficiencies of liberalism. Since that time, challenges to the American liberal 
ideology have failed in large part because conditions that in other countries 
brought about the formation of competing ideologies did not exist at the same 
time in the United States.lo 
Hartz believes that if American liberalism is to be modified in the cumnt 
era, it is most likely to result from American contact with foreign governments 
at a time when liberalism has shifted to an extreme." This demonstrates that 
development of the foreign policy implications of American liberalism is 
important to the study of liberalism in general, as well as to American foreign 
policy. 
LIBERALISM AND FOREIGN POLICY 
Liberalism has been identified by Samuel P. Huntington in his 1957 book, The 
Soldier and the State, as having several characteristics that influence foreign 
policy actions and tend to give Americans a marked commonality in foreign 
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policy thought. Of particular importance to moodlinterest analysis are the 
following Huntington observations: 
1. "Liberalism normally either denies the existence of power, minimizes its importance, 
or castigates it as inherently evil . . . [and] tends to assume the existence of. . . national 
security. " 
2. Although "the liberal believes that the natural relation is peace," he "will normally 
support a war waged to further liberal ideas," either business or reform. 
3. The liberal is normally uninterested in national security affairs and, when forced to 
consider them, will apply his well-developed and change-oriented domestic policy 
values. 12 
Edward Weisband's 1973 analysis argues that United States justifications for its 
foreign policy actions have been based largely upon three fixed characteristics 
of the American ideological tradition derived from Lockean liberalism: self- 
determination, self-identification, and self-preservation. l3 
While in domestic policy, reform liberals and business liberals can and 
often do balance each other because of conflicting immediate goals, liberal 
interest in foreign policy is irregular, and a liberal consensus can be attained 
more easily. The unrestrained desire of reform and business liberals to alter 
social conditions and seek improvement is particularly well evidenced in 
international affairs. Humankind has been unable to reach its often repeated goal 
of peace in any permanent sense. The natural reaction of the liberal is to urge 
change of the political nature and military manifestations of the system in order 
to obtain lasting peace. 
When Americans disagree on specific foreign policy issues, it often is in 
terms of the appropriate application of the liberal ideology. President Woodrow 
Wilson, leader of the Wilsonian internationalists, and Senator William E. 
Borah, leader of the hard-core isolationists, held similar nationalistic views; the 
difference between them being that internationalist Wilson saw an arrangement 
like the League of Nations as conforming to American national principles,14 
while isolationist Borah did not.15 In this instance, Borah represented an 
introvert application of liberalism while Wilson represented an extrovert ap- 
plication. Hans J. Morgenthau ascribes a similar lack of realism to both 
antileague "isolationists" and Wilsonian  internationalist^."^^ 
The Wilson-Borah disagreement occurred during a time when the public 
mood was changing, which happens every two to three decades. Most Amer- 
icans agree on a mood at any given time, but similar backgrounds can lead to 
different views at different times. For instance, many admirers of the reform 
liberal La Follette movement were critical of McCarthyism, but one analyst 
found "continuity between the isolationist wing of the La Follette movement 
and the strongest pro-McCarthy counties in 1952. "I7 This apparent incongruity 
appears less striking when it is remembered that liberalism has both introvert 
and extrovert extremes. 
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Despite many similarities, the two liberal variants may affect different 
aspects of American foreign policy. The profit motive, which is at the root of 
business liberalism, is an important reason for continuing United States interest 
in international economic opportunity. Likewise, the humanitarian concern, 
which is inherent in reform liberalism, helps to explain the constant United 
States interest in humanitarian affairs. However, in a complex world situation, 
many matters, primarily those of a politico-military nature, cannot readily be 
identified as being clearly economic or humanitarian concerns. Thus, these 
matters are particularly subject to alternation between two distinct foreign 
policy moods. 
On the one hand, both types of liberals may shy away from an activist 
politico-military policy as too costly in economic and human terms, especially 
in a war situation. A business liberal with a firm belief in economic betterment 
can decide that the laissez faire example of a strong and prosperous United 
States is more influential than the threat of armed force and that trade is more 
powerful than weaponq. Similarly, a reform liberal emphasizing a strong belief 
in human betterment can determine that the example of a free society is more 
persuasive than threatened violence. Thus, both business and reform liberals 
can tend toward minimum international politico-military involvement, or intro- 
version, for quite understandable reasons. 
On the other hand, a society using an example-setting strategy can be 
ignored in the rush of international events. Perhaps instruction of other countries 
in the American free enterprise, humanitarian, and democratic traditions is 
necessary to bring about international change. Perhaps American trade needs 
physical protection or an initial boost to get started. With these rationales, both 
the reform and business liberal have natural extrovert positions. 
The American liberal is periodically tom between introversion and extro- 
version, two possible expressions of his liberalism. Business liberals and reform 
liberals have usually acted in concert when dealing with foreign policy. On some 
occasions, both groups have chosen to become actively involved in international 
affairs, and on other occasions, both groups have chosen to remain relatively 
aloof, prefemng to set an example. The fact that the reform liberal is tom 
between being an example and providing direct instruction is well documented, 
perhaps because most academic observers in the United States are sympathetic 
to the reform liberal viewpoint. The ambivalence of the business liberal is less 
recognized because of the easy equation of business with the military, from 
which is stimulated the belief of many that the business community is consis- 
tently extrovert. However, instances in which business has been noted to have 
deviated from the expected promilitary extrovert position call the generalization 
into question. 
The diversity of business liberal thought is a particularly important consid- 
eration. Extrovert manifestations of the business liberal frequently have been 
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noted, as exemplified by business liberal support of a strong navy during most of 
the nineteenth century and support of much of the American involvement in 
twentieth-century international politics. Introvert manifestations are noted to a 
much lesser degree, but are nevertheless significant. For example, at the same 
time business liberals pushed for a strong navy, they also formed a substantial 
part of the opposition to the War of 1812, the Mexican War, and the Spanish- 
American War. In the twentieth century many business liberals opposed The- 
odore Roosevelt's foreign policy assertiveness,'* Franklin Roosevelt's indirect 
aid to the Allies prior to 1941,19 and early commitments in the cold war.20 
Recent documentation of the many sides of the business liberal can be found in a 
1975 study by Bruce M. Russett and Elizabeth C. Han~on.~' It must be 
concluded on this point that business liberals are more complex than is normally 
believed and that they do not simply follow the dictates of a "conservative" 
ideology One distinction that can be drawn between different types of business 
liberals is the difference between a business liberal involved in international 
trade and the business liberal involved in national and local trade. The multina- 
tional business liberal is most likely to appear extroverted, while the national 
and local business liberal may only make this a consensus when public mood is 
fully extroverted. 
One illustration of the desirability of using the division of terms reform 
liberalhusiness liberal, as opposed to the traditional liberal/conservative di- 
chotomy, is the 1950 foreign policy stance of Herbert Hoover, who cannot be 
fully understood if he is simply labeled a conservative. Hoover is far better 
understood as a business liberal. In 1950 he made some foreign policy warnings 
which were contrary to the later reputation of conservatives and which were to 
become popular with increasing numbers of liberals some two decades later. His 
now famous Gibraltar Speech warned against a United States commitment on 
the Eurasian mainland, which he maintained would be very difficult to sustain. 
Instead, he believed that the United States should become the Gibraltar of 
Western civilization, retaining appropriate naval and air capabil i t ie~.~~ 
Walter Lippman, from 1919 until his death, pointed the way for business 
and, particularly, reform liberal orientations even though his distrust of popular 
opinion in policy-making could be called classically conservative. Beginning in 
1919 with the Treaty of Versailles, he was continually ahead of liberal ideology 
on foreign policy. In 1969, with his "blue water" strategy,23 Lippmann took a 
stance close to that advocated in Hoover's Gibraltar Speech given nineteen years 
earlier; the introvert tenor of this Hoover-Lippmann viewpoint has gained 
support since 1969, though its specifics make it infeasible. 
Both Hoover and Lippmann, taking liberal introvert positions, advocated 
an American defense perimeter that stopped in the "blue water" off the 
Eurasian mainland. Hoover stressed problems of expense in a business liberal 
fashion, whereas Lippman stressed quality of life in a manner especially 
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appealing to reform liberals. Lippmann went so far as to state that Ameica's 
whole way of life had been distorted by excessive American involvement on the 
Eurasian mainland starting before the Korean War. Thus Lippmann, who 
appeals especially to the reform liberal community, agreed with Hoover's earlier 
warnings to the same effect: America was too activist. Certainly, to call Hoover 
simply a conservative is inappropriate. 
The Whig platform of 1852 expresses introvert sentiments of the type now 
popular in the United States. "Our mission as a republic is not to propagate our 
opinions, or impose on other countries our form of government by artifice or 
force; but to teach, by example, and show by our success, moderation and 
justice, the blessings of self-government, and the advantages of free institu- 
tions. "24 However, this was the last time the Whigs competed in a presidential 
election as one of two major political parties, for one of their major problems 
was that they expressed the introvert, example-setting viewpoint during a time of 
increasing extroversion. 
A well-known, early supporter of the introversion that now characterizes 
the United States was Senator J. William Fulbright. In 1966, when Fulbright was 
chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, he expressed his view- 
point in the book, The Arrogance of Power. 
If America has a service to perform in the world-and I believe she has-it is in 
large part the service of her own example. In our excessive involvement in the affairs of 
other countries we are not only living off our assets and denying our own people the 
proper enjoyment of their resources, we are also denying the world the example of a free 
society enjoying its freedom to the fullest.25 
A recent example of this viewpoint, in keeping with the current introvert mood, 
is contained in President Carter's statement that "No other country is as well- 
qualified as we to set an example. "26 
A comparison of the 1852 Whig platform, Fulbright's 1966 book, and 
President Carter's 1977 statement indicates historical continuity in introvert 
American foreign policy thinking. Such continuity can also be seen in extrovert 
foreign policy orientations. In contrast to periods of liberal introversion, periods 
of liberal extroversion have grown in terms of the geographic scope to which 
they have applied, although essentially they remain the same with regard to 
ideological rationale. During extrovert phases dating back to the early 1800s, 
both reform and business liberals have sought active United States involvement 
in certain international politico-military situations. 
Business liberals expressed a type of extrovert thinking in the 1864 Republi- 
can platform: 
Resolved, That we approve the position taken by the Government that the people of 
the United States can never regard with indifference the attempt of any European Power 
to overthrow by force or to supplant by fraud the institutions of any Republican Govern- 
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ment on the Western Continent and that they will view with extreme jealousy, as 
menacing to the peace and independence of their own country, the efforts of any such 
power to obtain new footholds for Monarchical Government, sustained by foreign 
military force, in near proximity to the United States.27 
President William McKinley, speaking of the Philippines around the turn of the 
century, expressed another form of extroversion when he said: "We could not 
leave them [the Filipinos] to themselves-they were unfit for self-government 
. . . there was nothing left for us to do but to take them all, and to educate the 
Filipinos, and uplift and civilize and Christianize them. . . . and I told him [the 
cartographer] to put the Philippines on the map of the United  state^."^^ 
Comparison of this statement with the 1961 inaugural address of reform liberal 
John F. Kennedy in the latest extrovert phase evidences continuity and growth of 
extrovert liberal thinking. Kennedy proclaimed: "Let every nation know, 
whether it wishes us well or ill, that we shall pay any price, bear any burden, 
meet any hardship, support any friend, oppose any foe, in order to assure the 
survival and success of liberty. This we pledge-and more. "29 These statements 
are derived from the common philosophical basis of American liberalism. The 
differences which can be noted in this sampling of liberal statements are due 
more to increased United States capabilities than to philosophical conflicts. 
In extroversion, as in introversion, when a business-liberallreform-liberal 
alignment does occur, the effect on American foreign policy is marked. Bruce 
Russett and Elizabeth Hanson make observations in this direction: "Economic 
interest and ideology-whether of the "liberal messianist" [reform liberal] 
variety or of a conservative anticommunist [business liberal] sort-might there- 
fore combine, in the American case, to produce a more powerful impetus to an 
assertive, activist foreign policy than either could produce alone."30 This 
reference of Russett and Hanson is to a convergence on extroversion. An 
example of such unity on introversion, on the other hand, occurred during the 
late 1930s when the isolationist coalition included both business and reform 
liberals. 31 
Further insight into the two-sided nature of American liberalism as it relates 
to foreign policy is given by Samuel P. Huntington in his 1981 book, American 
Politics: The Promise of Disharmony. As in his 1957 book, Huntington main- 
tains the Hartzian idea of the predominance of liberalism in America, but he 
adds, "If one had to apply one adjective to them [American ideals], 'liberal' 
would be it, but even this term does not convey the full richness and complexity 
of the amalgam." This amalgam is better described, says Huntington, as the 
American "creed," which is a conglomeration of elements, including medieval 
legalist ideas, seventeenth-century Protestantism, Lockean and Enlightenment 
ideas, and others. Although many of these elements are inherently contradicto- 
ry, Huntington points out that the basic creed has remained essentially un- 
changed for two hundred years. 
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The point here is that these inconsistent elements of the American creed 
have regularly contradicted each other in American foreign policy as well. 
Huntington notes the historical fluctuations in the different American liberal 
ideals that the public has called on our foreign policy institutions to support, 
citing the "new realism" of the 1950s and '60s and the "new moralism" of the 
1970s as examples.32 In relation to the mood/interest theory, then, this illustrates 
how the same basic American liberalism can equally support contradictory 
ideals, such as introversion and extroversion, depending on predominant 
moods. 
Therefore, American liberalism is apparently much more than a simple 
conglomeration of ideological statements. It also lends itself well to an inter- 
pretation of American foreign policy history based on moods, since at least one 
dominant trait of the American liberal is that he or she is never satisfied with the 
present situation. How, then, is the impact of this liberalism felt in American 
foreign policy? 
FOREIGN POLICY MOOD ALTERNATION 
Both reform and business liberals are constantly dissatisfied with, and therefore 
continually endeavoring to change, the realities of international politics. Amer- 
ican liberals have alternatively embraced two methods of change, choosing 
either a tendency toward introversion or a tendency toward extroversion, reach- 
ing an extreme in one before abandoning it for the other. American foreign 
policy, suggests the mood/interest theory, has fluctuated in this manner since 
1776.33 
Frank L. Klingberg's 1952 article, "The Historical Alternation of Moods in 
American Foreign Policy," delineates the mood swings fundamental to the 
mood/interest theory.34 However, little was heard or said of Klingberg's long- 
range perspective until about a decade and a half later when his indication for 
the end of the fourth extrovert phase uncannily became fact. A serious look at 
mood, to include its current implications, is long overdue. The moodlinterest 
theory works toward that end, relating long-term fluctuations of foreign policy 
to the shifting liberal moods of the American public and the leaders who 
respond to the public. 
Klingberg divided United States foreign policy history into four "extro- 






Mood Alternation 21 
By extension of the extrovert phases averaging twenty seven years and introvert 
phases averaging twenty one years, one can approximate the end of the 1940 
extrovert phase to be near 1967 and the end of the current introvert phase 
somewhere in the late 1980s. The 1968 date can be documented as the end of the 
last extrovert phase, but future dates remain a matter of pure conjecture. 
Klingberg's article provides extensive statistical documentation to support 
his phases. In his research, he tallied the number of wars, armed expeditions, 
and annexations-the most prominent indicators of extroversion-and found 
them to be situated overwhelmingly in extrovert phases. He studied inaugural 
addresses, annual presidential messages, and major party platforms and deter- 
mined the percentage of each which was devoted to foreign policy, especially 
positive American action beyond its borders. He then charted the results, which 
further supported his mood analysis. Other indicators that Klingberg studied 
were treaties, diplomatic warnings, annual naval expenditures, and election 
results. These, too, were in agreement with his theory.36 
Klingberg's analysis and the fluctuating liberalism of the moodlinterest 
theory must be understood as long-range perspectives. A consideration of the 
difference between long-term mood and short-term opinion should facilitate this 
understanding. The moodlinterest theory necessarily concedes that short-term 
fluctuations may occur within a long-term mood phase, and that individual 
indicators may deviate from the composite mood. Klingberg notes that "any 
study of the American mood for a short period of time will probably find the 
temporary fluctuations of opinion more impressive than its stability or consis- 
t e n ~ y . " ~ ~  Thus, while "public opinion" can be useful in understanding "public 
mood,"38 the moodlinterest theory emphasizes the underlying mood of the 
American public rather than momentary opinions. 
The underlying mood, in introvert phases, is typified by the concern to 
prevent development or expansion of American political and military concerns 
beyond its own borders. George Washington's statement gives an excellent 
indication of such an underlying mood of the American public during introvert 
phases: "So far as we have already formed engagements, let them be fulfilled 
with perfect good faith. Here let us stop."39 There is little politico-military 
assertiveness during introvert phases as compared to extrovert phases, which are 
characterized by a tone of expansion and extraterritorial political involvement. 
Each phase contains a period during which the extremes of introversion or 
extroversion are in conflict with the foreign policy interests of the nation. 
Introvert phases are characterized by a basic reluctance to do all that might be 
necessary to protect American interests in the world political arena; this reluc- 
tance grows in intensity during the phase. Conversely, an extrovert mood can 
grow to the point that the United States can do too much for her best interests;40 
each major American war since the Revolution has started during an extrovert 
phase. 
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Klingberg's mood analysis is worded carefully and does not place moods 
into a definite framework other than to establish introvert and extrovert phases 
with appropriate academic caveats. The moodlinterest theory asserts that 
Klingberg need not have been so modest, for his analysis did in its own careful 
way project a major change in American foreign policy not foreseen by scores of 
analysts who relied on more conventional tools. Most often, the conventional 
tools examine the world situation and conclude that American leadership can 
meet the challenge on a continuing basis and that the public can be sold on a 
course of action if the case is well presented. 
The contention of the moodtinterest theory is that the study of American 
foreign policy is best served by drawing Klingberg's moods into a more definite 
and, hence, less defensible form to see what it might mean to American foreign 
policy study. A number of American foreign policy analysts acknowledge a 
certain validity in the Klingberg analy~is.~'  However, analysts are usually 
optimistic on the question of whether Americans will outgrow the undesirable 
aspects of mood fluctuations: they commend the public for checking previous 
excesses of American policy and predict the public's ability to see the need for a 
still active, though more restrained, American role.42 This type of analysis often 
merely tends to explain Klingberg prior to proceeding to other courses of 
analysis. In fact, one analyst whose post-1870 dates of changes in foreign policy 
thought are similar to Klingberg's, nevertheless rejects the idea that precise 
numbers and dates can be used in studying foreign policy trends. He concludes 
that, "as social scientists, of course, we do not accept the notion that God plays 
numbers games with United States foreign policy. "43 
Klingberg gives various indications as to how moods operate. He says that 
there are several up-and-down fluctuations within a mood and notes that this is 
what might explain why analysts of short periods of time have difficulty 
understanding moods. Later, he states that a change from one phase to the next 
takes place over a several year period and that moods tend to grow over a period 
of time.* 
The material developed below builds on considerable evidence that those 
minor fluctuations that occur within a larger phase do, in fact, follow an overall 
pattern which increases in intensity. Thus, the growth and the several year 
change-over receive the greatest emphasis in this study. Indeed, a widespread 
shift takes a number of years if for no other reason than that old policies and 
attitudes cannot be changed at once. At times of change-over it is possible to 
have a new introvert mood as old extrovert policies are being modified. The 
steady growth of each individual mood phase is indicated by the tendency of 
extreme actions to be taken toward the end of a phase and not at the beginning. 
Paths to the Present, by Arthur Schlesinger, Sr., supports fluctuating 
moods in domestic politics. The book suggests that "the electorate embarks 
upon conservative policies till it is disappointed or vexed or bored and then 
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attaches itself to liberal policies till a like course is run." In comparison, the 
pre-1948 dates in Schlesinger's analysis do not correspond to Klingberg's 
pre-1948 dates. Schlesinger suggests that 1947-1963 will be conservative and 
that the next conservative "epoch" will be due "around 1978."45 Hindsight in 
the 1980s provides more support to Klingberg than to Schlesinger, but 
Schlesinger's portrayal of the public tendency to go to one mood extreme before 
abandoning it for another is a valuable illustration of mood fluctuation. 
Granted that human behavior during two hundred years cannot be repre- 
sented in mathematically precise terms, the moodlinterest theory suggests that 
an undulating curve (like a sine curve) may roughly represent the regular mood 
fluctuation of the Americn public as manifested in their liberalism. For 
simplicity of presentation and stimulation of thinking, the undulating curve 
illustrating the Liberal Moods Proposition has been pictured in figure 2 (page 
4). At the apexes of the curve are the dates at which extrovert phases become 
introvert, and at the nadirs of the curve are the opposite transitions. At this point, 
certain mathematical conceptions must be abandoned for the sake of clarity. 
While sine curves are normally products of charting points on a graph, this 
diagram is not meant in that way. For example, the turning point at 1798 is not 
mathematically the same as the turning point at 1891. The curve is only an 
attempt to indicate that a change in public mood and policy action occurred in 
the same direction at each of these points in time. The mood curve is manifested 
in liberalism, and liberalism appears necessary for its operation. That does not 
mean that it is caused by liberalism though this could be the case. The 
terminology "American liberal mood curve" will be used for purposes of a short 
descriptive reference. 
It must be stated that as an expression of overall mood or policy, this 
representation does not reflect the momentary changes which naturally occur in 
day-to-day, politico-military activity. Rather, it is an attempt to show a mood 
over time, a mood that is dominant in public thought and in United States 
diplomacy. The implicit argument is that because American public mood is so 
predictable and consistent in its shifting, it must be the predominant influence 
on policy; too many different variables and events impinge on policy for it to 
shift so predictably or regularly on its own. Hence, that regularity of shift is 
provided by public mood unless the regularity also coincides with another 
variable. 
The curve shows the dominant general mood in public thought and in 
United States diplomacy over time. The regular repetition of history implied by 
the curve is at variance with the American liberal belief in a constant pro- 
gression of history. The moodlinterest theory argues that this belief, charac- 
teristic of liberal writings and suggesting that America has outgrown its mood- 
iness, needs to be balanced by some argument that it has not. 
Indeed, the mood shift following the Vietnam war has produced a consid- 
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erable amount of writing which stresses that the American public has thrown off 
the simple internationalist/isolationist (or extrovert/introvert) dichotomy. As 
one study notes, "There is general agreement among analysts that the uni- 
dimensional, internationalist-isolationist continuum was a casualty of Viet- 
nam."46 The argument, generally, is that the Vietnam war was a formative 
experience whose lessons divided the public into several factions, thus eliminat- 
ing the possibility of any widespread public consensus comparable to that of the 
cold war era. After looking briefly at a few of the writings to this effect, a 
number of considerations will be raised to support the mood/interest contention 
that this is the kind of analysis that allows the cyclical pattern to continue; the 
public has not outgrown the introvert mood, it has merely outgrown the novelty 
of that mood. 
Ole Holsti and James Rosenau, in their article "Vietnam, Consensus, and 
the Belief Systems of American Leaders," write that the only consensus on 
foreign policy in the post-Vietnam era is that we should learn from the lessons of 
Vietnam; there is no such agreement as to what lessons should be learned.47 
Regarding foreign policy beliefs in a more general context than only those 
responses to the experience, Ole R. Holsti metaphorically describes 
America as the "Three-Headed Eagle." By this, he is refemng to the three 
"clusters of belief' in America in recent years: cold war internationalism, 
post-cold war internationalism, and isolationism. The basic difference between 
the two internationalist categories, according to Holsti, is that the cold war 
internationalists emphasize the East-West division and argue that most signifi- 
cant global problems are related to that division, while the post-cold war 
internationalists perceive the world as a complex, interdependent system where 
U.S. efforts to promote global stability are necessaq and where the Soviet threat 
is more dispersed than during the cold war era. The isolationists, as in most 
analyses, stress that the importance of U.S. activity is overemphasized, and that 
the problems needing action are mostly domestic.48 
Another article, by Michael Maggiotto and Eugene Wittkopf, divides the 
American public into four categories, each representing roughly the same 
percentage of the public: isolationists (20%), who oppose both militant interna- 
tionalism and cooperative internationalism; accommodationists (27%), who 
support cooperative but oppose militant internationalism; internationalists 
(30%), supporting both cooperative and militant internationalism; and hard- 
liners (23%) who support militant internationalism while opposing cooperative 
internationalism. By these figures, Maggiotto and Wittkopf argue that the 
American public is overwhelmingly internationalist (80% supporting some 
international activity), but that any consensus on the form of internationalism to 
be taken is lacking.49 
Michael Mandelbaum and William Schneider similarly argue that the 
American public is basically internationalist, but that a sharp distinction exists 
between what they term liberal (reform liberal) internationalism and conserva- 
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tive (business liberal) internationalism. The former, according to these authors, 
is more concerned with moralistic issues, while the latter is concerned with 
politico-military interests. Mandelbaum and Schneider also recognize the non- 
internationalists, but the argument is still towards predominant internationalism 
lacking consensus as to form and primary interests.50 
The mood/interest theory, on the contrary, argues that the conclusion of 
Vietnam marked the beginning of a new introvert phase much like previous 
introversion. First, an introvert mood need not be characterized by an "isola- 
tionist consensus." Other authors, such as Selig Adler and Manfred Jonas,51 
have noted the complexity of previous introvert phases. Jonas, for example, 
delineates five isolationist categories: foreign-oriented, belligerent, timid, radi- 
cal, and c o n s e ~ a t i v e . ~ ~  Thus, lack of consensus on specific aspects of introver- 
sion does not eliminate the possibility of an introvert mood. Indeed, in foreign 
policy matters a lack of consensus signals introversion since positive action in 
the Amercan political system usually requires consensus. 
Second, most recent studies do not take into account the fact that the United 
States can pursue a portion of its interests to some degree while still being 
basically intro~erted.~~ The attitude of maintaining only outright commitments 
can preserve the illusion of international activity while actually neglecting less 
obvious, yet important interests, as is characteristic of introvert phases. 
Similarly, -the so-called internationalism suggested by some does not 
always account for differences between politico-military, economic, and moral- 
istic interests. For example, Mandelbaum and Schneider do distinguish between 
moralistic and politico-military interests, but look at these as divisions within a 
basic internati~nalism.~~ On the other hand, the mood/interest theory contends 
that politico-military interests are of primary concern and historically are what 
have divided introverts from extroverts, while economic and humanitarian 
interests are secondary and characteristically are emphasized in both introvert 
and extrovert periods. Thus, introversion is not characterized necessarily by a 
lack of international activity; rather, it is characterized by a failure to adequately 
address politico-military interests abroad. 
Adding to the likelihood of this confusion is the fact that, unlike any 
previous introvert periods, fhe United States is now very much in the center of 
international political activity. Common-sense observation shows the degree to 
which our nation is involved, and this is also illustrated by George Modelski's 
theory of long cycles. According to his theory, the United States is currently 
occupying the position of dominant power in global politics, and the need for 
action in protection of our interests may be greater than recognized. Modelski 
sees America's current position as a provider of hope for conciliatory measures, 
such as arms control for the prevention of global (nuclear) war; other dominant 
powers in the past have enjoyed relative peace when they have been at a similar 
point in the period of d o m i n a n ~ e . ~ ~  
Much power used in American diplomacy implies the threat of force; such a 
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threat is important for a leader and a dominant power. It is not always publicly 
supported, but without it politico-military interests risk neglect. On this point, 
James L. Payne writes: "If we are to avoid such tragedy [of unnecessary and 
catastrophic war], we must grasp the relationships between American action- 
or inaction-in the present and the indirect and future consequences of that 
action. The focus for understanding these relationships is our nation's most 
powerful foreign policy instrument: the American threat of war."56 In this 
regard, President Reagan's 1983 actions regarding Grenada could be particularly 
important insofar as they demonstrate an assertiveness which in a period of 
introversion is likely to be noticed by others. 
Finally, a possible reason for underestimating the need for American action 
to protect its politico-military interests is the feeling that attempts at promoting 
these interests are generally unsuccessful. However, Samuel Huntington, in 
American Politics: the Promise of Disharmony, points out the little noticed 
value of U.S. actions abroad. He contends that right-wing "fascist" dic- 
tatorships, which have received U.S. support, are historically more stable, less 
repressive, and more susceptible to U.S. and Western influence than left-wing 
dictatorships; the U.S. almost single- handedly established the largest expan- 
sion of democracy in history by the inauguration of democratic regimes after 
World War 11; U.S. influence in Greece and Italy helped stem communist 
expansion during the cold war era; and American involvement in Latin America 
has corresponded with the advancement of democracy in the area.57 Conversely, 
it is easy to see how a lack of American activity abroad can lead to the decline of 
American interests. 
So, recent literature stressing that the United States has changed since the 
Vietnam war, in that the past isolationist-internationalist dichotomy is now 
obsolete, seems to help perpetuate the liberal ideology by assuring experts that 
we have changed from the past when we have not. The mood/interest theory, on 
the other hand, stresses that current American foreign policy actions in relation 
to American politico-military interests indicate the current existence of an 
introvert phase. 
INDIVIDUAL MOOD PHASES 
The moodlinterest theory incorporates many of the indicators Klingberg uti- 
lized to detail shifts in American foreign policy moods. Presidential messages, 
inaugural addresses, and major political party platforms since 1844 are helpful 
indictators suggested by Klingberg's He also used statistics on naval 
expenditures, which were subsequently gathered for the moodlinterest theory, 
along with key congressional votes to study shifts in support of naval expen- 
ditures during periods of introversion and extro~ersion.~~ Analysis of these data, 
in conjunction with the works by Louis Hartz and Samuel Huntington, aids the 
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tracing of liberal tendencies on foreign policy through the early years of 
American history.60 
A study of major territorial expansion since the Revolutionary War, which 
was also suggested by Klingberg's a~ticle,~'  showed that such expansion oc- 
curred exclusively during extrovert periods. After the United States could no 
longer feasibly expand its territorial borders, mutual defense treaties (consid- 
ered a form of extroversion) operated as a surrogate for territorial expansion. A 
total of eight mutual defense treaties were signed by the United States after 1945 
covering about 16 million square miles, close to 30 percent of the world's land 
mass. 
Information was gathered on instances of the use of U.S. armed forces 
abroad from 1798 to 1970, as well as major United States armed actions overseas 
with relevant congressional action from 1789 to 1970.62 United States armed 
forces overseas were used more often and more violently during periods of 
extroversion than during periods of introversion. This, too, supports the asser- 
tions of the mood/interest theory. The above sources, and others, contributed to 
the following general historical account of each American foreign policy mood 
phase.63 
The First Introvert Phase: 1776-1798 
The initial goal of the Revolutionary War was the establishment of more 
congenial ties with America's ruler, Great Britain. Territorial ambitions were 
also apparent in the invasion of Canada during the first year of the war,64 but by 
late 1776 the primary motivation of the American patriots was an introvert desire 
for independence from foreign rule. Therefore, the continuing Revolution sig- 
nified the beginning of the first introvert phase. 
During this phase, the Federalists, who combined business liberalism and 
conservatism in their ideology, were an important force in America. Although 
they were generally in favor of a strong central government, the more agrarian, 
states' rights reform liberals prevailed after the Revolution with the adoption of 
the weak Articles of Confederation. After their failure, a stronger constitution 
was adopted to replace them. Business liberals were interested in foreign trade, 
while reform liberals were concerned with the development of the frontier. 
Although conservatives had influence through such men as Alexander 
Hamilton, and to a lesser extent George Washington, liberals were continually 
asserting themselves as the introvert mood grew in intensity. Armed forces were 
maintained at weak levels. The Militia Act of 1792 reserved all authority over the 
state militias to the states during times of peace. Conservative Hamiltonian 
plans for a professionalized military were frustrated, and a peacetime navy was 
not created until 1794. 
In 1793, toward the end of this first introvert phase, President Washington 
issued his famous Neutrality Proclamation with regard to the conflict between 
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England and France. The position of a neutral nation desiring trade with both 
sides was difficult to maintain. Reform liberal opposition to his conservative/ 
business liberal foreign policy position increased with resentment of the be- 
havior of major European powers, particularly Great Britain, toward the United 
States. Some long-standing commercial, shipping, and territorial differences 
with the British were settled by the 1794 Jay Treaty, but many points were 
questioned by the American public and the compromise barely passed the 
Senate 20-10 in 1795. In 1796 President Washington gave his Farewell Address, 
calling for the United States to have as little political connection as possible in 
extending its commercial relations. Washington's address was reflective of the 
cautious, low-key foreign policy positions of the time, which aimed at insuring 
national survival. From 1795 to 1797 the United States pragmatically agreed to 
tribute treaties with three of the Barbary states. However, New England business 
liberals became disturbed at the increasing violation of their commercial 
interests by foreign powers. In 1798 came a gradual American liberal mood 
change from introversion to extro~ersion.~~ 
The First Extrovert Phase: 1798-1824 
The French response to the Jay Treaty was a firmer policy against neutral 
American shipping. Americans were unhappy, and there was soon enough 
liberal support to fight a limited, undeclared naval war with France from 1798 to 
1800. An extrovert phase had begun, necessarily modified by the need for 
American diplomatic reality and the competitive presence of the Federalist 
conservative elements. However, with the election of reform liberal Thomas 
Jefferson and the peaceful transfer of power that ensued, conservative fears of 
mass rule, which had provided much of their cohesion, were reduced, and the 
Federalist conservative elements began to fade from the American scene. 
As American resentment against payment of tribute to the Barbary pirates 
increased, President Jefferson initiated armed action. He also established the 
United States Military Academy at 'Vest Point in 1802, but altered it from a 
military institution of the type supported by Hamilton to a scientific-technical 
in~t i tu t ion .~~ Reform liberals concentrated much of their efforts on territorial 
expansion during this mood phase, and in 1803 Jefferson negotiated the pur- 
chase of the Louisiana Territory. During the early years of this_ phase much 
business liberal effort went into supporting naval expansion; reform liberals also 
gave the navy limited support, but the product of this support was, for the most 
part, relatively ineffective  gunboat^.^' 
The indecisive War of 1812 was fought against Great Britain from 1812 to 
1814. Evidently, less liberal support for such a war existed earlier in the phase 
since considerable British provocation (for example, the 1807 Chesapeake- 
Leonard Affair) was answered short of war. Apparently, the liberal extrovert 
mood had not gained sufficient intensity to support a war effort until 1812. Still, 
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there was considerable business liberal opposition to the War of 1812, although 
it was not hard-core antimilitary because many of these opposition business 
liberals had supported naval expansion. Conversely, many war supporters were 
reform liberals who had opposed naval expansion. This merely illustrates that 
the business liberallreform liberal convergence on extroversion was not yet 
complete. Although the war did not result in territorial gain, its outcome did 
increase international respect for the American position in North America and 
to a lesser extent on the high seas. Significantly, Federalist opposition to the War 
of 1812 contributed to the downfall of their party later in the phase. 
Following the War of 1812, there was sufficient congressional support to 
permit the establishment in 1815 of a Board of Naval Commissioners which 
increased the power of the professional navy68 Some conservative leaders of the 
South also showed signs of significant vitality during this time. One represen- 
tative of the group, John C. Calhoun, served as President Monroe's secretary of 
war from 1817 to 1825. Although he demonstrated innovation and initiative, the 
ever-dominant liberals frustrated most of his proposed educational changes for 
the military. Calhoun, however, did manage to establish an artillery school at 
Fort Monroe and improve military admini~tration.~~ 
Reform liberal support for territorial expansion continued with the acquisi- 
tion of Florida in 1819. However, with the proclamation of the Monroe Doctrine 
in 1823, the United States clearly stepped beyond its capabilities70 If the 
Monroe Doctrine seemed to be effective, it was due to the complementary 
interest of Great Britain and the protective insulation that its strong navy 
afforded the United States. Europeans were at peace and posed a decreasing 
threat to America, while in the United States there were important internal 
problems to address. Business liberals lost interest in this unilateral proclama- 
tion while continuing to pay attention to their relations with foreign trading 
partners. Reform liberals, influenced by the peaceful international scene and the 
complicated responsibilities implied in Monroe's proclamation, also became 
less interested in an extroverted politico-military foreign policy. This overbear- 
ing position yielded to a combined liberal mood of introversion beginning 
around 1824. 
The Second Introvert Phase: 18244844 
A general contentment with American survival characterized American 
foreign policy during the 1824-1844 introvert phase. As in other introvert 
phases, the United States did not retrench as much as it solidified advances 
made during the previous extrovert phase. This phase started under business 
liberal President John Quincy Adams, but the reform liberals soon found their 
own spokesman in President Andrew Jackson, who, contrary to what could be 
expected from his aggressive actions in Florida, carried the country even further 
into introversion. Typifying the liberal aversion to the military, Jackson more 
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than countered what few measures Calhoun had been able to implement toward 
professionalization of the military. Jackson thoroughly democratized the army, 
tried to assimilate it into the civilian sector, closed Calhoun's artillery school at 
Fort Monroe in 1835, and even opposed Jefferson's West Point.71 Naval con- 
struction during this period did not keep pace with modem developments, 
although the situation improved near the end of the phase. Americans were busy 
settling territory acquired during the previous extrovert phase. 
In 1836 Texas achieved independence after a bitter struggle with Mexico. 
The undeclared neutrality of the United States was pro-Texan in practice. Still, 
the liberal mood of the United States was introvert and, despite the desires of 
many Texans, annexation was not forthcoming. United States-British tensions 
grew when Britain indicated some willingness to protect Texan independence, 
while United States-Mexican relations worsened with Mexico threatening war 
should the United States decide to annex the fledgling nation. United States- 
British tensions were further increased over activities by individual Americans 
during various insurrections in Canada; yet the United States endeavored to 
enforce official neutrality. The United States and Britain also experienced 
boundary conflicts, particularly in Maine and Oregon. In 1842 an agreement 
was reached over the boundary of Maine. Many Americans were both embar- 
rassed and enraged by the terms of the compromise settlement, but it did pass 
the Senate. The feeling that perhaps the United States had not been active 
enough during this introvert mood grew. The business liberal outlook was again 
manifest in the area of naval expansion while reform liberals were oriented 
toward territorial expansion. As the introvert mood weakened, support for both 
types of expansion grew. 
Despite the disappearance of the major vestiges of New England con- 
servatism, conservatives in the South continued to rationalize and romanticize 
their lifestyle. This produced enough internal cohesion to maintain themselves 
as a viable force within the predominantly liberal society and to secure' the 
continued existence of the institution of slavery. At some points during this 
introvert phase and the extrovert phase which followed, this competing ideology 
served to modify the liberal tendencies of the larger society, but did not prevent 
the intensity of foreign policy moods from increasing according to normal 
patterns. 
The Second Extrovert Phase: 1844-1871 
The second extrovert phase featured a favorable settlement in 1846 of the 
Oregon boundary dispute with Great Britain, in contrast to the less favorable 
Maine settlement four years earlier. Under the leadership of reform liberal 
President James Polk, the United States entered into war with Mexico beginning 
in early 1846 after Polk sent American troops into disputed territory. As with the 
War of 1812, much of the opposition to the Mexican War came from the business 
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liberal community. This opposition intensified when the ambiguous circum- 
stances under which the war had commenced became obvious. However, the 
favorable war settlement featured a substantial transfer of territory to the United 
States. 
After the war, as the extrovert phase grew in intensity, reform liberal 
opposition to naval expansion softened, as did business liberal opposition to 
territorial expansion. Americans spoke of their "Manifest Destiny." There was 
serious talk about the acquisition of Cuba, and a treaty was signed with Britain 
concerning a possible Central American canal. Commodore Peny visited Japan 
and some naval improvements were achieved. However, naval development and 
territorial expansion in this phase were complicated by the growing domestic 
sectional tension over slavery. The extrovert characteristic of territorial acquisi- 
tion, involving the increasingly bitter argument as to whether new land would be 
slave or free, led in part to the Civil War. 
At the war's end, southerners had been divested of their human property and 
southern conservatism was eliminated as a strong, ideological force in America. 
The United States no longer had major ideologies other than liberalism to 
consistently compete for public support, and thus fewer forces to modify 
extreme liberal tendencies. 
After the Civil War, the United States became assertive about French 
actions in Mexico. A large, sparsely inhabited region called Alaska was pur- 
chased from Russia in 1867. Americans pressed for financial settlement of 
claims against Great Britain for British subjects who built and sold to the 
American Confederacy ships which subsequently inflicted costly damage on 
the Union. Business liberals were upset over these financial losses; reform 
liberals were upset as a matter of principle. As the negotiations were protracted, 
frustration and intolerance grew. By 1869 American demands reached unre- 
alistic proporions. The chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee 
implied that the British debts could be cancelled by the cession of Canada to the 
United States. The United States, however, was in no mood for a conflict with 
Great Britain. Moves to annex the Dominican Republic and Virgin Islands met 
with a decided lack of enthusiasm. The American public, now composed of an 
even greater proportion of liberals, tired of war, and realizing the height of the 
American extrovert position, settled with Britain and began a mood swing 
toward introversion. 
The Third Introvert Phase: 1871-1891 
The reasonable Treaty of Washington with Great Britain in 1871 heralded 
the beginning of the third introvert phase. Business liberals continued their 
support of the war hero and Republican unification figure, Ulysses S. Grant, in 
the presidency. However, another scaling down of American foreign policy 
objectives took place when Grant's unrealistic efforts to annex the Dominican 
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Republic were frustrated by the Congress. Typical of American liberalism, the 
military establishment had been drastically cut back after the Civil War. Army 
expenditures were cut from over $1 billion in 1865 to just under $36 million in 
1871.72 Business liberals viewed large defense expenditures as a drain on 
economic growth. In fact, this entire introvert phase was characterized by 
tremendous internal industrial growth as emphasized and stimulated by busi- 
ness liberals. Reform liberals directed their attention toward the settling of the 
West and improving the living conditions of workers victimized by American 
industrialization. 
The Spanish seizure in 1873 of a gun-running ship illegally registered in the 
United States and the execution of the partially American crew provoked no 
decisive call to arms. Efforts by a French company to build a canal in Panama 
produced only mild American reactions, especially in comparison to American 
actions in the same area during the following extrovert phase. Without the 
challenge of southern conservatism, business and reform liberals emphasized 
particularly their domestic distinctions; the resulting domestic controversies 
allowed the generalized liberal introvert foreign policy mood to drift further, 
increasing the intensity of the mood. The United States Senate took an assertive 
role in curbing extrovert foreign policy manifestations and "ratified no impor- 
tant treaty between 1871 and 1898."73 
Throughout the 1871-1891 introvert phase, the United States maintained a 
low profile as European powers became more assertive throughout the world. 
The navy was weak throughout most of this phase; in fact, in 1881 "it was 
suddenly realized with alarm that several South American republics had been 
acquiring warships, any one of which single-handedly could probably destroy 
the entire United States Navy."74 The United States therefore took some 
measures to improve its navy in the latter part of the phase and established the 
Naval War College in 1884. Despite this effort and a relatively consistent 
disinterest in world affairs, European imperial assertiveness indicated that 
neglect of American interests was more pronounced toward the end of the phase 
than toward the beginning. This European assertiveness, combined with Amer- 
ica's relative weakness, moved liberals to support a more active international 
role for the United States. As was the case in previous shifts from introversion to 
extroversion, business liberals were interested in naval expansion. Reform 
liberal interest was directed toward perceived injustices on the international 
scene. A phase of combined liberal extroversion began around 1891. 
The Third Extrovert Phase: 1891-1919 
The third extrovert phase can be characterized as an abortive effort at 
launching the United States as a major world power. The reform liberal President 
Grover Cleveland, an introvert during his 1885-1889 term in office, took a strong 
stand against the United Kingdom in the 1895 Venezuelan boundary crisis. The 
Spahish-American War, which began in 1898 over reform liberal concern for 
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oppressed Cubans, resulted in the acquisition of Puerto Rico and the Philippines 
and an increasingly active role in world affairs. Business liberals had been 
skeptical of the 1898 war effort until the possible benefits of imperialism and the 
new economic opportunities resulting from the war were p e r ~ e i v e d . ~ ~  Hawaii 
was soon annexed and the "Open Door" to China proclaimed. 
It was during this phase that a group advocating some nonliberal policies 
emerged in American history. The neo-Hamiltonians combined aspects of 
earlier American conservatism with aspects of liberalism. Like the conserva- 
tives, they could pursue national interest by means of power politics and, like 
the liberals, they could be assertive adventurers who rationalized policy in 
liberal terms.76 Theodore Roosevelt provided a good deal of political leadership. 
Army and navy modernization throughout this phase was inspired by the 
writings of such neo-Hamiltonians as Admiral Alfred Thayer Mahan and 
General Leonard Wood. President Theodore Roosevelt sent the Great White 
Fleet around the world and the United States power abroad increased. The 
United States participated in the Hague Court and entered into a large number of 
arbitration treaties. The assertive Roosevelt Corollary to the Monroe Doctrine 
dates from this period, which also saw the completion of an American canal 
across Panama, a new nation which had gained its independence from Colombia 
with American assistance. Since territorial expansion was now limited, Amer- 
ican extrovert emphasis had shifted to the expansion of politico-military influ- 
ence. 
Although American liberals followed the neo-Hamiltonians' foreign policy 
position, they did so mostly by default since no liberal alternative was made 
available. President Taft's "Dollar Diplomacy" was an effort to popularize 
extroversion for business liberals. In Woodrow Wilson, liberals finally found an 
alternative to the power politics of the neo-Hamiltonians. Wilson's moralistic 
efforts to affect the course of Latin American and later, European affairs, capped 
this extrovert period and carried America to the extreme of liberal extroversion. 
His over-involvement in the affairs of Latin American and Europe, tied to his 
strong vision of a new world order, was unrealistic for his time. Wilson's 
moralistic emphasis in foreign policy, however, hurt the neo-Hamiltonians and 
destroyed the potential for this quasiconservative force to obtain an enduring 
place on the American scene. With the displacement of the neo-Hamiltonians, 
liberals gained strength in the Republican party and, feeling the strains of 
Wilson's comprehensive world commitment, began to move to another mood of 
introversion. 77 
The Fourth Introvert Phase: 19194940 
The fourth introvert phase began with the liberal defection from Wilson 
after World War I. The Treaty of Versailles, which included provisions for the 
League of Nations, was rejected by the Senate and a separate treaty of peace was 
later negotiated with Germany. The leadership of the reaction against Wilson 
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had diverse motivation. Some leaders, such as Henry Cabot Lodge, initially 
were interested in discrediting Wilson for partisan political purposes. Reform 
liberals, tired of extroversion, joined the ranks of those opposing Wilson's 
internat ional i~m.~~ Some powerful ethnic groups also contributed to the 
launching of this phase. 
As the 1920s progressed, the introvert movement intensified and gained 
support from business and reform liberals. America, however, was not ready to 
pursue extreme introversion this early in the phase. The administrations of 
Harding, Coolidge, and Hoover inched toward introversion while straddling the 
fence between introversion and extro~ersion.~~ The United States was active in 
East Asian affairs, participated in disarmament conferences, helped initiate the 
Kellogg-Briand Pact outlawing offensive war, and cooperated with the League 
of Nations; however, growing introversion prompted the United States refusal to 
join the league because of the commitments it might entail and also prompted its 
failure to adhere to the World Court because of intense congressional opposi- 
tion. 
Not until after Franklin Roosevelt took office in 1933 did America become 
entrenched in introversion. The four Neutrality Acts of 1935-1939 were an 
extreme manifestation of American introversion dictated by public mood and 
were an unrealistic answer to the dictates of world events. The circumstances 
leading to Ameirican involvement in the Second World War demonstrate the 
costs of such a policy. Reform and then business liberals joined in support of 
another extrovert orientation, belatedly realizing the necessity of an active 
United States participation in world affairs to insure its security. 
The Fourth Extrovert Phase: 1961968 
In the early years of the fourth liberal extrovert phase, Americans were 
absorbed in World War 11. After the war's conclusion, reform liberals were 
particularly vocal on the need for continued American extroversion. The United 
States spearheaded the effort to establish the United Nations. Business liberals, 
increasingly supportive of extroversion, still were reluctant followers of the 
reform liberals in foreign policy; and since the reform liberals were not fully 
prepared to assume extrovert responsibilities, conservatives were again in some 
positions of responsibility. The naturally conservative military was given a 
significant role in the governing of occupied territories, and a number of 
military men were appointed to civilian foreign affairs and defense posts after 
the war.80 Conservative realist George Kennan formulated the doctrine of 
containment in 1947. American liberals soon became concerned about the 
"communist menace" and set out on an anticommunist crusade. Economic aid 
was used to bolster friendly nations in Europe and other parts of the world. The 
United States took the initiative to form broad alliances like the OAS, NATO, 
and later SEATO. Under President Harry Truman, the United States became 
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involved in a frustrating limited war in Korea, which was eventually ended by 
President Dwight Eisenhower. Eisenhower, however, also followed the extrovert 
mood and sent United States forces to Lebanon. America developed an im- 
pressive nuclear arsenal under business liberal Eisenhower and joined the space 
race. Reform liberal President John Kennedy emphasized a diversified conven- 
tional defense strategy and began the Peace Corps. 
Kennedy took office near the height of the cold war against communism. 
The administration had a mixture of liberal and conservative beliefs, as did the 
turn-of-the-century neo-Hamilt~nians.~~ As often is characteristic of times with 
some conservative influence, the military was modernized through improved 
management techniques which met with mixed public reaction. America be- 
came involved in another limited conflict in Vietnam, which continued under 
reform liberal Lyndon Johnson. At its zenith Vietnam was to have 543,500 
United States troops committed to the conflict,82 at an annual cost of $28.8 
billion. 83 
Vietnam, by the apex mood year of 1968, was seen as an area in which the 
United States was overcommitted and overextended. Business liberals became 
wary of this extrovert foreign policy because of the costs of such an extensive 
network of commitments. Reform liberals shared these frustrations and found a 
need to first deal with domestic problems, such as equality for minorities, as 
well as to change the thrust of their world reform efforts from direct involvement 
to example-setting. As was the case in 1919, a particularly important role in the 
1968 mood shift was played by a group of reform liberals who formerly 
supported an extrovert, Democratic president's policies. The stage was set for a 
joint liberal swing back to another period of introversion. 
The Fifth Introvert Phase: 1968- 
Evidence indicates that the current introvert phase was firmly established 
and grew in intensity during the 1970s. An early portent of the mood shift to 
introversion occurred with the decidedly introvert reaction to the July 1967 crisis 
in the Congo.84 The Vietnam Tet Offensive in early 1968 was the prelude to a 
political year characterized by a marked lack of support for President Johnson 
and his extrovert Vietnam policies.85 The business liberal Richard M. Nixon 
was elected, at least partially and significantly, on his pledge to end the war in 
Vietnam. 
The current introvert phase has seen policy responses such as the con- 
clusion of the American role in Vietnam, a decline in military spending as a 
percentage of gross national product, and termination of the draft. In 1973 the 
Congress passed the War Powers Act restricting the ability of the president to 
engage in prolonged extroverted politico-military activities without congres- 
sional involvement. 
The year 1976, finding the United States fully in its fifth introvert phase, saw 
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President Ford and his secretary of state unable to obtain a commitment for even 
indirect support for one faction in the African nation of Angola in the face of 
large-scale Soviet and Cuban intervention on behalf of an opposing faction. The 
introvert mood of the American public was expressed in its election of an 
inoffensive introvert leader, Jimmy Carter. President Carter expressed this 
introvert rationale in his inaugural address: 
Our Nation can be strong abroad only if it is strong at home, and we know that the best 
way to enhance freedom in other lands is to demonstrate here that our democratic sysem 
is worthy of emulation. . . . We will not behave in foreign places so as to violate our rules 
and standards here at home, for we know that the trust which our Nation earns is essential 
to our strength.86 
In 1977 and 1978, despite the strong examples of France, Belgium, and 
Morocco, the United States minimized involvement in struggles in the African 
nation of Zaire. A 1978 study notes that President Carter operated under more 
than seventy congressional foreign policy constraints and advocated repealing 
only three of them.87 
At the same time that the United States was minimizing its politico- 
military role in the world, the Soviet Union was building its strength. To be sure, 
a reduction of the United States role in parts of Asia was feasible because the 
Sino-Soviet split created a more multilateral power balance. However, the 
U. S. S .R. did not share the American desire for a reduced politico-military role, 
and the world moved toward a dangerous power i m b a l a n ~ e . ~ ~  Toward the end of 
the 1970s, the American public mood became more self-interested than earlier 
in the decade. However, there was no return to the "missionary zeal" of the 
1960s. 89 
The 1970s saw a steady growth in the importance of the Middle EastPersian 
Gulf area to the United States. A number of United States foreign policy 
adjustments were required to achieve even an Israel-Egypt settlement not 
supported by most Arab states. By the end of the decade, the importance of the 
Middle EastPersian Gulf had increased because of the continued political 
necessity of insuring Israel's survival and the economic necessity of importing 
Middle Eastern oil. The Shah of Iran's 1979 replacement by a theocratic regime 
added to regional instability. 
It is possible that such instability, combined with indecisive United States 
policies, made the difference in the Soviet decision to invade Afghanistan 
during the winter of 1979-1980. Such Soviet behavior alarmed the United 
States, which started to increase its military spending, expanded cooperation 
with the People's Republic of China, and sought nonmilitary means of commu- 
nicating dissatisfaction to the Soviets. Whether these events are but a phase in 
the development of an introvert mood, as indicated by history, or indications that 
there might be an earlier than expected return to extroversion can only be 
determined with time. 
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The extrovert-sounding rhetoric of President Ronald Reagan also gives an 
appearance of a return to extroversion, but it should be noted that Reagan's 
actions to date have failed to match his rhetoric. Perhaps a Congress with 
introvert ideas and realization of American weakness helped restrain Reagan's 
hand, but policies toward situations in Poland, El Salvador, and even Lebanon 
evidence a U.S. policy of restrained action. Even the strongest Reagan actions, 
such as those in Central America and the Caribbean, have come in a geographic 
region of long-standing American strength. Cuba is allowed to do in Africa 
what it is not allowed to do in Grenada. If anything, the Reagan adminstration 
seems comparable with that of former President Franklin D. Roosevelt, where 
foreign policy problems were realized but viable options for dealing with them 
were very much limited. Also, both FDR and Reagan faced significant domestic 
problems demanding action, so their attention was diverted from foreign mat- 
ters. Again, historical perspective will clarify the situation.90 
2. Alternate Methodologies 
and Foreign Policy Concepts 
If the mood/interest theory is a valid interpretation of American foreign policy, it 
is reasonable to expect that other analyses relating to public moods and foreign 
policy activity could be related to it. The first part of this chapter, then, will deal 
with several long-range studies and how they relate to the moodlinterest theory. 
Later in the chapter, other prominent descriptions of American foreign policy 
and their relation to liberal moods will be discussed. 
U.S. FOREIGN POLICY MOODS APPLIED 
TO PRESIDENTIAL PERSONALITY 
by Robert E. Elder, Jr., and Jack E. Holmes* 
In order to reinforce the linkage between foreign policy moods and actual 
foreign policy behavior, this section will examine several long-range studies and 
their relation to the mood/interest theory: a Library of Congress survey of 
military actions abroad from 1798 to 1970, David McClelland's work on the 
human motivations of affiliation and power as they relate to war, David Winter's 
studies of the power and affiliation motivations of American presidents as 
expressed in presidential inaugural addresses, James David Barber's categoriza- 
tion of American presidents, and Arthur Schlesinger, Sr.'s 1948 and 1962 and 
Robert Murray and Tim Blessing's 1983 compilations of presidential rankings.' 
These comparisons show that discernible patterns of behavior in American 
foreign policy do exist. Such patterns may occur because of changes in motive 
level on the part of large segments of our population. Evidence of these motive 
shifts may be discerned through changes in the motive imagery expressed in 
popular literature and in presidential inaugural addresses. Regular changes in 
public mood influence the types of presidents elected to office, the prestige 
granted to presidents in the years following their departure from office, and the 
degree to which a president's experiences in office are likely to be positive or 
*Adapted from papers prepared for the 1982 and 1983 meetings of the International Studies 
Association. 
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negative. Foreign policy mood cycles also appear to operate in conjunction with 
a public policy cycle that alternates scandal and political reform with social and 
economic reform and war. 
Congressional Study of Uses of Force Abroad 
The mood/interest theory holds that public mood greatly influences shifts 
in American foreign policy from periods of introversion to extroversion and 
back. This proposition fits neatly with documented events in American political 
history. As table 1 suggests, virtually all of our major wars and land annexations 
have taken place during extrovert periods. (Tables begin on page 169.) 
A closer survey of uses of force abroad from 1798 to 1967, done by the 
Library of congress for the House Committee on Foreign Affairs, suggests that 
extrovert periods also far surpass introvert periods in regard to instances of force 
used abroad (see table 2). 
The mood/interest theory suggests that aggressive or expansive activity 
fluctuates in accordance with immediate past events as a liberal public interacts 
with a power-oriented international environment. An introvert phase starts as a 
reaction to excessive extroversion, and uses of force should gradually decline as 
the introvert phase continues. Toward the end of the introvert phase, however, the 
international environment should begin to stimulate an increase in activity that 
becomes dramatic as the phase changes from introvert to extrovert. Extrovert 
phases should feature a gradual increase in activity abroad that begins to slow 
somewhat as the international environment starts to force a decline of American 
activity into introversion. There also should be some tendency toward a mid- 
phase balance, sometimes seen as a decline in activity in middle stages of 
introvert and extrovert phases, since American activity is most in accord with the 
immediate demands of the international system. 
An examination of uses of force abroad by stages of introvert and extrovert 
phases indicates that patterns projected above are most obvious when the stages 
of all introvert and extrovert phases are added.= Counts for uses of force abroad 
within the three stages of individual introvert and extrovert phases are believed 
to be subject to variables affecting only a single phase. Thus, the analysis 
centers on cumulative totals. Table 3 documents use of force in first, second, and 
third stages of extrovert and introvert phases for which the congressional study 
data are ~omplete .~ Twenty-one-year introvert portions of each cycle were 
divided into three seven-year stages, and extrovert phases, which average 
twenty-seven years, were divided into three nine-year stages. Short years were 
taken from the second stage, while extra years were placed in the third stage. 
This method was designed to minimize variations in the length of stages. 
Table 3 indicates that first thirds of introvert periods are likely to exhibit 
force that represents a continuation, albeit with gradual deescalation, of the 
excesses of the previous extrovert period. 
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The last thirds of introvert periods feature an increase in use of force, and 
thus reinforce the moodlinterest theory's claim that because interests have been 
ignored, foreign policy makers belatedly start to compensate for their previous 
unwillingness to protect national interests. The public has the least difficulty 
with the expression of its introvert mood during the second stage of introvert 
periods, as indicated by the greater use of force at either the beginning or end of 
these periods. Extrovert periods, on the other hand, exhibit less second-stage 
balance and feature a gradual rise in uses of force which tapers off during the last 
two-thirds of a phase. Table 4 gives a generalized picture of the stages in policy 
orientation toward uses of force across history. 
That the mdin teres t  theory identifies a pattern that persists across time is 
difficult to dispute. But why do such patterns occur? The theory suggests that in 
addition to mood acting in relation to immediate past events, swings in public 
mood trigger policy changes that may or may not lead to other events in the long 
term. Only when mood is at an extreme do events act to force a mood change. As 
has been stated, the mdin teres t  theory proposes that mood swings are best 
expressed by the changing nature of Lockean liberalism and its aversion to 
excessive concentrations of power. This, in combination with a lack of strategic 
restraints such as those experienced by most other world powers, has allowed 
mood to fluctuate pretty much as a liberal public would dictate. 
McClelland's Study of Low and High Power Motives 
To say that liberals are change-oriented does not address the question of 
what makes them predisposed to certain types of change; nor does it explain 
why such changes occur in historically discernible patterns. Events are one 
possible explanation for these shifts, but at times the patterns seem to occur with 
no discernible relationship to events. Another possible explanation dealing with 
forces affecting public mood has been suggested by the studies of psychologists 
such as David McClelland, who explained changes in terms of shifting balances 
of human motives. In this regard McClelland successfully isolated and mea- 
sured three distinct motives shaping human behaviors: the need for power, the 
need for achievement, and the need for affiliation. The desire for power involves 
the need to have status above, or control over, others; the desire for achievement 
involves the need to accomplish concrete measurable results; and the desire for 
affiliation normally deals with the need to have the affection or approval of 
significant  other^.^ 
McClelland later applied techniques used on economic development to 
American political history. He coded literature in mid-decade years and found a 
relationship between high powerllow affiliation scores and war.5 He suggested 
that these wars occurred in decades that began fifteen years after the high power1 
low affiliation years.6 Our studies suggest a more immediate relationship. The 
United States has had seven major foreign wars. The mid-decade year prior to 
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World War I was not scored. For the other foreign wars, high powerllow 
affiliation literature was found in the last mid-decade year scored prior to the 
war's start in five out of six instances. 
Table 5 compares the second stage periods in extrovert and introvert cycles 
with McClelland's high and low power years. It would be expected that second- 
stage periods would correspond to McClelland low power years, because during 
second stages American moods correspond best to short-term interests, indicat- 
ing a powerlaffiliation balance. 
The two studies coincide on six of eight chances for a relationship between 
second stage periods and a powerlaffiliation balance; one instance fits in part 
and another does not fit. The partial fit occurs because the 1835 low power year, 
while within the 1831-1836 second stage, is at the very end and thus does not 
allow for the lead time posited by our analysis. The suggestion that second 
stages are periods of strategic balance and show less tendency toward overreac- 
tion seems to be matched by McClelland's measurement of the relationship 
between the motives of power and affiliation during these periods. 
How good a measure is McClelland's motive theory as an explanatory 
variable for shifts between introvert and extrovert periods? It would be expected 
that high powerllow affiliation literature would occur in swing decades (the last 
five years of an old phase and the first five years of a new phase), because a 
stronger power motive is needed in order to reverse the excesses of the previous 
phase when U. S. interests were not properly maintained. 
High power years occur in swing decades in 6 of 7 chances when swings 
occurred and data were available (table 6). Although the samples are quite small, 
the coincidence between the mood swings and McClelland's shifts in motiva- 
tional balance tends in the direction of the moodlinterest analysis. 
Power Divergence Scores and Affiliation Ratios 
If a relationship is definable between high powerllow affiliation literature 
and wars and various other power-related forms of behavior, and if the balance 
between these various motives measurably shifts across time, what of the 
motives of our chief architect of foreign policy, the American president? David 
Winter measures the motives of American presidents through a content analysis 
of their fxst inaugural addresses. Winter argues that of all the speeches a 
president makes only his first inaugural allows for the free expression of dreams 
and aspirations. The president is on a honeymoon and has not yet become 
enmeshed in the rough world of presidential  politic^.^ In such a situation, 
Winter suggests, and we concur, the president's dominant motive is most likely 
to show through. 
In analyzing inaugural addresses, we first compiled each president's total 
motive score-the number of times he referred to the themes of power, affilia- 
tion, and achievement per thousand words. The number of times each type of 
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motive imagery was referred to was divided by a presidential total motive score 
to yield a percentage for each individual motive. The affiliation percentage was 
then subtracted from the power percentage to provide a power divergence score 
(PDS). * 
Our thought was that a high power divergence score would indicate power 
dominance of the sort against which McClelland warns. Low or negative power 
divergence would indicate a powerlaffiliation balance less likely to produce 
aggressive behavior. Comparisons were made between extrovert and introvert, 
as well as between second-stage and first- and third-stage presidents. We 
thought that if the McClelland and moodinterest theses were to be reinforced, 
the inaugural addresses of presidents occupying office during extrovert periods 
would exhibit a high PDS. Presidents in office during introvert periods would be 
more likely to register a low PDS. Presidents in both extrovert and introvert 
second-stage periods would have a closer balance between affiliation and power 
than presidents at the beginning or end of extrovert and introvert periods. finally, 
presidents in introvert second-stage periods would have the lowest PDSs of all. 
Table 7 provides achievement, power, affiliation, and power divergence 
scores for all elected presidents who served at least one year in office from Polk 
through Reagan, as well as presidential PDS averages for second-stage-only 
(SSO) presidents and non-SSO presidents in introvert and extrovert periods. 
Although the SSO and non-SSO differential for the third extrovert phase is 
an exception, the findings in table 7 essentially confirmed our prediction. Note 
that the average PDS for SSO presidents is less than a third that of non-SSO 
presidents and that the difference increases considerably when non-SSO presi- 
dents and SSO introvert presidents are compared. 
A further relationship between the moodinterest theory and power diver- 
gence scores is illustrated in figure 5. The lowest average PDSs for introvert and 
extrovert phases occurred in the second stages. This drop reflects the proximity 
of public mood to perceptions of national interest; yet as would be expected, the 
average score of the extrovert phases is higher than that of introvert phases. The 
figure demonstrates that PDSs often fluctuate with the mood curve. 
If one looks at the ratio of affiliation motive to total motive score for the 
presidents studied, nine presidents have had ratios of 1:4.9 or below (see table 
8). Three of the four peacetime presidents with a ratio of 1:4.9 or below 
(Cleveland [second term], Theodore Roosevelt, and Taft) served during the third 
extrovert phase (1891-1919). During this phase, all presidents except McKinley 
had 1:4.9 ratios or below. The robust and self-confident aura of 1891-1919 
perhaps accounts for the low ratios of the period. The president who is the 
exception, McKinley, found himself practically pushed into the Spanish-Amer- 
ican War by the "yellow journalism" of the period. (Zachary Taylor, a Mexican 
War hero elected in 1848 but constrained by regional difficulties, was the other 
peacetime president with a low ratio.) 
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Figure 5. Fluctuating Average Power Divergence Scores and the 
Mood/Interest Curve 
1st Stage 2nd Stage 3rd Stage 
Introvert 12.78 5.28 13.5 
Extrovert 28.95 14.92 31.92 
Sources: Figure 5 is derived from table 7 and the mood/interest curve. 
Indeed, with the exceptions of McKinley and Taylor, table 8 shows a 
tendency for wartime presidents to have lower ratios than the peacetime presi- 
dents in the same eras. In the second extrovert phase, two of the three lowest 
presidents were Polk and Lincoln. The third extrovert phase is the exception 
although World War I president Wilson was tied for the second lowest ratio. 
During the fourth extrovert phase, the highest ratio was Eisenhower, the presi- 
dent least associated with the start or escalation of a war. 
A clear-cut difference is visible in the ratio of motive imagery between 
extrovert and introvert periods with the exception of the fourth introvert period. 
This exception would not be the case if one excluded Franklin Roosevelt. From 
his scores, one would expect Roosevelt to be war-prone. He was moving toward 
military build-ups to meet a growing German-Japanese threat; more important, 
he was fighting an economic war for the survival of the nation-a war in which 
strong, decisive leadership was necessary. 
Ronald Reagan, elected in 1980, has a 1:4.65 ratio, the tenth lowest ratio. 
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Reagan has moved toward substantial increases in military expenditure as did 
Franklin Roosevelt in a similar period. Should this be cause for alarm? In a 
strictly statistical sense, one cannot tell since Franklin Roosevelt's ratio is much 
lower and Reagan's ratio is close to that of several peacetime presidents. 
However, Reagan's ratio is lower than those of other presidents in his period. 
Comparing Franklin Roosevelt to Ronald Reagan, one notes that each 
followed a lower power divergence president who had difficulty coping witk 
large issues (Hoover and Carter, respectively). Each also down-played his 
foreign policy concerns to gain support for domestic policy. It was eight years 
after Franklin Roosevelt's inaugural before direct American involvement in 
World War I1 started, but Roosevelt fought to increase defense expenditures and 
respond decisively to the growing German and Japanese threats during most of 
his first two terms in office. As Reagan emphasizes the need for a strong foreign 
and defense policy, he looks like a man who is on time in terms of cycle theory. 
McClelland Compared to Winter 
Having established a relationship between the data of the mood/interest 
theory and Winter, we measured the degree to which power divergence scores 
correlated with McClelland's years of high and low power. We hypothesized that 
a presidential inaugural in a decade following a high power year would be more 
likely to reflect the mood of the literature of the period or the president involved 
would be less likely to be elected. To establish some basis for comparison, we 
constructed a table of the presidential first inaugurals nearest to the dates 
content analyzed by McClelland in his study of American literature. The 
findings presented in table 9 partially confirm our hypothesis and the exceptions 
to the rule are limited in significance. 
In twelve chances, eight presidential inaugurals nearest in time to the 
twelve years content analyzed by McClelland had a power divergence rating 
corresponding to McClelland's rating for their period. Eight in twelve chances 
(67%) is a solid indication of a noncoincidental relationship. It is also interest- 
ing to note that in three of the four cases where motive in literature and 
presidential PDS did not coincide, a president's death had resulted in giving a 
vice president the incumbency power necessary to win the office. (Perhaps this 
was against the original inclinations of party and public?) The fourth case, 
McKinley, involved a president with a conciliatory inaugural following a 
divisive election. 
Behavior in Office and Inaugural Addresses 
Do presidential inaugurals also relate to actual behavior in regard to use of 
force? The ten presidents with the highest PDSs and the ten presidents with the 
lowest PDSs were selected and scored in terms of number of forceful actions per 
year in office. The findings are in table 10. 
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With one exception, the presidents with highest PDSs are extrovert presi- 
dents. The one exception is Coolidge, who has a marginally high PDS and is a 
successor president. There is also a strong indication that low-PDS presidents 
once in office are less predisposed to take forceful actions to protect American 
interests abroad. High-PDS presidents averaged 1.35 actions per year in office in 
comparison to the low-PDS president's average of .87 actions per year in office. 
Table 11 compares second-stage-only presidents for both extrovert and introvert 
periods from the second, third, and fourth mood cycles with first- and third- 
stage-only extrovert presidents from the same cycles in regard to their likelihood 
to use force. 
Although second-stage-only presidents have just over a quarter the power 
divergence scores of their first- and third-stage-only extrovert counterparts, 
there is no decisive indication that their slightly lower levels of force are the 
result of lower PDSs. However, six of the seven major American wars since 1845 
started under the ten first- and third-stage-only extrovert presidents, whereas 
none of the wars started under the six second-stage-only presidents. As sug- 
gested earlier, once momentum toward action builds in an extrovert period, it 
may be difficult to slow regardless of presidential motivations. 
Only when the second-stage-only introvert presidents were sampled was 
strong support found for our hypothesis that power divergence scores and 
forceful actions per year should relate to stages. Presidents classified only in the 
second stage of introvert periods had quite low PDSs and were less inclined to 
use force than were presidents at either end of an extrovert period. Thus, in these 
instances, motive scores and likelihood to take forceful action do relate. Note 
the PDSs of Hayes and Hoover, in comparison with their counterparts who were 
classified only in the first and third stages of extrovert periods. 
As is indicated in table 12, introvert second-stage-only presidents have less 
than one-tenth the PDSs and forceful actions per year as their extrovert first- and 
third-stage-only counterparts, suggesting a relationship between PDSs, use of 
force, and mood  stage^.^ 
Barber's Categories of Presidents 
The thesis of James David Barber's book, The Presidential Character: 
Predicting Pedormance in the White House, is that character is of prime 
consequence in presidential performance. This character is manifested in either 
high energy or passivity (active or passive), and enjoyment or lack of enjoyment 
of the job of being president (positive or negative). Although Barber suggests 
that situational context and ideology are also considerations, he believes that 
character is the prime determinant of behavior in the oval office.1° 
Our thought was that situation and ideology are of equal importance to 
early childhood experiences in forming a president's character. Public mood 
may dictate not only what presidential policy will be, but may even decide which 
candidate is elected. Table 13 lists presidents under Barber's categories, whether 
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they occupied the presidency during an extrovert or introvert period, and their 
party affiliation. 
Active-positive presidents, with the exception of Rutherford B. Hayes, 
tend to be found in extrovert periods. They also tend to be Democratic, a party 
affiliation associated with an activist rather than a passive caretaker concept of 
the presidency. Active-negatives appear to follow the same general pattern. 
Note that passives, both positive and negative, are mostly introvert (55%) and 
either Republican or Whig (91%). 
Taken alone these results seem to suggest that circumstances are influential 
in shaping character. However, in support of Barber, it is still possible to suggest 
that Americans during introvert periods favor presidents with passive pre- 
dispositons. If this is the case, democracy is working very well indeed and the 
public appears to be getting exactly what its mood dictates. 
Before proceeding further in our analysis, it was decided to classify each 
president by the stage or stages corresponding to his presidency. Table 14 lists 
presidents from Polk to Carter and how they are classified by stages of mood 
phases. 
Carrying our investigation one step further required the checking of 
"bridgepoint presidences," or presidencies that fall within a year of the transi- 
tion year between phases in the mood cycle. A mood-oriented viewpoint would 
argue for a greater amount of uncertainty and thus negativity during bridge- 
points between periods, because mood transition demands a style of behavior 
different Erom that of the preceding period. Table 15 lists all bridgepoint 
presidents and provides their Barber type. 
Examination of table 15 reveals that Franklin Roosevelt and James Polk are 
the only major exceptions to the suggestion that occupation of the presidency 
during one of the bridgepoint years is not a pleasant experience. James Monroe's 
first term was considerably easier than his second, which spanned a period of 
transition. If he is rated as a passive-positive, it is largely because of the "era of 
good feeling" with which his presidency began. 
Because these results fit well with our speculations, it was decided to 
determine the degree to which second-stage presidents differ from their first- 
and third-stage extrovert counterparts. The thought was that because second 
stages exhibit more balance between power and affiliation, presidential style 
would be more passive in these than in extrovert first and third stages. In 
addition, the authors speculated that because of Republicans' concept of limited 
governmental power, they would be more likely to be elected to office during 
second stages than would Democrats. Since foreign policy moods and interests 
are most in harmony during second stages, the authors hypothesized that 
second-stage presidents would be a bit more positive than their first- and third- 
stage introvert counterparts, as second stages have less of the tension that can 
produce negative behavior. 
Table 16 shows that second-stage presidents tend to be more passive (45% 
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vs. 23%) and Republican (64% vs. 38%) than first- and third-stage extrovert 
presidents. Second-stage presidents also tend to be slightly more positive (55%) 
than first- and third-stage introvert presidents (43%). Thus, table 16 essentially 
confirms the preceding speculations. 
Barber Compared to Winter 
Barber's findings correspond to mood cycle periods and stages, but do they 
also mesh with Winter's method of categorizing presidents? 
Robert Elder (1981) suggested that a relationship appeared to exist between 
Barber and Winter, and that integration of the two approaches could provide a 
basis for examining the underlying motivations of presidents as they were 
entering the office, as well as their actual behavior as presidents.ll Table 17 
provides summary averages of Winter ratings of presidents from Polk through 
Carter by Barber category and moodlinterest phases. The force indicator levels 
are calculated on the basis of numbers of uses of force abroad, major wars, and 
major war casualties per year each of the four Barber types occupied the 
presidency. 
Table 17 suggests a degree of complementarity between specific Winter 
motives and Barber behavioral categories. For example, active-positive presi- 
dents appear to be distinguishable from all other Barber types in having a closer 
balance between power divergence and achievement. Presidents who are pas- 
sive-negatives are least likely to serve in extrovert phases. Active presidents are 
much more likely to be involved in major wars, and are also most likely to 
occupy the presidency during periods when these wars involve heavy casualties. 
Active-negative (and to a lesser degree passive) presidents are distin- 
guished from active-positive presidents by an imbalance between their achieve- 
ment and power divergence scores. McClelland suggests that high achievers 
have a strong desire to see results but do not like taking high risks to realize their 
aims. l2 This description fits the active-negative. In a highly politicized broker- 
rule environment which necessitates compromise, tangible results are more 
difficult to realize. This achievementlnegativity hypothesis may be a possible 
explanation for Barber's and most historians' perceptions of active-negatives as 
having greater unhappiness and perceived ineffectiveness in the oval office. It is 
interesting to note that the last two sets of bridgepoint years between extrover- 
sion and introversion (1918-1920 and 1967-1969) have been occupied by three 
of the eight active-negative presidents. Seven of the eight occupied the presiden- 
cy during very trying times, as can be seen from certain events: Taylor- 
Compromise of 1850; Buchanan--Southern Secession; A. Johnson-Recon- 
struction; Hoover-Great Depression; Wilson-World War I; L. Johnson and 
Nixon-Vietnam. 
Passive presidents are distinguished from active presidents by a greater 
need for affiliation and low power divergence scores. Passives are involved in 
substantially fewer wars with fewer casualties than their active counterparts. 
48 Alternate Methodologies 
Passive-negatives most often are elected in introvert phases or second stages of 
extrovert phases. 
Possibly the least expected result in the chart is that active-positives and 
passive-negatives have the lowest average numbers of uses of force abroad per 
year in office. The highest number of uses of force per year is scored by passive- 
positives, followed by active-negatives. However, as noted above, when one 
calculates major U.S. wars and especially battle casualties in major wars, the 
results are closer to those expected: active-positives appear the most likely to get 
involved in major military conflict, and this would be especially true if the table 
were modified to include Civil War figures. Thus, intensity as well as number of 
uses of force is important when considering Barber types. Indeed, some of the 
previous results could have been more impressive had the researchers weighted 
the uses-of-force-abroad formula to take greater account of intensity. 
That Barber's presidential categories correspond closely to the data on 
moods and presidential motivation is clear. The question that needs to be 
answered, however, is whether a president's behavior is influenced more by 
circumstances he faces in office, his ideology, or his character. 
Certainly the relationship noted earlier between bridgepoint years and 
negativity, even when high power divergence, generally a signal of a positive 
character, is present (e.g. Wilson), indicates that events or time periods may 
occasionally overshadow character as a cause for negativity in the oval office. 
Second-stage extrovert and all introvert presidents have been found to have 
a greater tendency toward passivity and affiliation than their first- and third- 
stage extrovert counterparts. Does this mean that presidents act passively 
because the mood of the electorate gives them no other choice, or are they 
elected during these periods because their character predisposes them toward 
passive-affiliative behavior? A single conclusion is not readily apparent. 
One enticing possibility noted earlier is the achievemenunegativity hypoth- 
esis: high achievers may become frustrated in a broker-rule political environ- 
ment, and, if achievement is their dominant motive, they may end up as active- 
negatives. High achievement and negativity are present in presidents L. 
Johnson, Nixon, Buchanan, and Hoover. Striking a blow against the achieve- 
menunegativity hypothesis is the clear exception of McKinley, who was a high 
achiever with a very low PDS. Although he did not complete his second term in 
office, McKinley must be scored as passive-positive as of the time of his death. 
It also seems possible for an electorate to perceive and elect high or low energy 
presidents depending on popular mood at the time of an election. Considering 
all of this, it appears to us that situation and mood of the electorate is as likely to 
trigger negativity in the White House as character. 
Posterity Ranking and Public Mood 
To what degree does the time period that a president is in office influence 
his posterity ranking? At least five studies have ranked presidents in terms of 
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effectiveness in office.13 An accomplishment poll and bestlworst studies have 
also been done. The combined average rankings of three of these studies are 
listed in table 18. The studies considered in obtaining these presidential posteri- 
ty rankings included surveys of historians by Arthur Schlesinger, Sr., in 1948 
and 1962 and by Robert K. Murray and Tim H. Blessing in 1983.14 
Table 19 gives a summary average for presidents by rank, Barber type, 
Winter power divergence rating, party affiliation, and foreign policy mood. Our 
prediction was that in general the higher a PDS and the more forceful actions a 
president has taken, the higher the president's rank will be in the eyes of 
posterity. McClelland had linked high power to both reforms and wars, the items 
most written about by political historians. It seemed likely that extrovert 
presidents would attract more attention than their introvert counterparts. Unlike 
Bailey, who found that historians have a bias toward Democrats,15 the authors 
found Republican and Democratic presidents distributed in accordance with 
PDS average and Barber type. 
As is indicated in table 19, a president's ranking is affected by his person- 
ality type. Active-positives clearly have the highest posterity rank and a corre- 
spondingly high power divergence score. Of the other three categories, active- 
negatives rank highest in the eyes of historians. Table 20 lists presidents by 
stages in the Klinbgerg-Holmes mood cycle and points to the fact that rank and 
mood stage also correspond. The average number of actions during each of the 
six stages of mood cycle across the three periods for which data are available is 
included, as is the average PDS per cycle stage. 
Table 20 basically worked as expected. The average posterity rank for 
extrovert periods was significantly higher than that for introvert periods. The one 
finding that needs elaboration is that one of the higher posterity rankings of the 
six stages is accorded third-stage introvert presidents. By the third stage of 
introvert phases, Congress has grown quite influential in foreign policy matters 
and a president who begins to reassert presidential authority prior to a new 
extrovert phase can look quite good in retrospect. 
This table provides students of public policy with an emerging pattern of 
the interaction between presidential personality, public mood, and the making of 
foreign policy. 
Possibility of a Combined Cycle 
The moodlinterest theory implies that foreign policy moods may determine 
political behavior. However, moods labeled extrovert and introvert may be part of 
a public policy cycle that includes patterns of reform and scandal, as well as 
wars and territorial annexations. Frank Klingberg has done suggestive work in 
this areal6 and David McClelland's work was a valuable catalyst in suggesting 
the link between reform, war, and higher power divergence, and between 
affiliation and scandal. l7 
The relationship between reform cycles in American history and data 
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presented earlier further confirms McClelland's hypothesis. Introvert periods 
are often associated with scandal and political reform. Although the public 
shows more concern with propriety during the first two stages of introversion, 
presidents who allow or are involved in major scandals are often found during 
the first stage. 
First-stage introvert presidents also tend to slightly above average affilia- 
tion scores (table 7), low power divergence scores, and low posterity rankings 
(table 20). Second-stage introvert periods are characterized by political reform 
and an attempt to clean up the mess created in the first stage: a "His Honesty" 
Hayes,18 a political outsider like Hoover, or an "I'll never lie to you" Carter. 
Average affiliation scores for presidents following scandals usually begin to rise 
as the public elects presidents who flaunt their honesty and nonpoliticized 
orientation. Third-stage introvert presidents tend to be more predisposed to 
initiate reforms of a more meaningful nature (Roosevelt and his "New Deal," 
Reagan and his "New Federalism"). During the last introvert stage and the first 
stage of extrovert periods, the socioeconomic, reform-war portions of the public 
policy cycle become more evident. Abolition, Populism, the New Deal, and 
New Federalism were all born in the last-stage introvedfirst-stage extrovert 
thirds of the mood cycle. 
Extrovert periods appear to alternate reform with war (Mexican War, 
abolition, Civil War; Populism, Spanish-American War, Philippine Insurrec- 
tion, Progressivism, World War I; World War 11, Korea, civil rights, War on 
Poverty, Vietnam). 
Each of the extrovert periods under consideration concludes with a war 
followed by a period of political scandal, reform, and quiescence. This cycle is 
repeated three times during the period covered by this study. These relationships 
are summarized in table 22. 
In conclusion, a comparative survey of the moodlinterest theory and the 
survey of uses of armed forces abroad by the Library of Congress, the studies of 
David McClelland, David Winter, James David Barber, and the presidential 
rankings compiled by Arthur Schlesinger, Sr., and Robert Murray and Tim 
Blessing indicate a high degree of congruence between mood cycles and the 
findings of the other five studies. In extrovert periods, wars, actions to protect 
interest abroad, and territorial expansion are more likely to occur. Extrovert 
periods are likely to begin with, end with, and be immediately preceded by high 
powerllow affiliation imagery in American literature and presidential inaugu- 
rals. Extrovert periods are also dominated by energetic presidents who like their 
jobs and are most often Democratic. Introvert periods, especially during the 
second stages, are significantly lower in actions taken, force invoked, and power 
imagery in literature and presidential inaugurals; such periods evidence a high 
need to affiliate and achieve, and a relatively low power drive. Accordingly, 
introvert periods are more likely to feature passive presidents. 
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The data in this comparison suggest that the work of authors analyzing 
similar phenomena using different methodologies can be related in a mean- 
ingful manner. The fact that they can be related reinforces each of the works by 
indicating that others rendered similar conclusions by different methodologies. 
In addition, it suggests that American foreign policy analysts would benefit by 
paying greater attention to long-term trends. 
The easiest way to see the relationship between these studies and the mood/ 
interest theory is to fit the findings of these studies into the basic fluctuation of 
mood from one extreme to the other and the first, second, and third stages of 
each introvert and extrovert period. 
It is difficult, however, to summarize the work of David McClelland in this 
manner; his limited number of dates does not lend itself to specific agreement 
with individual introvert or extrovert cycles. McClelland is most applicable in 
pointing out the difference between .all second stages, whether introvert or 
extrovert, and all first and third stages. In this respect, McClelland's analysis of 
literature supports the moodlinterest theory. McClelland's low powerlhigh affil- 
iation years correspond with second stages, when activity on the international 
scene is quieter than before or after. McClelland's high power years correspond 
with swing decades when the United States, at a mood extreme, is furthest from 
its national interest and high power tendencies are needed to redirect activity. 
During the first stage of an introvert period, the public mood points back 
toward the nation's realistic interests but is not yet there. In this stage, the use of 
force abroad is less than the extreme of the third-stage extrovert; yet it has not 
decreased to the point that it will in the second-stage introvert period when the 
public mood is very near to realistic national interests. An analysis of Winter's 
scoring of inaugural addresses indicates that the average first-stage introvert 
president has a power divergence score that is lower than his more active third- 
stage extrovert predecessor, yet higher than the following second-stage introvert 
president who is nearer to the realistic short-term interests of the nation. Most 
first-stage introvert presidents are passive, negative, and Republican. The fact 
that they are passive agrees with the idea that they are in the process of turning 
the nation away from its extreme extroversion, and the fact that they are 
Republican, with that party's concept of limited government, coincides with 
their job of limiting activity and returning to national interest. Posterity ranks 
first-stage introvert presidents quite low, because they do not appear as dynamic 
as their extrovert counterparts and may be seen in retrospect as tempering the 
nation when it appeared to be most powerful on the international scene. 
The fewest uses of force were found in the second-stage of introvert periods 
and can be explained by the fact that the nation is still compensating for its 
extreme extroversion. The United States is at a point where short-term national 
interests are being fulfilled. Other nations are unwilling to seriously challenge 
us because of memories of the last extrovert phase. However, our deepening 
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introversion is noticed by the world, leading to renewed challenges in the third 
stage. Presidents during second-stage introvert periods have the lowest power 
divergence scores, possibly because the nation is on its way into deep introver- 
sion and presidents of this stage still are reacting against the power used during 
the preceding extreme extroversion. Second-stage presidents, whether introvert 
or extrovert, are more passive than first- and third-stage extrovert presidents. 
This may be because they are in office during a period nearer the nation's short- 
term interests, and thus have a better balance between power and affiliation. 
Posterity ranks second-stage introvert presidents quite low, in part because of 
their relative passivity and lack of forceful actions abroad. 
Third-stage introvert periods appropriately have more uses of force abroad 
than the preceding second stages. Although the nation is in its deepest introver- 
sion, other countries are presenting the United States with greater challenges, 
some of which cannot be completely ignored. (Uses of force in third-stage 
introvert phases appear less severe than in other stages in terms of casualties and 
duration, but more research on this relationship is needed.) This third-stage 
introvert period naturally uses far less force than the following first-stage 
extrovert period when the nation has fully turned toward exerting itself on the 
international scene. Likewise, third-stage introvert presidents have higher power 
divergence scores than those presidents of second-stage introvert periods be- 
cause there is a bigger difference between the nation's interests and its actions 
during the third stage that forces the presidents to speak of power rather than 
affiliation. First- and third-stage introvert presidents were more negative than 
second- stage presidents, thus reflecting the greater tension between short-term 
national interest and public mood during first and third stages. As would be 
expected, first- and third-stage introvert presidents are more passive than their 
extrovert counterparts in the process of exerting the nation on the international 
scene. Third-stage introvert presidents received quite a high posterity ranking, 
which may reflect history's positive view of their efforts to reassert themselves 
against a Congress that has grown strong in international affairs during the 
earlier part of the introvert phase. 
As would be expected when the nation returns to extroversion, a marked 
rise in uses of force abroad compared to the preceding third-stage introvert 
period is seen. first-stage extrovert periods rise in the use of force, but not to the 
point that they will rise to later in the extrovert period when the nation has 
become committed on the international scene. Accordingly, first-stage extrovert 
presidents have an average power divergence score that is more than double that 
of the preceding third-stage introvert presidents. Their scores are also higher 
than second-stage extrovert presidents because of the greater tension between 
short-term national interest and public mood in first-stage extrovert periods. 
According to the Barber ratings, first- and third-stage extrovert presidents were 
the most active presidents, which is reflected in their drive to assert the nation on 
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the international scene, whether or not in discord with national interest. First- 
stage extrovert presidents had an average posterity ranking of 16.3, which is 
higher than average and illustrates history's positive opinion of their efforts to 
reestablish the United States as an active international power. 
Second-stage extrovert periods feature a gradual increase in uses of force 
abroad compared to first stages reflecting the pressure on the United States to 
continue its international commitment. Like second-stage introvert presidents, 
second-stage extrovert presidents have low power divergence scores, demon- 
strating the nearness of public mood to the short-term national interest. A 
majority of second-stage presidents are positive, perhaps because of the lack of 
tension they feel during a period when short-term national interest and mood are 
congruent. The posterity rankings of second-stage extrovert presidents drop, 
possibly reflecting the lull in new international activity due to the proximity of 
mood and interest and therefore leaves the increasingly extrovert public with 
perceptions of presidential ineffectiveness. 
As one would expect, the use of force abroad is highest during third-stage 
extrovert periods when the mood reaches the extreme of extroversion and the 
United States is its most active in the international arena. Presidents serving in 
these stages have the highest power divergence scores, showing their extreme 
use of power language in accordance with the nation's international role. First- 
and third-stage extrovert presidents are the most active presidents, which 
indicate increased commitments abroad. Presidents of third-stage extrovert 
periods receive the highest posterity rankings, which reflects history's positive 
view of their active role in pressing the nation further into extroversion. 
In the process of analyzing introvert and extrovert moods by thirds, the 
authors become ever more aware of the distinction between long-term and short- 
term considerations. Conflicts between moods and interests have been ana- 
lyzed, referencing specific points in time. It is quite possible for an action 
dictated by mood to be within the American interest at the time it is taken, but to 
set the stage for future challenges by other nations and future U .S. actions not in 
accord with interests. 
Our analysis makes the point that long-term considerations deserve in- 
creased attention. Should the authors not then take the long-term view of 
deviation from interests? The answer is yes if enough information is readily 
available to project the long-term consequences of actions. However, for pur- 
poses of this analysis, the authors thought it best to start with commonly 
identified short-term consequences. 
A next step after the moodlinterest conflict is acknowledged would be to 
look at actions that do not in and of themselves violate interests, but probably 
lead to later violations. For example, using such a framework it would be 
difficult to argue that second-stage actions are in accord with interests if they 
lead to third-stage problems. Rather, it would be entirely likely that second- 
54 Alternate Methodologies 
stage actions (or lack of actions) set up difficult third-stage challenges that 
mood prevents the United States from meeting until events have forced a mood 
change. Certainly any attempt to avoid the extremes of mood must take such 
lead time into account. 
It would seem that the people get approximately what they desire in a 
president. As Walter Lippmann implied in The Public Philosophy, the public in 
a democracy may have too much influence over foreign policy, sending foreign 
policy (often belatedly) on an emotional roller coaster that may make little sense 
in terms of real strategic interests. l9 What can be done about the situation? The 
public can attempt to control events and motives rather than be driven by them. 
It can attempt to respond to events with an awareness of the period the United 
States is currently in, treading heavily when the predisposition is too affiliative, 
more lightly when it would be too likely to use the "big stick." A more balanced 
approach to the making of long-range foreign policy is needed, but perhaps in a 
democracy like the United States this is more than can be expected. 
OTHER FOREIGN POLICY CONCEPTS 
AND LIBERAL MOODS 
The contention that alternating U.S. foreign policy moods are manifested in 
liberalism can be challenged by assertions that other considerations are of equal 
or greater importance. However, the mood/interest theory sees these forces as 
operating within the general context of liberalism. Therefore, liberalism must be 
considered more significant than these other forces: (1) pragmatism, (2) moral- 
ism, (3) conservatism, (4) elitism, (5) circumstances unique to America, and 
(6) world events. While study of these concepts can improve understanding of 
American foreign policy, it must be emphasized that the mood/interest theory 
maintains that liberal moods are of foremost significance. 
Pragmatism 
Americans (whether reform or business liberals) want flexibility in their 
choice of actions, in part because their liberalism is firmly grounded in the 
American pragmatic tradition extant since before the founding of the re- 
The pragmatic liberal American may have his preferred methods of 
changing the international system, but will support even an opposite orientation 
if it appears to be appropriate to the circumstances and is rationalized in such a 
way as to seem consistent with liberal values. 
A true pragmatist objectively evaluates every possible course of action in 
order to determine which will work best. Most Americans believe that they 
conform to this definition and that they, perhaps uniquely, have the capacity to 
choose the most rational course of action. Therefore, they perceive themselves 
to be pragmatic in deciding foreign policy, as in other issues. The mood/interest 
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analysis asserts, however, that while America has a pragmatic tradition, its 
pragmatism in foreign policy is related more to the fluctuating liberal mood than 
to national interest or universal inherent pragmatism. Americans cannot be 
pragmatically objective because their perceptions are distorted by the liberal 
public mood that envelops most of the society. 
As mentioned, the pragmatic tradition in America makes the appearance of 
a rationally pragmatic choice very important to Americans. If most Americans 
are in a dominant introvert or extrovert mood, though, how is the appearance of 
pragmatism maintained? The answer lies in the fact that "dominant" mood does 
not mean "unanimous" mood; deviations from the dominant public mood by 
nonrepresentative minorities offer alternatives on both sides of the dominant 
mood, which are needed to make the dominant public mood appear pragmatic. 
Thus, nonrepresentative viewpoints have a sort of bracketing effect: by repre- 
senting extreme views, they counterbalance one another and make the main- 
stream public mood appear less extreme and more rationally pragmatic. 
An analysis of United States senators and their voting patterns on major 
issues illustrates this point well. Such an analysis is based on the fact that there 
are nationally visible figures outside of the mainstream of American thinking 
who can supply the diversity needed to propagate perceptions of "pragmatic" 
decision-making. In the case of United States senators, it is easy to see how 
some senators, namely those of the sparsely pogulated states of the West and 
Great Plains, can give the appearance of strong opposition to the public mood 
while not representing a large portion of the American 
A brief study of some of the important issues in recent foreign policy 
history and of the Senate's response to them shows that senators advocating a 
foreign policy different from the mainstream of American thinking have most 
often come from the sparsely populated states of the West and Great Plains. It is 
argued that the viewpoints of these senators are related to the constituent make- 
up of their states in that important characteristics of these states, such as the 
relatively small population per square mile and the propensity of constituents to 
take pride in their senator, produce less sophisticated balances of interest than 
are produced in most other states. In earlier times, when communications were 
less developed and election to the United States Senate less direct, senators 
holding extreme positions were more likely to come from a variety of states than 
is now the case.22 Still, the effect is the same: senators representing views 
outside the public mood help the public mood appear pragmatic. 
A senator with fewer interests and constituents to be concerned with is 
allowed more freedom of action and greater amounts of time to work on 
substantive issues. Also, a senator from such a state is frequently given more 
leeway by constituents who, due to geographic isolation and fewer constituents 
per senator, form stronger loyalties to their "person in Washington." The result 
is a United States Senator who does not need to tread as many thin lines between 
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opposing constituent interest groups-a senator who is more likely than others 
to deviate from the overall mood in foreign policy decisions. 
Liberal Americans are by nature likely to have some leaders who are ahead 
of the mood simply because of zeal to sell the public on a new position. Usually 
some leaders with a more complex position than the current mood can be heard. 
What is most difficult to find are leaders who have fallen behind a mood or who 
state a clear position at one extreme; in this regard, senators from the sparsely 
populated states of the Great Plains and West are important. These senators 
practically ensure that the pragmatic American will be able to find national 
leaders more introvert and more extrovert than the current mood. In this manner, 
the mood of the country at large can seem to be a pragmatic compromise 
whether it happens to be extremely extroverted, extremely introverted, or 
somewhere in between. 
Using Manfred Jonas's study on isolationism, Isolationism in America 
1935-1941, the twelve major isolationist senators of the 1930s can be selected.23 
Seven of these senators were from sparsely populated western and Great Plains 
states.24 These extremely introvert senators were sometimes balanced by sen- 
ators from their own states who held opposing viewpoints. For example, Edward 
R. Burke, a colleague of isolationist George Norris from Nebraska, in 1940 
introduced controversial legislation to reinstate the draft.25 In this case, with 
isolationist leaders even more introvert than the dominant mood phase, as well as 
some persons less introvert than the dominant mood, an extreme introvert 
position, reluctantly reinstating only a quite limited draft in the face of great 
national danger, could be perceived as a pragmatic balance between the oppos- 
ing forces. Still, the world situation at that time would indicate that such an 
American balance was indeed extremely introvert. 
An analysis of senators opposing NATO in 1949 provides further substan- 
tiation of the point that sparsely populated states of the Great Plains or West are 
more likely to produce views outside of the current mood. The vote in the Senate 
committing the United States to the NATO alliance on July 21, 1949, was 82 to 
13. Eight of the thirteen senators voting against NATO were from sparsely 
populated states of the Great Plains or West.26 These opposing senators were 
balanced by other leaders ahead of the mood who stressed the need to meet the 
challenge of communism and a vote for the NATO alliance easily could be 
perceived as pragmatic, a perception that would have been impossible before 
World War I1 when the United States was in an extremely introvert mood. 
A vote analysis of a version of the proposed Bricker Amendment of 1954, 
which aimed at subjecting treaties and executive agreements to increased 
constitutional and legislative scrutiny, shows that senators from the Great Plains 
and West were more likely than other senators to lend it their support. Proponen- 
cy of the Bricker Amendment indicated an introvert position because of the 
stringent limitations it sought to impose. The Senate failed to refer a version of 
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the Bricker Amendment to the states by a vote of 60 to 31 on February 26,1954. 
Only five opposing senators, or a little less than one-sixth of the opposition, 
were from sparsely populated states of the Great Plains and West.27 Since states 
of the Great Plains and West with small populations compose just less than one- 
third of the entire Senate, one may assume that senators from these states were 
more likely to vote in favor of the amendment than senators from the remainder 
of the country. This support effectively added to the introvert position, which in 
turn made the extrovert position that eventually defeated the amendment appear 
more pragmatic. 
Another example indicating that senators with a less demanding constitu- 
ency are most likely to be inordinately introvert or extrovert is found in the 
support given the introvert National Commitments Resolution of 1969. The 
resolution passed the Senate by a vote of 70 to 16. Nine of the sixteen opposing 
senators were from sparsely populated states of the Great Plains and West.28 
Opposition senators did not carry the day, but certainly served to express an 
extrovert view at variance with the existing public mood. This view, balanced 
with those of strong introverts ahead of the mood, served to convince the public 
of its pragmatism. 
In the 1981 Senate vote concerning President Reagan's proposed sale of 
weapons to Saudi Arabia, which included a number of Airborne Warning and 
Control System (AWACS) radar planes, the 52 to 48 vote supporting the sale 
depended on support from the sixteen sparsely populated states of the Great 
Plains and West. Twenty-four of the fifty-two votes supporting the sale came 
from the sixteen states named, whereas only eight of the forty-eight opposing 
votes came from these states. Also, those eight votes came from seven different 
states; in only one of the sixteen states, Oregon, did both senators vote against 
the sale. Interestingly, one of these two senators, Senator Packwood (R-Oregon) 
was the major Republican party leader of opposition to the sale; this further 
emphasizes the ability of these senators to take diverse positions. Without the 
support of these senators who had the freedom to vote contrary to the predomi- 
nant introvert sentiments, the sale would never have been approved.29 In this 
case the flexibility allowed these senators gave President Reagan the chance to 
carry out what could be argued as a truly pragmatic policy in an introvert mood. 
Acting outside of the public mood would rarely be possible for a president 
without such support. 
Less than average susceptibility to presidential foreign policy lobbying, 
tendency to extremes, and latitude in foreign policy stances are frequent 
characteristics of senators from sparsely populated states of the Great Plains and 
West and were also manifested in the 1978 vote on the Panama Canal treaties. 
While senators from these states are less than one-third of the Sente, they cast 
over half of the votes in opposition to the treaties, again strengthening the 
pragmatic appearance of the final outcome of the votes.30 Interestingly enough, 
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two senators who assumed leadership roles in support of the treaty were from 
sparsely populated western states. Senator Frank Church from Idaho was the 
floor leader in favor of the treaties and Dennis DeConcini of Arizona played a 
leadership role in formulating reservations and understandings. 
When nationally articulated extreme positions of some senators are bal- 
anced by positions in the opposite extreme, the general public may conclude that 
middle positions must be moderate and therefore reasonable. The Gulf of 
Tonkin Resolution affords another example. The two-vote opposition to this 
resolution by senators from sparsely populated western states3' and the strong 
extrovert measures concerning Vietnam advocated by Bany Goldwater (Ari- 
zona) helped to convince the country that President Johnson's 1964 actions were, 
indeed, reasonable and proper; Johnson was portrayed as a moderate. Only with 
the perspective of history can this portrayal be viewed as inaccurate. President 
Johnson, in reality, was not acting according to interest but rather in an 
extremely extroverted manner according to mood. 
Table 23 (page 000) summarizes the points made above by comparing 
Senate votes with votes from the sparsely populated West and Great Plains 
states. By calculating what the West and Great Plains vote would have been if it 
were proportionate to those states' percentage of the entire Senate vote, and then 
comparing this to the actual votes from these states, the bracketing effect in 
regards to the appearance of pragmatism can be seen, with the general public 
mood being situated between widely diverse views. 
This American desire to have at hand a variety of alternatives from which a 
"reasonable" course of action can be selected is also illustrated by the presiden- 
tial elections of 1964 and 1972 in which senators Bany Goldwater of Arizona 
and George McGovern of South Dakota, respectively, were overwhelmingly 
defeated. Goldwater camed the torch of strong extroversion in the face of a 
slightly less extrovert public mood and lost the election. Likewise, McGovern 
was ahead of the 1972 mood in that he was more introvert than the general public 
which chose the more moderate Richard Nixon. 
Americans, who perceive themselves as pragmatic partially because of the 
presence of these nonconformist leaders, fail to see that their foreign policy 
stances are becoming extreme (either introvert or extrovert); this in turn enables 
a mood to escalate with minimum restraints. It must be noted, however, that if 
America's stance becomes too extreme, that pragmatic element of American 
thought will force a decisive shift in mood. Americans believe that if one course 
of action fails, perhaps the opposite course of action might succeed. When the 
force of world events periodically dictates such change, America's unique 
pragmatic impulse helps to generate it. 
Moralism 
Moralism is seen by many foreign policy analysts as having a significant 
bearing on American foreign policy and it operates as an inherent set of political 
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values within the broader liberalism. In the United States moralism can many 
times be equated to religion, since most American leaders base their morality on 
their religious background. The impact of religion on American morals can be 
traced back to the early settlers who came to America for religious reasons. 
America's consistent humanitarian concern, reflected in its overall morality and 
policy, demonstrates American adherence to the idealistic and universal de- 
mands of religion. United States foreign policy has often been observed as 
having a stronger moralistic tone than is found in the foreign policies of other 
nations.32 
More specifically, the idealistic viewpoint of foreign policy reflected by 
moralism states that nations should do what is "right." A nation is only as 
strong as its morality and sense of purpose. Moralism demands consistency of 
action toward a set of idealistic goals. Once one of the liberal foreign policy 
orientations is adopted, be it introvert or extrovert, it must be pursued consis- 
tently with little attention to the other liberal foreign policy orientation. When 
the adopted orientation begins to fail to correspond to reality, the moral demand 
for consistency results in a temporary increase in the intensity of that particular 
orientation or mood. When this orientation finally reaches an extreme, the 
pragmatic demand for workable change and the consequences of unrealistic 
foreign policy force a reversal in foreign policy by both reform and business 
liberals. Thus, moralism motivates Americans to allow a mood to run rampant 
before changing it, but when it is changed the moralist wants to change it 
completely. After the change, moralism requires consistency in the opposite 
direction until another extreme is reached, and so on. 
Similar introvert or extrovert moral traits in presidents can appear at similar 
points in the development of separate introvert or extrovert phases. For example, 
both presidents Hoover and Carter, whose terms fell in the middle of introvert 
phases, evidenced a strong humanitarian concern and support for arms control 
and disarmament. Presidents Theodore Roosevelt and Harry Truman each 
served toward the beginning of an extrovert phase and sold the public on moral 
requirements that necessitated increased American foreign policy activity. 
Moralistic and religious opinions regarding foreign policy vary with the 
general public mood. Moral arguments rarely give clear and constant guidance 
to the moralist in foreign policy matters. In an April 1978 interview Henry 
Kissinger noted: "You have to know how to go from your values to your security, 
your world structure, or whatever it is you are aiming for. You cannot simply do 
it in a fit of moral enthusiasm. "33 An American moralist's sense of purpose can 
lead to strong disdain for war or to zealous support for a particular war, but rarely 
in between. 
A look at some leading national statesmen reveals that positions by persons 
of similar religious background can vary considerably. Senator William E. 
Borah, a strong opponent of the Treaty of Versailles, came from a midwestern 
Calvinist ba~kground .~~  President Woodrow Wilson, supporter and negotiator 
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of the treaty, was the son of a Presbyterian minister. Richard Nixon liked to refer 
to his Quaker background; for example, during the 1970 Middle East crisis he 
said, "There is an old Quaker saying, 'the most important quality in a crisis is 
peace at the center.' "35 Curiously, much of the hard-core opposition to his 
Vietnam policies came from Quakers. Joseph Kennedy, the father of the first 
Catholic president of the United States-John Kennedy-took a vastly different 
viewpoint toward the U.S. role in Europe from that of his son.36 The Reformed 
Church in America has had two of its members serve as president of the United 
States: Martin Van Buren, who was a careful introvert, and Theodore Roosevelt, 
who was a strong extrovert. 
During the 1920s and 1930s, there was religious support for disarmament 
and opposition to the munitions makers. A crusade against an atheistic commu- 
nism received religious support in the 1950s and early 1960s. Much religious 
concern has been shown with the destructive nature of modem weapons and the 
inability of nations to resolve differences during the late 1970s and early 1980s. 
An example of disagreement between American foreign policy analysts arguing 
from a Christian perspective during the same time frame is provided by authors 
Robert L. DeVries and Ronald Kirkemo. DeVries argues that decreases in birth 
rates come with economic prosperity and that the United States should 
promote minimal economic rights for each person in the world. Kirkemo says 
that exports of food reserves could be contingent upon the developing countries 
starting "family planning programs to begin slowing the population boom. "37 
This same point is also illustrated by the current split in Christian view- 
points in America. On one side, the mainline Protestant denominations in 
America support a mostly introvert position regarding foreign policy, with an 
emphasis on arms control. The argument is that the destructive power of modem 
weapons works against God's will and threatens everyone and everything and 
should be strictly controlled. On the other side are some Christian-oriented 
organizations like the Moral Majority, sometimes called the "New Right. "3s 
Since communists actively oppose Christian values, these organizations advo- 
cate a more extrovert foreign policy than their mainline counterparts and a strong 
military deterrent to communist expansion. Again, the point here is that Amer- 
ican moral values, Christian values in this case, can support both introvert and 
extrovert foreign policies. 
Due to the inconsistent guidance provided to American foreign policy 
makers by moral considerations, some observers argue that the country should 
follow a realistic point of view. The realist argues that the United States must do 
what is in its interest, since this is the way the international system functions. 
Realists maintain that wars can be caused by an unduly inflated sense of justice, 
that morality cannot be imposed by force, and that current military capabilities 
are too awesome to risk an unnecessary war over conflicting moralities. Idealists 
attack this realistic point of view as being unworthy of the aspirations of the 
American people. 
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In the end, the realist can be seen as having a position in between the two 
extremes of American idealism. He takes a more moderate view than many 
American liberals, such as Wilson, Borah, and Joseph or John Kennedy. While 
idealists as a group might be said to embrace an inconsistent idealism, which is 
disruptive to world peace and stability, the realist point of view at least affords a 
chance for a sustained American contribution to world order. 
Conservatism 
A third force that must be analyzed is the sometimes powerful impact of 
classical or Burkean conservatism on American foreign policy. Why is it that an 
overwhelmingly liberal country's conservatives have a significant impact on its 
foreign policy at certain times? Much of the answer to this question centers on 
the inability of the two varieties of liberalism to address the complexities of 
international  relation^.'^ The liberal, particularly at times of mood change, 
desires immediate and sweeping revisions of policies that take much time to 
change. The conservative more readily accepts the immediate realization of 
limited measures. In addition, since liberalism does not provide the tools for 
creative thinking on military matters, conservatives also can be instrumental in 
changes regarding military strategy and organization. For purposes of this 
analysis, the conservative who is reconciled to foreign policy realities can be 
compared to the realist. 
The mood/interest theory argues that the American public rules foreign 
policy and indicates that American foreign policy is liberal, since the perspec- 
tive of the realist or conservative is foreign to American public thinking. The 
reason the realist or conservative point of view has been supported by many 
influential Americans is that many times liberals have unrealistic expectations 
of foreign policy. Sometimes they adopt an introvert stance, sometimes an 
extrovert stance; sometimes the only feasible alternative is in the middle range 
where lies the consistent position of the realist or conservative. Thus, at many 
times the conservative position coincides with the only feasible options avail- 
able to frustrated liberals. The conservative can be viewed as farsighted in that 
he is consistently within the boundaries of the interest zone. At the start of a new 
mood phase, liberals of both varieties and conservatives can find themselves in 
general agreement, such as the conservative-realist agreement from 1940-1947, 
with increasingly extrovert liberal idealists, and from 1968-1972, with in- 
creasingly introvert liberal idealists. 
Both George Kennan and Henry Kissinger can be described as foreign 
policy realists or conservatives who place emphasis on major power balances in 
world politics. Both believe the public can be sold on wise policies. In the tense 
atmosphere of 1947, Kennan advocated the need for containment of the Soviet 
Union.40 The liberal public bought Kennan's policy, but later militarized it to 
what he considered an unacceptable degree.41 In 1969 Kissinger joined the 
Nixon administration as a foreign policy advisor who advocated balance-of- 
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power policies consistent with American capabil i t ie~.~~ Kissinger was able to 
execute his policies through secret, personal diplomacy. However, the public 
became restless for liberal rationales and methods of the kind later provided in 
the rhetoric of President Jimmy Carter in such areas as human rights, arms 
control, and a general advocacy of humane purposes for American foreign 
policy. 
During Kennan's time (1947), the United States mood was below the inter- 
est zone, but moving in an extrovert direction. In 1969 with Kissinger, the mood 
was above the zone but moving in an introvert direction. Kennan and Kissinger 
were influential in their respective eras because they provided rationales to move 
American policy in a direction favored by the public. The public listened less to 
Kennan and Kissinger as time progressed and further movement in the direction 
of the then current mood was believed desirable. Though realists such as Kennan 
and Kissinger might be correct in their policy arguments, the moodlinterest 
analysis indicates that the liberal public can be sold only what it wants to buy 
and sees balance-of-power positions largely as temporary measures. 
Important contributions by civilian conservatives have also been made in 
the realm of military affairs. Federalist Alexander Hamilton's ideas about the 
military were more conservative than his peers and had a rough time in the 
American political system. Conservative southerner John C. Calhoun made 
some important contributions when he was secretary of war under President 
James Monroe from 1817 to 1825. After the Northern victory in the Civil War, 
civilian conservatives were not particularly influential in military affairs until 
the turn of the century, when neo-Hamiltonians such as Theodore Roosevelt, 
who thought in a mixed liberal-conservative manner, were instrumental in the 
development of a modem general staff system and in securing recognition of 
modem naval strategy43 The Kennedy administration can be identified as 
another influential group that thought in a mixed liberal-conservative manner.44 
Robert McNamara, Kennedy's secretary of defense during the last part of the 
1940-1968 extrovert phase, brought some sweeping innovations to the United 
States military establishment in planning and organization. However, the time 
that Calhoun, the neo-Hamiltonians, and the Kennedy administration remained 
in power was limited, as was the execution of their policies. 
Elitism 
Most analyses of American foreign policy either implicitly or explicitly 
endorse the proposition that an elite group determines American foreign policy 
and then persuades the public of its appropriateness. Indeed, foreign policy has 
often been a concern involving few Americans. Wise actions in foreign policy 
require a knowledge of other governments, which an elite can most easily 
acquire, and in which the electorate has little interest. In essence, therefore, the 
elite can be said to make foreign policy decisions and suggestions which the 
public, with little knowledge of alternatives, will accept. 
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Elitist theory is an attractive perspective for a number of reasons. Foreign 
policy is indisputably the province of the elite in most countries of the world and 
scholars are therefore conditioned to think about elite control. Foreign policy 
writers, whose credentials naturally depend on analytical ability, are less likely 
to experience the power of the public than is the politician who must compete for 
the public's votes in order to win and retain office. Writers with governmental 
experience who emphasize the importance of their actions while in government 
also contribute to the illusion of elite rule. Another important reason for 
adherence to elite rule doctrines is that people naturally believe their own 
activities and perceptions of reality are superior to those of others. Thus, a 
person can easily assign failures to an elite who does not listen to him. If the 
public were held to be the supreme authority, the responsibility would force all 
Americans to take a much harder look at themselves. 
The elitist perspective has merit and can even be a basis for some mood 
analyses. In the early 1970s Graham Allison argued that the foreign policy 
attitudes of elite young Americans contrasted sharply with those of their 
elders,45 and Michael Roskin noted the importance of shifting elite generational 
paradigms in foreign Indeed, mood swings are easier to explain if an 
enlightened elite, rather than the entire public, is assumed to periodically shift 
directions. 
One shortcoming of elitist analysis is that it fails to give sufficient attention 
to other considerations. Placing mood shifts within an elite context makes it 
difficult to grasp the underlying importance of mood because the elitist analyst 
naturally emphasizes modification of elite behavior to check moodiness. Such 
emphasis all too easily by-passes the possibility that public moods are deep, 
underlying, recumng, and not easily changed. Elites may influence public 
mood and express new opinions, but the mood/interest theory argues that these 
elite influences will not stand in the long term if they attempt to contradict the 
general public mood. 
Many adherents to elitism make the debatable assumption that elites can 
guide the public mood and change policy when they believe appropriate, while it 
often fails to explain the reverse-that the public can ably restrain or temper 
elitist policies. For instance, the elitist orientation fails to explain how a leader 
like Lyndon Johnson, who followed his foreign policy consistently, could lose 
his ability to govern effectively in the face of the public reaction against 
American involvement in Vietnam. As had also been the case with the Korean 
war, the long-standing mass opinion that one fights a war right or not at all 
ultimately won out over arguments by many in the elite concerning the necessity 
of coping with the complex challenge of limited war in the nuclear age. The 
mass public had its way in Vietnam as American policy began a shift in 1968 that 
led to the termination of direct American participation in the war by 1973.47 The 
liberal aversion to limited wars is again becoming accepted President 
Carter appeared reluctant to commit the nation to another limited Asian land 
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war and indicated that "South Korea would be protected by U.S. nuclear 
might-and the implication that it would be used 'if necessary'-after the 
withdrawal of American troops."49 While a delay of United States troop 
withdrawal was announced in 1979, it is clear that the elite neither wins every 
argument nor shapes long-term opinion. 
A 1982 survey of the public and leaders identifies gaps between the two in 
significant areas. The public is presently less prone than leaders to support an 
active role in world affairs, foreign economic aid, foreign military aid and sales, 
free trade, actions against South Africa, previous U.S. actions in Vietnam, 
relations with Cuba, use of military force in the event of invasion of countries 
allied with the United States, increased relationships with the Soviet Union, and 
arms control.50 These choices basically outline policies now being followed by 
the government with the exception of willingness to use military force in the 
event of invasions of allies. Thus American foreign policy generally is closer to 
opinions expressed by the public than to those of elitist leaders. 
The mood/interest theory accepts elite influence on foreign policy formula- 
tion, but emphasizes that the elites regularly alter policy according to the 
public's demand. Elitist theory too often fails in the matter of identification. 
Who is the elite? How did they become the elite? Why are they listened to in 
preference to others? The moodlinterest theory argues that elites are chosen by 
the public from among a large body of potential elites. One elite can be replaced 
with another elite. 
Although the public cannot comment daily on matters of foreign policy, the 
public does set the parameters within which the political leadership must act. 
The moodlinterest theory admits that elites make foreign policy decisions and 
influence the public over the short term. Over the long term, however, an elite 
must remain inside the parameters set by the public or risk being replaced by a 
new elite. In cases of conflict, mood clearly prevails over the desires of an elite 
leadership. Presidents throughout history have had their foreign policy limited 
by prevailing public mood. Even aristocratic John Adams, while trying to 
adhere strictly to his conscience, would yield in the face of irresistible public 
pressure.51 Presidents who have not adjusted to change in mood have found 
themselves in losing positions like those faced by Woodrow Wilson over the 
League of Nations and Lyndon Johnson over Vietnam. Others, such as Franklin 
Roosevelt during the extremely introvert 1930s, have conformed to public mood 
on foreign policy to gain domestic objectives. 
The "public mood discussed in this analysis refers more to that of the 
mass public than to that of the elite or attentive In general, the mood/ 
interest theory asserts that a combination of the mass mood and world events 
sets the boundaries within which the elite and attentive publics must maneuver 
if they are to be effective. 
Many analysts of American foreign policy underestimate the role and 
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intelligence of the mass Often it is criticized for being uninformed, 
pessimistic, and supportive of unwise policies. Gabriel Almond's 1950 book on 
foreign policy moods contained implied criticism of the mass public for tenden- 
cies toward military solutions and i ~ o l a t i o n i s m . ~ ~  The implicit idea in all of this 
is that informed individuals can lead the mass public down the right path. 
The mood/interest theory suggests that the mass public can be more 
indicative of ultimate policy than the elite or attentive publics. Since Almond 
wrote his book, two trends unexpected by many of the foreign policy elite 
emerged in American foreign policy. The first was the "militarization" of 
American foreign policy which became more popular55 as extroversion, par- 
ticularly that directed toward containing communism, grew in intensity. The 
second was the late 1960s shift to in t rover~ion.~~ Thus, the tendencies toward 
military solutions and isolationism that Almond saw in the mass public both 
found their way into American policy. The "pessimism" that Almond criticized 
in the mass public was not characteristic of his own work, as he was optimistic 
that some of the past American moodiness could be overcome.57 Perhaps the 
mass public's alleged pessimism deserves greater attention and consideration by 
foreign policy analysts interested in future implications for American foreign 
policy. 
The criticism of the mass public as being uninformed about foreign policy 
is well documented, but uninformed does not necessarily mean unintelligent. 
The mass public is simply more concerned with the domestic matters affecting 
them directly. As Almond determined in his studies: "It is not the foreign or 
domestic character of the issue which determines the accessibility of public 
attention, but the intimacy of the impact. From this point of view, foreign policy, 
save in moments of grave crisis, has to labor under a handicap; it has to shout 
loudly to be heard even a little."58 Because American liberalism is constructed 
primarily to deal with domestic issues, the mass public does not have many 
ideological tools to comprehensively consider problems of foreign policy. 
However, the mass public's lack of information could mean that it is less likely 
to be caught up in a momentary mood than is the elite or attentive public, which 
endeavor to lead the mass public. Elite decision-making may be action and 
reaction, whereas the public has general perceptions that will give them a 
consensus for a period of time. 
A more suggestive method of breaking down public thinking than into the 
standard mass, attentive, and elite public categories might be into the consistent, 
leadership, and mass public categories. The consistent group, diverse and 
composed of members of the public least prone to fluctuation, represents all the 
feasible options that can be used in a policy-making situation. Members 
consistently occupy one of the points on an introvert- extrovert continuum. The 
leadership public decides which members of the consistent public shall have 
their viewpoints put before the mass public. The very zeal of the leadership 
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public in attempting to give the mass public the choice it desires makes the 
leadership public the most prone of the three to fluctuate. The actions and 
rhetoric of the leadership public, in its attempt to "sell" the public on a certain 
policy direction, can contribute to the normal momentum of a mood swing, but 
cannot alter normal changes in international direction (as witness the cases of 
presidents Wilson and Johnson). The mass public, the final arbiter of American 
foreign policy, does fluctuate, but only within definite boundaries. If the 
leadership public's persuasive zeal were tempered by an acknowledgment of the 
mass public's intelligence (as opposed to knowledge), perhaps the elites would 
be less likely to oversell certain policies and create unrealistic expectations, 
making it less likely for moods to be carried to illogical extremes.59 
Bernard C. Cohen, usually an adherent to elite perspectives, says this about 
Klingberg's public mood perspective: "a policy making system which has 
mastered all the modes of resistance to outside opinion nevertheless seems, 
from a long-run perspective, to accommodate to it."60 The foreign policy 
arguments advanced by the moodlinterest theory are pluralistic. Acknowledg- 
ing the significant role of elites in foreign policy determination, the theory 
maintains that the role is circumscribed by the desires of the public, which 
regularly shift according to mood. 
It is recognized that there is no definitive way to prove whether an elite 
leadership or the public mood ultimately determines foreign policy. Since most 
analyses support an elite rule argument, however, the impact of public moods on 
foreign policy has been insufficiently identified and analyzed. This analysis 
maintains that the powerful elite retains its position only so long as it remains 
true to public mood. The elite makes many decisions, but wisely makes most of 
them within parameters set by the public. The mass public has many tools with 
which to contain and influence elites. More research is needed to identify the 
exact dynamics of group interaction and influence. The relationship may be 
somewhat dialectical with the elite offering pragmatic decisions and the public 
continuing along its steady path to one extreme or the other. The argument here, 
however, is that a first step is the recognition that the mass public may be more 
influential than commonly thought. 
Fortunate Circumstances and Modern Technology 
A fifth consideration that helps explain the operation of American liber- 
alism in the foreign policy realm is the role of fortunate circumstances and 
modem technology. American circumstances have been so fortunate that moods 
have been able to predominate over foreign policy interests to a much greater 
degree than is possible in most other countries. America's dominant liberal 
ideology has flourished without strong internal opposition, insulated from the 
international consequences of basing foreign policy on that liberal ideology. 
Such consequences have been felt strongly only every two to three decades, 
Other Foreign Policy Concepts 67 
when the cumulative force of world events helps stimulate change from introver- 
sion to extroversion or vice versa. 
European nations, often bordered by a number of strong potential rivals, are 
unable to deviate so far from a realistic foreign policy approach. Germany 
simply cannot follow liberalism from extreme to extreme and still hope to 
survive. The United States, with its weaker neighbors to the north and south and 
expansive oceans on the east and west, can do so and has. Japan might not have 
to worry about immediately powerful neighbors, but its freedom to act is 
restricted by a dense population and dependence upon trade. Its economic 
interests must be given a higher priority than is the case in the United States, 
which has considerably more natural resources and less dependence on trade. 
Thus, the United States has the ability to shape short-term events to a much 
greater degree than other major powers. 
One can argue that modem technology has stripped away America's insula- 
tion from world politics by making Americans and the rest of the world more 
interdependent. However, as one of two super-powers, the United States is more 
militarily independent than previously. Unless absolutely necessary, no nation 
will stand in the way of a strong United States desire to be introverted or 
extroverted. The United States is powerful enough to stand apart from a number 
of world events if it so desires, and the United States is not inhibited from taking 
an active role in many world events if this is in accord with the prevailing public 
mood. Military super-power status also can compensate for some of the leeway 
lost by other changing circumstances, such as strong Third World concerns or 
spreading nuclear arsenals. 
When the military super-power status is combined with the momentum 
gained from a two-hundred-year cycle of fluctuation, fortunate circumstances 
and modem technology can be seen to have allowed and will continue to allow 
the changing liberal moods of the public to conflict with foreign policy interests 
at the extreme. 
Events 
The regularity in moods advanced by the moodlinterest theory might 
actually be a recurrence of certain types of events that require similar United 
States responses. Some foreign policy literature identifies regular patterns in 
international events. Warfare and violence do not occur on an entirely random 
basis; patterns of some sort do exist. Such patterns do not correspond exactly to 
the dates of American liberal mood phases, which occur with greater reg- 
~1ari ty;~l  yet there can be no denial that world events affect U.S. foreign policy 
and probably do so increasingly as the United States plays a larger role in 
international politics. Events also have a particularly strong impact upon policy 
when mood phases have gone to such an extreme that U.S. policy is very 
unrealistic; at such times, events can contribute to a mood change insofar as the 
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deficiencies of the existing mood are demonstrated by events. However, the 
mood/interest theory argues that usually United States reactions to events are 
conditioned more by American foreign policy moods than by the nature of the 
events. 
To illustrate this point, the mood cycles developed in Chapter 1 can be 
compared to the Small and Singer analysis of all international war. Table 24 
(page 188) shows the average nation months of war under way per year in each of 
the comparable mood phases described earlier. 
It is evident from this perspective that the international war pattern has a 
limited relationship to American liberal moods prior to 1919. Similarly, com- 
parison of interwar intervals of nations which fought in three or more interstate 
wars shows that the United States mean interval of 24.2 years is the highest 
mean interval, and is nearly twice the average mean interval of the nineteen 
other nations listed.62 Also, even as one of the largest and most powerful 
nations, the United States ranks only tenth in Small and Singer's rank order of 
nations by war experience  indicator^.^^ The indication of these two points is that 
despite its size and influence, the United States is not consistently involved in 
international wars. 
Finally, Small and Singer suggest that involvement in international wars 
does fluctuate in somewhat of a cyclical pattern, with peak periods about twenty 
years apart.64 Although this pattern might be said to support some general idea 
of a cyclical theory of international politics, the cycles identified by Small and 
Singer do not correspond to the American liberal mood cycles. The conclusion 
to be drawn from these several indications is that the American mood fluctua- 
tions defined by this theory are somewhat independent of the influences of 
international events, and that these moods do determine the foreign policy 
response to such events to a greater extent than the reverse. 
While American foreign policy moods are different and more regular than 
world events patterns, it is obvious that world events affect American foreign 
policy moods, especially when moods reach extremes. American extrovert 
periods do correspond to periods of more international violence than introvert 
periods, though the difference was not dramatic before 1919. Alternative pat- 
terns of world events with less regularity than American foreign policy moods 
have been hypothesized. Detailed research on American mood patterns in the 
context of alternative theories regarding world event patterns could reveal 
relationships that would improve understanding of the moodlinterest theory. 
Some analysts of American foreign policy go so far as to argue that each 
event is different when analyzed in detail, as is the American response to each 
event. However, patterns do exist and identifying them is valuable as long as it is 
done with appropriate attention to detail. 
The American's liberal ideology tells him to be introverted or extroverted. 
Within this encompassing force his pragmatism tells him to choose thoughtfully 
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a course of action from among those which confront him; only at extremes, 
however, does such pragmatism lead to a change in his extrovert or introvert 
orientation. Moralism tells Americans to pursue an orientation consistently 
until it has clearly failed; then moralism prompts them to try the opposite mood 
orientation. The few conservatives in American history have had a strong 
influence on foreign policy at certain times, but only within parameters allowed 
by liberalism. Elites, likewise, have some influence, but there are several 
potential elites at any given time and the mass public gives its ear to the one it 
chooses. Fortunate circumstances will probably continue to permit American 
foreign policy to fluctuate, although world events will continue to present 
challenges. At the root of all these considerations is a strong American liber- 
alism very much related to public mood and its conflict with foreign policy 
interests. 
3. American Foreign 
Policy Interests: Their 
Moody Relation to Policy 
The forces behind United States foreign policy moods and United States foreign 
policy interests are in basic conflict, periodically causing American foreign 
policy to deviate fmm interests. This basic conflict cannot be analyzed until both 
sides have been identified. Liberal foreign policy moods, including their 
relationship to some other foreign policy concepts, have been delineated. On the 
other side of the conflict are the politico-military interests the United States 
needs to pursue in the international system. 
POLITICO-MILITARY INTERESTS 
Karl W. Deutsch said that, generally speaking, "the foreign policy of every 
country deals first with the preservation of its independence and security, and 
second with the pursuit and protection of its economic interests. "l This being 
so, discussion of interests centers on matters of a political and military nature. 
The foreign policies of individual nations are necessarily linked together. A 
powerful nation must take more actions than weaker nations. Thus, action 
required to achieve American interests has expanded with the growth of Amer- 
ican power. This growth has enveloped more geographic areas, required greater 
United States activity, and necessitated increasing adaptivity to changing cir- 
cumstances. In extrovert phases, the United States has expanded its politico- 
military activity and ultimately done too much in pursuit of its interests. In 
introvert phases, the United States has endeavored to avoid new politico-military 
activity and ultimately has not done enough to protect its interests. 
Although liberal American thinking contains an aversion to the use of 
power, the complexities of international relations frequently require it. The 
world does not share the liberal American's ideology, nor the Marxist's ide- 
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ology, nor any single ideology; but most nations understand and appreciate the 
realistic functioning of power politics. Further, they understand that some use of 
power politics may be necessary to maintain politico-military interests to a 
greater extent than does the United States. 
Within the gamut of political and military interests lies a wide range of 
viable actions, and as the world situation changes, the nature of such actions 
changes. Thus, in 1793 it was appropriate (in the United States interest) for 
President Washington to issue a proclamation of neutrality, and in 1950 it was 
equally appropriate for President Truman to send troops to Korea. In the former 
example, the need for internal development was more important for maintaining 
independence than was the need for involvement in European disputes; in the 
latter example, United States security interests were better served by the United 
Nations action than by the issuance of a neutrality statement. One should note 
that these policies are the results of human perceptions of the international 
situation and the nature of American interests at a given time. 
America's most basic interest, preservation of its territorial integrity and 
well-being, has been directly threatened at various times. The outcome of the 
Civil War prevented the dismemberment of the nation. In a much less dramatic 
sense, Florida Indians in the early 1800s and some Mexican nationals in the 
early 1900s threatened internal placidity in border areas and were pursued 
beyond United States borders. Japanese aggression in the Pacific eventually 
posed a definite threat to American territorial integrity and was countered by the 
United States entry into World War 11. Since 1945, basic preservation has also 
entailed the prevention of a destructive nuclear, biological, or chemical ex- 
change. 
America's interdependence with other nations requires a degree of freedom 
of the seas. In early years, America went to war (declared and undeclared) with 
France from 1798 to 1800, certain Barbary states from 1801 to 1805 and 1815, 
and Great Britain from 1812 to 1814, in part to protect this basic interest. The 
United States' displeasure over British actions regarding construction of Con- 
federate commerce raiders during the Civil War also demonstrates American 
concern regarding freedom of the seas. German attacks on American shipping 
were a major consideration prompting American entry into World War I. 
The primary interests of United States foreign policy include more than just 
these basic concerns with territorial integrity and freedom of the seas. In the 
complex world situation, the United States has specific interests in extrater- 
ritorial geographic areas. Events in one part of the world have had an increasing 
impact on other parts of the world. Because security is not easily divisible, a 
nation must seek to realize politico-military conditions outside its immediate 
boundaries. These can, of course, vary with the size and geographic location of a 
nation. 
The mood/interest analysis rejects the argument that American interests are 
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so global that regional variations are of questionable significance. Rather, an 
early point in the identification of a viable set of interests is the recognition of 
regional variations. Bernard Gordon, in his book Toward Disengagement in 
Asia, has classified three levels of geographic interests for the United  state^.^ 
Those interests in the first level are of such importance that the United States is 
willing to intervene militarily to protect them; activities in areas of level-two 
interest are of concern to the United States but do not necessarily require a 
military commitment; and those activities in the third level can be most easily 
ignored because they least threaten American national security. The focus of the 
moodlinterest theory is three geographic areas of level-one interest: Europe, the 
Western Hemisphere, and East Asia. 
One interest of a first level nature is the prevention of one-nation (or 
coalition) dominance in Europe3 The early opportunity of the United States for 
internal development was the result not only of the neutrality proclamation, but 
also, and more importantly, of the factional nature of European politics which 
kept a single, powerful European state from turning its attention westward 
toward the not yet powerful, but wealthy, American continent. In this century, 
both world wars were fought in large part to prevent a German hegemony in 
Europe. In the post-World War I1 period, United States efforts have been 
directed against a threat of Soviet hegemony in that area. 
A second important geographic concern of the United States has been to 
preserve its dominance among major powers, first in North America and later in 
the entire Western Hemisphere4 The North American interest is one of survival 
since the United States has a larger population than its North American 
neighbors and is the naturally dominant power. Origins of the interest in the 
Western Hemisphere can be traced to the Monroe Doctrine and to the turn of this 
century when the United States assumed from the United Kingdom the domi- 
nant politico-military role in the Western Hemi~phere.~ Internal disputes in 
Latin America have not threatened United States dominance simply because no 
Latin American state has had big-power status; therefore, internal disputes in 
that area cannot be considered a level-one intere~t .~ The fact that the United 
States sometimes has intervened when it was not necessary is indicative of an 
unrealistic public mood or an attempt to compensate for weakness elsewhere in 
the world. In terms of level-one interest, United States politico-military involve- 
ment is essential only when necessary to prevent politico-military domination of 
Latin American areas by extrahemispheric forces. A recent example of the 
pursuit of this interest is the willingness of the United States to go to war over the 
placement of Soviet missiles in Cuba. If a Latin American nation, such as Brazil 
or Mexico, were to acquire major power status as long-term trends indicate 
might be possible, United States interests would require dominance in North 
America and an appropriate balance of power within Latin America. This 
discussion of past and possible future changes in United States interests in the 
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Western Hemisphere indicates that interests can change in accordance with 
changing situations. 
Another level-one United States interest is the prevention of one-nation (or 
coalition) dominance in East Asia (China, Japan, Korea, and Southeast A ~ i a ) . ~  
United States interest in this area developed gradually and was openly articula- 
ted near the end of the last century as the "Open Door" policy. In the late thirties 
and early forties, Japan's threat of dominance eventually led to American 
intervention, and in the early sixties, a major change in the Southeast Asian 
situation was perceived as possibly leading to Sino-Soviet hegemony. 
Sources other than Gordon can be cited in support of this statement about 
Europe, the Western Hemisphere, and East Asia as priority areas of geographic 
intere~t .~ The need to prevent one-nation dominance in these areas is still crucial 
to the United States, but it has been modified recently to include the dominance 
of a single ideology, such as communism or fascism. As noted earlier, American 
interest since World War I1 has required consideration of the world's ability to 
destroy itself with nuclear, biological, or chemical warfare. 
American interests in the Western Hemisphere, Europe, and East Asia 
require a certain degree of American interest in other geographic areas which 
Gordon identifies as level-two interests. For example, the economies of Western 
Europe and Japan are particularly dependent on oil from the Middle East, and 
although it was once definitely an area of level-two interest, the Middle East has 
moved closer to being an area of level-one interest. Conflicting pressures on the 
United States have increased the danger of America being drawn into any clash 
between Israel and the Arab nations. On one hand, American sympathy for 
Israel and commitment to Israel's existence have remained constant when other 
governments have abandoned that nation for reasons of political expediency; 
American involvement on the Israeli side in the Middle East has the potential to 
promote Soviet involvement on the Arab side. On the other hand, Soviet 
involvement in Arab nations and the need for oil from these nations have 
balanced United States sympathy for Israel. Thus, though the Middle East may 
not definitely be a level-one interest, it has moved in this direction during the last 
d e ~ a d e . ~  Indeed, because the Reagan administration has greatly expanded the 
Carter plans for a rapid-deployment force for Persian Gulf contingencies, the 
need for Persian Gulf oil may even be ahead of the U.S. priority in East Asia. lo 
However, one must keep in mind that East Asia is a long-standing interest where 
the United States happens to have flexibility because of a current power balance, 
and the current situation in the Persian Gulf happens to have put pressure on the 
United States. 
South Asia has moved closer to joining Ahca  in level three, mostly because 
of leeway provided the United States by the Sino-Soviet split. These two areas 
have been of distinctly limited interest to the United States. During the period of 
European colonial rule, the United States regularly regarded these areas as being 
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under European dominance. Flurries of U. S. interest were evidenced during the 
1940-1968 extrovert phase but weakened at the start of the post-1968 introvert 
phase and are even weaker today. Currently, United States interest in South Asia 
and Africa is probably limited to maintaining acce~sibility.~~ 
American wars and near wars can be related to the above interests. When- 
ever such conditions threaten, America becomes war prone because of the 
demands of interest. Despite fluctuations in public mood and in the nature of 
United States foreign policy, Gordon would argue that interests generally have 
been consistently pursued during this century.12 Nevertheless, nations do not 
always act or think in terms of their best interest. Gordon does not analyze 
specific actions at specific times in terms of public mood, and he seems to view 
foreign policy makers as somewhat apart from public mood influence. Mood, 
however, is also involved: it emphasizes specific enemies, acts for ideological 
reasons, and influences the proneness to war. 
THE MOOD/INTEREST CONFLICT 
Successful pursuit of national interests implies the use of some degree of power. 
'Ihe American liberal orientation includes a distaste for power politics and, 
subsequently, for the notion of pursuing interests. Therefore, in order to make 
politico-military interests palatable to the public, American leaders have used 
what are today known as "Madison Avenue" techniques. Euphemizing interests 
in terms like "Manifest Destiny," "Anticommunism," and "self-determina- 
tion" has not only allowed pursuit of interests, but has also produced popular 
slogans which have remained in the American mind after their usefulness has 
ended. Leaders, empowered by election, are forced to carry out policies that are 
not always in the American interest. Such "packaging" of interests and its 
resultant effects are prime motivators of the extreme fluctuations of mood and 
policy. 
Prevention of one-nation dominance in Europe and Eastern Asia prior to 
World War I1 could be achieved through insuring that two or more viable 
political groups existed in both areas. In times of extreme introversion, such as 
the late 1930s, the United States did too little to maintain this interest. Since 
1945, the United States has had to assume an active role in order to maintain the 
European and East Asian balances. Most of this action was during an extrovert 
phase, and by the late 1960s more was being done than was required. In the 
mid-1970s, the United States reached a desirable level of activity. However, the 
current continuing introversion involves the danger of disastrous neglect. 
krhaps the real problem lies in the demand of the public for clear images of 
ambiguous situations, images which are necessarily discredited by the com- 
plexity of world events. The argument of the moodlinterest theory is not for a 
curtailment of democracy, but rather for citizen recognition of the conflict 
between their attitudes and the reality of international politics. l3  
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The Mood/Interest Conflict Proposition of the moodlinterest theory empha- 
sizes this basic conflict. Each new mood phase starts as a justifiable reaction to 
the excesses of the previous phase. Time is required for the excesses to be 
comcted. Then the phase passes through a middle-range viable interest zone 
and finally concludes in unchecked excesses setting the stage for the opposite 
phase. In this manner the regularly undulating curve of the moodlinterest theory 
is perpetuated. 
When the fluctuating mood curve is superimposed on the ever-rising level 
of activity required to realize interests, the mood curve becomes one of extrovert 
rise and introvert plateau. It is important to realize that the mood curve taken 
alone follows a rise and fall pattern like other cyclical theories. Thus, in the 
largest sense, the United States has been forced to adjust to the ever-increasing 
level of activity that requires the world situation to meet interests. However, the 
introvert/extrovert mood curve dominates in the short-term and often forces the 
United States to act outside of its interest zone at the beginning and end of mood 
phases. 
Such a pattern suggests that the turning points of the curve are possibly the 
necessary adjustments of a democratic society whose foreign policy activities 
and public mood must be somewhat compatible with the pursuit of national 
interests, a requirement for survival in the international system. Thus, during 
the brief period of time before each phase changes (possibly two to seven years), 
the prevailing mood has become powerful enough to prevent United States 
leaders from always acting within the national interest. The policy of the first 
few years after the phase change may also be in conflict with United States 
interest, because the actions and attitudes just preceding the shift must be 
corrected before the United States can again act realistically. 
It is apparent that there are internal and external forces behind the mood 
fluctuation. The internal mood of the nation may cause the country to reach one 
extreme, but mood can vary only so far from external realities represented by the 
interest zone before it is forced to turn once again toward true interests. For 
example, during the 1930s public mood forced the nation deep into introversion, 
but the external realities of World War 11 represented by the later bombing of 
Pearl Harbor forced the mood to change. In such instances, external realities are 
an important force preventing even greater extremes. 
When the rising level of United States national interest is added visually to 
the mood curve, the resulting illustration is figure 6. Both of these depictions 
represent an average from which there can be some individual variation. 
Changing American foreign policy moods are depicted by a line that undulates 
in an upward direction. A constantly rising zone of actions in accord with the 
United States' interests is reflected by the inclined shaded area. While the 
overall number of actions required to achieve the United States' national interest 
has risen steadily in the past and is continuing to rise, the number of required 
actions might level off or even decline in the future.14 The conflict in the 
The curve represents the public mood, the fluctuations of which, over the course of time, reflect the 
alternating attempts of American liberalism to change international politics. The shaded area (reality/in- 
terest zone) represents the interim period during which liberal mood and politico-military interests are 
in harmony. The curve extended above or below the realityhnterest zone reflects periods of excessive ex- 
troversion or introversion, respectively, demonstrating that a new introvert or extrovert phase begins at 
a time when overall mood leans strongly in the opposite direction. 
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diagram is basic: the American public with its changing mood curve is in 
opposition to the dictates of the international system, represented by the shaded 
area. Moods are sometimes in accord with interests, but periodically they are 
not. 
Analysis even indicates that there is a lapse before the effects of neglect of 
interests is felt. If this is the case, the moodlinterest cycle would be particularly 
difficult to overcome because actions causing problems can occur a few years in 
advance of the problems. Thus, during the 1919-1940 introvert phase, the weak 
U.S. Aresponse to the invasion of Manchuria in 1931-1932 could have set the 
stage for problems from 1935 to 1939. Yet this nation's overall policy in 
1931-1932 could have been realistic. The same might be said of President 
Eisenhower's overall policy from 1953 to 1961, even though certain initial moves 
were made in %etnam during those years. Operation of lead time could make it 
even more diffiicult to break the mood/interest conflict pattern. 
INTERESTS, MOODS, AND WAR 
A nation's wars are the most emphatic expression of its foreign policy. If the 
moodlinterest theory's validity is to be advanced, American wars should fit into 
this framework, relating American wars to foreign policy interests and looking 
at both the wartime dissent and the results of war. 
American wars and near wars can be related to the pursuit of United States 
interests which have grown in scope and complexity over time within the 
constraints of liberal public moods. Following a period of introversion and a 
difficult attempt at political and commercial neutrality, the United States entered 
its first phase of extroversion under the cautious John Adams, who directed an 
undeclared naval war with France from 1798 to 1800. During this same extrovert 
mood phase, the United States fought the Barbary State of Tripoli from 1801 to 
1805, finally ending the Barbary nuisance in an 1815 war with Algiers. 
Like most of the major military actions of this phase, the War of 1812 was 
directly related to America's interest in freedom of the seas. The United States 
contentions with Great Britain and earlier with France might also be related to 
the prevention of one-nation dominance in Europe. Many early American 
presidents had served as secretary of state and were adept at playing European 
powers against each other. Although probably not engaging in war with France 
or Great Britain specifically to combat one-nation dominance in Europe, 
America nevertheless seems to become war prone whenever such dominance is 
threatened. Whatever its motivations, the War of 1812 began amidst a public 
clamor for action, although war was declared by the narrowest margin ever.15 
The fact that it was even declared, the preceding large turnover in the Congress, 
and the strength of the War Hawks,16 is indicative of this public clamor, 
especially since the United States and Great Britain were approaching a settle- 
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ment on the major disputed issues. The dissent that existed had to be tolerated 
because of some regional concentration (New England) and the danger that 
undue suppression might have posed to the very existence of the young United 
States. The War of 1812, occurring during the middle third of an extrovert phase, 
ended with a virtual restoration of the prewar status quo. Liberal America had 
been too fixated on extroversion to easily negotiate a settlement, but became 
flexible enough over time to end conflict with no worse than a stalemate solution 
to a war which had involved a threat to its territorial integrity. 
The second American extrovert phase had scarcely begun when war was 
declared on Mexico in 1846 with great popular and congressional support.17 
Prevailing American sentiment saw the territorial gains of the war as contribut- 
ing to the fulfillment of America's "Manifest Destiny," but the war also 
maintained interests in North America. The liberal public, however, had not yet 
fully progressed beyond the confused period of mood phase transition, and 
dissent rose as the ambiguity of the war's beginning and other problems became 
evident.I8 Dissent was tolerated because, as in the War of 1812, there was some 
regional concentration of dissent in New England; because the public mood was 
not yet strongly extroverted; and because, after some initial military engage- 
ments, victory over Mexico seemed imminent. In contrast to the War of 1812, 
but perhaps as an adjustment to the introversion which had characterized 
American policy until 1844, the Mexican War was settled favorably for the 
United States under a treaty which provided for the cession of New Mexico and 
California in exchange for a Rio Grande River boundary between the United 
States and Mexico and monetary considerations totaling $18.25 million. Even 
so, the extrovert mood was still consolidating, and prolonged negotiations were 
undertaken before a treaty was submitted to and ratified by the U. S. Senate. l9 
The American Civil War, an internal matter obviously related to the 
territorial integrity of the nation, occurred near the end of the second extrovert 
phase. This war is unique because Americans were the only major participants, 
and yet mood still played a part in perceptions of it. Before the war, during the 
middle years of the 1844-1871 extrovert phase, the normal degree of extroversion 
was a bit subdued by the North-South conflict since both sections were con- 
cerned with the question of whether annexed territory would be slave or free. 
The Civil War engendered frustration and disillusionment as it dragged on, and 
its fury produced a strong postwar introvert reaction. One can speculate that 
some of the disillusionment regarding the war was taken out on the South during 
Reconstruction. 
The 1891-1919 extrovert phase included the Spanish-American War, in 
which the United States intervened in the Cuban situation to protect its develop- 
ing interest as the dominant indigenous power in the Western Hemisphere. 
Progress toward a peaceful settlement with Spain had been made only to be 
eclipsed by the sinking of the U.S.S. Maine in the Havana harbor under 
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ambiguous circumstances. Reform liberal concern for the oppressed Cubans 
fueled a public clamor for revenge, and by a substantial margin, the Congress 
approved a joint resolution condemning Spanish presence in Cuba. Nineteen of 
the twenty-one Senate votes against the resolution were Rep~b l i can ,~~  indicat- 
ing business liberal reservations. Indeed, business liberals on the whole did not 
favor the outbreak of hostilities with Spain.21 Dissent was not an important 
consideration, however, because a swift military victory seemed certain, and, as 
with the Mexican War, the public mood was not yet overbearingly extrovert. 
American victory did come after three brief months of war, and business 
liberals abruptly changed their attitude as they perceived economic oppor- 
tunities arising from the American acquisition of Spanish te r r i t~r ies .~~ This shift 
and the fact that a Republican was in the White House encouraged Senate 
Republicans to overwhelmingly endorse the peace treaty, which contained a 
provision for the acquisition of the Philippines. Reform liberals, conversely, 
were not yet so extrovert as to plunge decisively into imperialism. The treaty 
barely passed the Senate.23 Many reform liberals continued to disapprove of the 
American occupation of the Philippines, especially of the efforts to quell 
Filipino insurrections. In fact, the 1900 Democratic platform included an anti- 
imperalist plank. However, growing extroversion and an improved military 
situation in the Philippines gradually minimized the effect of the dissenters. In 
the introvert 1930s, definite efforts to divest the nation of its major Pacific 
holding were made only to be delayed by the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor. 
The 1898 acquisition of the Philippine Islands from Spain can be related to 
the United States interest in preventing European dominance in the Far East. 
Americans viewed European nations as excessively hungry for colonies and not 
above banding together to shut the United States out of the Far East. By 
establishing a foothold in that area, the United States thwarted possible Euro- 
pean domination and presaged the Open Door policy regarding China. 
President Wilson's actions in Mexico during the years prior to America's 
1917 entry into World War I, although inspired by an overly ambitious extrovert 
desire to help the Mexicans govern themselves, had some relation to the United 
States interest as the dominant power in the Western Hemisphere and, after a 
1916 border raid, to United States territorial integrity. America entered World 
War I to make the world safe for democracy; the entry was also related to the 
U.S. interest in freedom of the seas and the prevention of one-nation dominance 
in Europe. There were numerous dissenters to American involvement in World 
War I, and they were not readily tolerated. Although the public was beginning to 
tire of the extrovert mood which started in 1891, the overall extrovert mood wa3 
still strong and dissenters had the misfortune of facing and bearing its wrath. 
World War I, like the Civil War near the end of an extrovert phase, was 
instrumental in creating a public reaction toward introversion. Perhaps this is 
because the liberal American public had become so fixated upon extroversion 
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that the nation could not make the necessary adjustments to do no more than 
needed to maintain its actual interests. World War I, under Wilson's messianic 
leadership, created expectations that were not fulfilled despite military victory, 
and resulted in generalized public disillusionment. United States intervention in 
the Soviet Union after World War I can be ascribed to Wilson's desire for an 
active American world role and U.S. concern with prevention of one-nation 
dominance in East Asia. Japan, in contrast to its exhausted European allies, had 
been greatly strengthened by its World War I participation, especially in 
territorial gains in the Pacific. Japanese troops, with an eye on further expan- 
sion, were sent into Vladivostok, followed by smaller numbers of British and 
American troops. The American reason for intervention, supposedly to rescue 
Russian war material and anti-Bolshevik Czechoslovak troops, was actually "to 
thwart Japan's imperialistic designs in Manchuria and Siberia."24 
After an introvert period of no effective opposition to Japanese designs on 
East Asia and German designs on Europe, America early in the 1940-68 
extrovert phase entered World War 11, acting to protect neglected interests in 
Europe and East Asia, as well as freedom of the seas. The war with Mexico and 
the Spanish-American War, also at the beginnings of extrovert phases, similarly 
were waged in part to redress previous extremes of introversion. 
There were fewer dissenters during World War I1 than there had been during 
World War I, and there was greater tolerance of their views. 25 The mood/interest 
theory could be used to explain the numerical difference by observing that 
World War I1 posed a significantly greater danger to American security inter- 
ests, because those interests had been neglected in the introvert years prior to the 
war to a greater extent than in the extrovert years prior to World War I. The 
smaller number of dissenters in World War I1 allowed Americans to be more 
tolerant. Many Americans also remembered their own introvert mistakes in the 
1930s and therefore were tolerant of what they perceived as mistakes of others. 
A related consideration is that people ahead of the times in World War I1 were 
pushing the need for extroversion; their task was made easier by the Japanese 
attack on Pearl Harbor. As in the Mexican and Spanish-American wars, the 
American public was in a state of transition from introversion to extroversion, 
and the circumstances of the times did not necessitate intolerance of dissenters; 
during World War I the transition was occurring in the opposite direction. 
Later in the 1940-68 extrovert phase, America sought to protect its interests 
in East Asia by entering the Korean conflict. The danger involved in the 
undeclared war, although less than that in the two world wars, was considerable 
in terms of possibilities for escalation. President Truman's limited objective of 
preventing a North Korean takeover of South Korea was foreign to liberal 
America's "all or nothing" mentality regarding wars, particularly at a time of 
growing extroversion. In fact, the American liberal public mood generally was 
more extrovert than the president's policy Hence, the president's major pro- 
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blem was those who wanted the war fought in a more vigorous manner rather 
than those who opposed the war. In this atmosphere, antiwar dissent did not 
constitute a major problem. As with the War of 1812, liberal America was un- 
likely to negotiate an early settlement in the midst of an extrovert phase but was 
still flexible enough to settle for a compromise return to the prewar status 
quo. 
In the last years of the 1940-1968 extrovert phase, the United States entered 
the %etnam war to combat communist designs believed to threaten one-nation 
dominance in East Asia. Like the Mexican War, the Vietnam war was begun 
with a considerable degree of public and congressional support.26 In both cases, 
a great deal of dissent was generated over time as it became clear that the 
circumstances at the start of both conflicts were more complex than had been 
indicated to the public. In the case of the Mexican War, however, dissent was 
abrogated by an intensifying extrovert mood and decisive military victory. 
Conversely, the Vietnam war began in the latter part of an extrovert phase and 
steadily lost support and gained dissenters as military victory was not forthcom- 
ing. American liberals became frustrated with the limited war situation which, 
like Korea, was contrary to their "all or nothing" war mentality. Dissatisfaction 
increased. Since the Vietnam conflict was increasingly perceived as posing no 
major danger to United States security, dissenters were generally tolerated. But 
like the Civil War and World War I, the Vietnam war produced bitterness, 
disillusionment, and a reaction toward introversion. American participation in 
Vietnam involved more than was needed to pEvent one-nation dominance in 
East Asia, and because of the public mood change, it was brought to a frustrating 
conclusion in 1973, five years into the current introvert phase. After 1969, the 
real conflict within the United States was between those who wanted to with- 
draw slowly because of power realities, represented by President Nixon, and 
those who believed that a faster withdrawal was needed, as represented by many 
in Congress. The slow withdrawal school won, but at the political cost of a 
substantial rise in congressional power and a reaction against Nixon's realist 
methods. 
Of particular significance in the history of American warfare is the lack of 
new politico-military commitments during introvert phases. In the long run, 
however, the reality of international relations overcomes the extremes of either 
American mood. After 1945, the United States had to assume an active role on 
one side of the power balance in both East Asia and Europe to maintain its 
interests. This eventually led to overinvolvement in Vietnam, and only in the last 
decade has the United States returned to a desirable level of international 
activity. Internal forces checking American politico-military actions are likely 
to be strong over the next few years, which should produce opportunities for the 
reduction of tensions. During this time American policy could become less 
realistic and more unilateral, particularly in a politico-military sense. On the 
82 American Foreign Policy Interests 
surface, the value to other nations of reaching accommodations with the United 
States might seem questionable. However, a summary of past American wars in 
relation to extrovert phases indicates that more is to be gained by accommoda- 
tion than by confrontation with the United States. 
America has fought eight major wars since the Revolutionary War. The 
three wars occurring in the f i t  third of an extrovert phase were not anticipated 
on the basis of United States behavior in the decade prior to the war, but all three 
ended positively for the United States. The Mexican War ended in military 
victory and large acquisition of territory; the Spanish-American War ended in 
military victory, big power status, and small acquisition of territory; World War 
I1 ended in military victory and superpower status for the United States. Such 
unexpected action on a small scale was experienced by the French and the 
Barbary states in the first third of the first extrovert phase. In summary, an 
introvert mood will change into an extrovert mood and there is fury in such a 
change. The most dangerous situation for an American adversary is strong 
American action whose thrust can be sustained over a long period of time, which 
is precisely what can be expected at the start of an extrovert phase. This alone is 
reason for a present or potential future adversary to be cautious in taking 
advantage of American introversion. The continued existence of nuclear ca- 
pabilities makes this situation all the more crucial. 
By contrast, the two wars in the middle third of an extrovert phase, the War 
of 1812 and the Korean war, ended in essentially the prewar status quo. The three 
wars occurring during the final third of an extrovert phase, the Civil War, World 
War I, and the Vietnam war, ended with varied military situations, but in each 
case disillusionment with the war was instrumental in a public reaction toward 
introversion. 
It is apparent that the mood/interest analysis is readily applicable to wars: 
their justification, dissent toward them, and their resolution. American foreign 
policy interests at times in the past have required war for effective pursuit; but 
those interests pursued too laxly, or too zealously, can result in costly wars 
whose outcomes fail to benefit the United States. These interests need consistant 
attention, but the shifting moods of the American public manifested in liber- 
alism can prevent it. 
As has been asked with increasing frequency in recent years, is it not 
possible to rise above this balance-of-power situation and move toward a greater 
global interdependence and peace? A good deal of literature has arisen relating 
to this subject, some arguing in favor of principles involved in such a move,27 
and some emphasizing difficulties involved because of military power balance 
 structure^.^^ The conclusion drawn by the moodlinterest theory is that global 
interdependence is a viable goal and one that the United States should work 
toward, but overly wishful thinking should not overcome the need to consider 
basic security. In previous introvert periods, emphasis on economic and human- 
itarian concerns has contributed to the tendency to neglect security. Perhaps a 
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hard look at American diplomatic history can help avoid this possibility in the 
current introvert phase. 
George Modelski's long cycle theory of dominant world powers must also 
be considered. Modelski argues that since around 1500 A.D., a cyclical pattern 
of international politics is discernible. In cycles of a little more than one hundred 
years, certain nations have held a position of dominant power and have evolved 
through four subphases, starting with world power and ending in global war. 
The last cycle, in which Great Britain was the dominant power, ended with 
World Wars I and 11, at which time the United States assumed the dominant 
power position in a new cycle.29 
The significance of this cycle theory is that the United States is now in the 
stage of the current long cycle which Modelski calls "Delegitimization. " Thus, 
the stage known as "Deconcentration" has to pass before the threat of global 
war looms again. Comparing the long cycle theory with the moodlinterest 
theory, the next American extrovert mood is not likely to occur in the most 
volatile stage of Modelski's international cycle. If, indeed, this long-cycle 
theory holds true, there is some hope that the next extrovert period will not be as 
violent as some,past extrovert periods have been. On the other hand, the gradual 
deterioration of American dominance predicted by the long-cycle theory and 
the dangers of nuclear weapons suggest that adequate protection of American 
interests will remain important. 
SECONDARY INTERESTS 
Economic and humanitarian interests are important to the United States. Be- 
cause these interests consistently appeal to the American liberal ideology, they 
receive a more constant attention than politico-military interests and are not 
subject to the fluctuations of public mood that determine politico-military 
foreign policy. Humanitarian and economic interests thus are less prone to the 
problems involved in the moodlinterest conflict. Politico-military interests, 
necessary to the survival of the nation's people and territorial integrity, take 
precedence over economic and humanitarian interests in the hard world of 
international 
Economic Interests 
Economic interests are of secondary importance in the determination of 
American foreign policy and differ from politico-military interests in their 
relation to liberal public moods in America. Although ideologically disin- 
terested in politico-military matters, American liberals, especially business 
liberals, have a constant concern for economic affairs. Economic extroversion, 
an important aspect of capitalism, is apparent in introvert as well as extrovert 
mood phases. President George Washington's Farewell Address states that "the 
great rule of conduct for us, in regard to foreign nations, is, in extending our 
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commercial relations, to have with them as little political connection as possi- 
ble. "31 Selig Adler's study of isolationism concludes: "Yankee willingness to 
offer sacrifices of profitable business upon the altar of non-entanglement has 
been the exception rather than the rule."32 In 1975 an analyst noted that 
American isolationism "insofar as it has existed has been specifically political 
and military."33 Some more recent sources do not emphasize this traditional 
distinction between economic-humanitarian interests and politico-military in- 
terests when discussing the degree of internationalism in the American public's 
foreign policy thinking. They do acknowledge, to some extent, a diminished 
desire for military intervention abroad but do not relate this directly to tradi- 
tional introversion as does the moodlinterest analysis. 34 Economic consistency, 
as seen by the mood/interest theory, can be explained in part by restraints of 
profit and loss, which make economic concerns less prone to fluctuations of 
mood than humanitarian or especially politico-military intere~ts.3~ 
Public perceptions of the relative importance of economic and politico- 
military issues are, however, subject to the prevailing mood. In extrovert phases, 
economic issues are overshadowed by those of a political or military nature; 
during introvert phases America directs more time and intellectual energy 
toward economic issues. This is a difference in relative attention more than an 
actual fluctuation of interests. 
The United States has proved its ability to be economically assertive 
regardless of public mood phase. During the second introvert phase, President 
Jackson was quite aggressive in demanding payment of debts owed by the 
French. In the introvert phase following the Fxst World War, the United States 
became known as the infamous "Uncle Shylock who demanded that European 
governments repay their war debts. Later in this same phase the Congress passed 
the Johnson Act against governments which had defaulted on their financial 
obligations to the United States. The current introvert phase has seen a marked 
postwar resistance to assistance to Vietnam, Laos, or Cambodia. All of these 
actions can be attributed to an introvert desire to make a point regarding poor 
politico-military investments of the previous extrovert years: perhaps some 
money can be salvaged from these investments, or at least more money and lives 
will not be sunk into a situation regretted by an introvert public. 
The operation of business, tariff, and price fluctuations apart from the 
regular foreign policy mood fluctuations also suggests that economic interests 
are of secondary importance to politico-military interests. This is not to say that 
economic considerations cannot have some influence on a mood phase, only 
that they are not the primary influence. If they were, economic interests would 
relate directly to moods. 
Tariff changes, for example, usually are made in response to different sets 
of circumstances, rather than foreign policy mood changes. In the early period 
of economic and political nation-building, the tariff was used as a tool to 
promote unity, independence, and revenue. Once the danger of foreign attack on 
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the United States faded in 1828, tariffs were reduced. With the outbreak of the 
Civil War, high tariffs were once again imposed until about 1913. Since the Civil 
War, "the United States has been in five wars: the Spanish-American War, 
World War I, World War 11, the Korean War, and the Vietnam War, but in none of 
these wars, strangely enough, has the tariff been raised."36 A comparison of 
dates and direction of tariff changes with those of the mood phases in foreign 
policy indicates that there is no strong relationship between tariff changes and 
the particular introvert or extrovert phase. 
The lack of a definite relationship between business cycles and foreign 
policy moods is just as evident as the lack of a definite relationship to tariffs. 
Frank Klingberg observed in 1952 that there seems to be no decisive effect from 
depressions in stimulating the United States to undertake "foreign adventure. " 
Further, he identified seven significant depressions that occurred during intro- 
vert phases and four during extrovert phases. 37 Since that time, there have been 
the recessions of the 1950s in an extrovert phase and the recessions of the 1970s 
in an introvert phase.38 
One economic fluctuation whose dates might be compared to the dates of 
American liberal mood fluctuation is the wholesale commodity price index as 
measured by N. D. Kondratieff in 1926.39 His dates are not the same as 
Klingberg's, but there are enough similarities from 1844 to 1919, when 
Klingberg's transition years fell within Kondratieff's six- to eight-year long 
wave turning points, to suggest economic considerations can contribute to a 
politico-military mood. One problem with comparing the Kondratieff cycles to 
American foreign policy moods is that his cycles apply to Britain and France, 
which have not experienced regular foreign policy mood fluctuations, as well as 
to the United States. Kondratieff's cycles also do not apply to prices of all 
commodities and are less regular than American foreign policy mood fluctua- 
tions. The later fluctuations continue to be important, but in view of the decline 
of the gold standard there is debate as to whether Kondratieff's cycles are 
applicable to the post-World War I1 period.40 Work by Jay W. Forrester indicates 
that another Kondratieff cycle has been completed since 1920;41 this could 
mean that the rough comparison with the Klingberg dates can be extended. 
However, W. W. Rostow argues that changes in the world economy in 
1972-1976 might mark the first stage of a fifth Kondratieff upswing;42 if so, this 
upswing does not correspond to American politico-military extroversion. 
George Modelski has compared his theory of long cycles to the economic 
fluctuations described by K~ndra t ie f f .~~  His findings display a significant 
correspondence between Kondratieff's waves and the subphases of his long 
cycles. This leads one to ask whether or not politico-military interests and 
economic factors might be interrelated to the point that they are inseparable. 
The correspondence between Kondratieff s waves and Modelski's long cycles 
helped convince the latter that perhaps this was indeed the case.44 The mood/ 
interest theory maintains that economic factors have high priority in the United 
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States, and emphasis during an introvert mood can make them appear even more 
important, but politico-military interests are characteristically most important in 
United States foreign policy. 
Several researchers have carried Kondratieff's long waves to the present. 
One interpretation that has a suggestive relationship with the modinterest 
theory is that of Jacob Van Duijn, a Dutch economist, who builds on concepts 
initially posited by Joseph S~humpe te r .~~  Van Duijn divides Kondratieff's 
swings into periods of prosperity (including war), recession, depression, and 
recovery. Table 25 (page 188) gives the percentages of introvert and extrovert 
periods that are consumed by each of Van Duijn's four divisions, each of which 
is eight to fourteen years in length. 
This table indicates that international prosperity phases (which include 
years designated as war by Van Duijn) usually occur in extrovert periods, while 
international depressions are exclusively an introvert phenomenon. Interna- 
tional recovery tends to be concentrated in introvert times, and international 
recession is a little more evenly divided between the mood types, though 
tending more toward introvert phases. Thus, harsher international economic 
realities seem to accompany introvert periods, while better international eco- 
nomic conditions are present in times of extroversion. 
Robert Elder, Jr., and the author have explored these relationships further, 
comparing mood subphases of American foreign policy with the Van Duijn 
subphases of Kondratieff. The degree of correspondence between the two was 
suggestive. It was also found that an American war preceded every international 
economic downturn defined by Van Duijn, with one, the =etnam war, starting 
just before the downturn and continuing through a large part of it. An American 
war has occurred after every international recovery; but World War 11, a war that 
the United States was, for the most part, forced to enter, was fought during a 
recovery phase. This Elder-Holmes research indicates that American foreign 
policy patterns are more regular than those of other countries, and suggests that 
internal considerations, such as those advanced by the modinterest theory, are 
more important in the United States than in other countries.46 
The world economy appears to have a closer relation to American foreign 
policy moods than does the domestic economy. This could be due to rela- 
tionships between the world economy and world politico-military situations. As 
previously noted, the latter situation, as reflected in interests, ultimately affects 
mood. Since most other countries do not make as sharp a definition between 
politico-military and economic interests as the United States, it is unlikely that 
the world economy and world politico-military trends have as sharp a di- 
chotomy as American trends. However, this does not mean that the internal 
American mood is a product of economic considerations except in a rather 
indirect sense. The United States continues to promote economic interests on a 
regular basis while its politico-military mood fluctuates. 
The partial independence of these economic indicators from the fluctua- 
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tions of foreign policy moods suggests a lack of primary importance of econom- 
ic considerations in the making of American foreign policy. Indeed, the utility of 
a country's active world politico-military role as a means of inducting general 
economic prosperity can be que~ t ioned .~~  A recent relevant example is the well- 
known strength of the West German and Japanese economies as compared to the 
economies of some countries with more active politico-military roles. Similarly, 
a study published in 1977 indicated that from 1948-1967, a period of extrover- 
sion, "there was little or no correlation between intervention and U.S. business 
involvements during or after foreign crises."48 A study based on research in the 
early 1970s notes that: 
Even those [business executives] who would resist substantial cuts in the defense budget 
seem unconvinced that such cuts would have important deleterious effects on the 
country. . . . Just 33 percent thought such a large cut "would have an adverse effect upon 
the American economy," and only 38 percent thought "a retrenchment of U.S. foreign 
policy commitments would have a negative effect on U.S. economic expansion abroad. " 
. . . we find that the businessmen evidence substantial readiness to see the United States 
retreat from many of the military and political commitments of world power.49 
?his lack of relationship between extroversion in economic matters and extro- 
version in politico-military matters is apparent in the ideology of Senator 
William E. Borah of Idaho, a staunch isolationist, who nevertheless criticized 
the 1922 Fordney-McCumber Tariff as building "a wall around the United 
 state^."^^ The paradox appears again in Herbert Feis's analysis of the 
1919-1932 era, which notes that although Americans opposed the League of 
Nations, they were still "disposed to relieve [world] suffering, to rebuild its 
destroyed parts and to help it regain health and strength," and that the three 
Republican administrations of the era "were in favor of our foreign financial 
activity."51 Later during this introvert phase, President Franklin Roosevelt 
successfully pushed for reciprocal trade provisions. The extrovert economics of 
Senator Henrik Shipstead of Minnesota also differed from his politico-military 
ideology; one of two senators to vote against United States membership in the 
United Nations, he still believed that American farm problems had to be treated 
as part of the world economy if they were to be solved.52 
Conversely, Americans who tend toward politico-military extroversion may 
not be so extroverted in their economics. An example can be seen in the current 
priorities of American labor organizations. Although predominantly extrovert 
and anticommunist in its politico-military persuasions, American labor tends to 
favor further restrictions on international trade to compensate for certain diffi- 
culties in competing in an open world market. American farmers, on the other 
hand, while perhaps sharing some of labor's politico-military convictions, are 
better able to compete internationally and favor fewer restrictions on world 
trade. 
A relevant finding is that of Bruce Russett and Elizabeth Hanson, who 
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conclude that foreign policy beliefs of businessmen are influenced more by 
domestic ideology than by economic interests.53 The mood/interest analysis 
does not deny the role of business leaders in the formulation of American 
foreign policy. Rather, it suggests that in foreign policy, business leaders, like 
other leaders, act first in accord with their liberal ideology. Business leaders 
also pursue economic interests. 
The current liberal introvert mood shows the expected propensity for 
assertiveness in economic matters. President Carter displayed a desire to de- 
crease arms trade and in the case of another oil embargo, to use economic 
weapons to combat the offending nations. President Reagan has been willing to 
increase American arms sales in several instances. Such willingness, however, 
has not been accompanied by a corresponding degree of politico-military 
assertiveness. This dependence upon economic rather than politico-military 
clout during an introvert phase is predictable, but rather than proving economic 
fluctuations, it indicates instead that politico-military answers to foreign policy 
questions have temporarily been shoved into the background. 
Humanitarian Interests 
It has been noted that American liberal ideology contains an inherent 
aversion to matters of a politico-military nature. A more constant concern- 
especially of reform liberals-has been humanitarian interests, not only in 
domestic issues but also in American dealings with other nations. Throughout 
American history, medical and religious missionaries have promoted these 
humanitarian interests. Humanitarian concerns are more variable than econom- 
ic concerns whose variation can be checked by profit-and-loss considerations, 
as well as by ideology; however, both are less variable than politico-military 
concerns. Nevertheless, humanitarianism in foreign policy can vary in meaning 
and application in the introvert and extrovert mood phases. 
During the second introvert phase, 1824-1844, Americans expressed hu- 
manitarian concern for the people fighting against authoritarian control by 
European governments. In 1830 President Jackson and members of his cabinet 
appeared at rallies supporting the July Revolution in France.54 Later in the 
decade, Americans were sympathetic to Canadian insurgents fighting for 
greater rights against the British government. The third introvert phase, from 
1871 to 1891, witnessed American involvement in the recently established 
International Red Cross and the 1882 signing of the humanitarian Geneva Treaty 
of 1864 by President Chester Arthurss at the same time that the United States 
was avoiding politico-military involvements. The fourth introvert phase, like 
those before it, saw humanitarian concerns remain constant when politico- 
military concerns had diminished. Although a marked lack of enthusiasm for 
international involvement characterized this period, Herbert Feis has pointed 
out that Americans were "pleased" by their humanitarian efforts to relieve 
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suffering and to rebuild certain areas destroyed by World War I.56 The Neutrality 
Acts of the latter part of this phase were not applied against China, the 
underdog, in its struggle with Japan. Considerable missionary influence was felt 
regarding China policy, and the United States consistently maintained a deep 
humanitarian concern for the welfare of the Chinese people, as well as concern 
about growing Japanese influence.57 
Humanitarianism during extrovert phases is more likely to evolve into 
politico-military involvement than during introvert phases. Such was the case in 
the 1890s when humanitarian concern over the oppressed Cubans contributed to 
the outbreak of the Spanish-American War. Similarly, post-World War I1 
humanitarianism was eventually translated into anticommunist support. Follow- 
ing the war, Americans expressed sympathy for the suffering millions of war- 
devastated Europe. Secretary of State George Marshall publicly suggested that 
economic assistance be given to all European countries willing to cooperate 
with others in self-help efforts. The Soviet Union was asked to participate but 
was not interested, nor did her satellites become part of the Marshall Plan. 
America's growing extrovert mood, stimulated by the February 1948 political 
coup that delivered Czechoslovakia to the communists, strengthened domestic 
support for economic aid, and the Marshall Plan was passed by Congress in 
April 1948. Economic constraints are of less concern to humanitarian-based 
foreign policy formulation during such extrovert phases than during introvert 
phases, such as the one following World War I when the United States de- 
manded repayment of European war debts. 
Politico-military considerations are particularly prone to ovemde econom- 
ics during extrovert phases; following World War 11, most Americans grew to 
believe that economic aid would strengthen the anticommunist forces of the 
world through a prosperity which would stimulate "free world" military and 
political strength. However, military aid soon proved popular with an in- 
creasingly extrovert public because this aid could be used to directly resist 
communism, a humanitarian purpose to the American liberal thinking of the 
time. In fact, military aid became so popular that the military rationale was soon 
used as a reason for the United States to provide economic aid even to countries 
where a postwar emergency argument was not applicable. Such military ra- 
tionale was usually able to cany the day against the many foreign aid opponents 
who womed about economy in government and attention to domestic needs. 
Thus, a genuine humanitarian concern evolved into a definite politico-military 
concern during an extrovert phase. 
The Peace Corps was created during the height of the 1940-1968 extrovert 
phase under John Kennedy's administration. President Kennedy's purpose in 
establishing the Peace Corps was to foster beneficial personal relationships 
between American volunteers and nationals of foreign countries where Peace 
Corps workers were providing aid and skilled services. This was an impressive 
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foreign policy innovation, which was intended to be free of other foreign policy 
influences and thus nonpolitical in nature. The Peace Corps, a humanitarian 
gesture by liberal America to the disadvantaged countries of the world, enjoyed 
wide support when it was initiated, worked well abroad, and was in full accord 
with the extrovert mood of the times rationalized in appealing humanitarian 
terms. 
Changing desires of recipient countries, budgetary pressures, and other 
considerations have led to a reduction in the size of the Peace Corps, but it still 
enjoys widespread popular support among the liberal public. Volunteer applica- 
tions have been on the rise and the program seems to be a vigorous, ongoing 
operation.58 The continued support of this program in the face of an introvert 
mood is significant. It demonstrates the strength of liberal America's human- 
itarian concerns and suggests that a cause rationalized and sold to the public in 
humanitarian terms can be sustained independently of the effects of American 
foreign policy moods. 
Interest in foreign aid delivered with a politico-military rationale has 
significantly diminished during the current introvert phase. The "military 
strength against communism" argument has weakened in relation to economy 
in government, humanitarian, and domestic concerns. United States official 
development assistance to foreign countries has declined as a percentage of 
Gross National Product and in relation to percentages of aid given by other 
countries.59 The foreign aid that remains is rationalized more by humanitarian 
interests and less by politico-military concerns than was previously the case. 
President Carter, in particular, was interested in humanitarian aid to Third World 
countries. 
Much politico-military aid in this introvert phase has been seriously con- 
tested. After the 1973 Paris agreements, Congress was ready to allow South 
Vietnamese military equipment levels to decline, and in 1974-1975 Congress 
enacted a troublesome embargo on arms to Turkey. High levels of American aid 
continue to the Middle East, however, in hopes of encouraging an Arab-Israeli 
settlement in that area.60 
The American public's attitude toward arms sales has been generally 
negative. President Carter appealed to this sentiment during his election cam- 
paign, and while in office attempted to decrease military sales with limited 
success. The United States, no longer so concerned with strengthening anticom- 
munist forces, is more willing to give aid for humanitarian purposes; but 
bilateral aid has recently been given more emphasis than multilateral aid. 
Humanitarian concerns in the form of human rights have recently gained 
attention. President Carter's reform liberal emphasis on such matters was 
pursued to the detriment of amicable relations with the Soviet Union and some 
Latin American countries. Congressional enthusiasm for promoting human 
rights at times even surpassed that of the Carter administration during the 
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consideration of foreign aid measures.61 The recent humanitarian emphasis in 
foreign aid might serve to lessen resistance to such aid during this introvert 
phase in the same manner that the politico-military rationale lessened resistance 
during the last extrovert phase. 
Frank Klingberg mentions a current "consolidation (idealism)," Western 
or possibly world, cultural cycle phase which indirectly affects American 
foreign policy. This idealism should add to the normal strength of humanitarian 
considerations in American foreign policy over the next several years and 
perhaps even spur resolution of other foreign policy issues. Thus, in Klingberg's 
opinion the next extrovert phase has the potential to be less violent than previous 
extrovert phases6* 
Humanitarian interests appear more important during introvert phases than 
during extrovert phases because of reduced concern about politico-military 
interests during introvert phases. Yet, overall humanitarianism is a constant 
concern of United States foreign 
In the end, politico-military interests are still the deciding consideration in 
American foreign policy, especially in relation to the moodlinterest conflict. 
Other cyclical theories offer at least some hope for the prospect of relating 
foreign policy issues. George Modelski's theory of long cycles indicates a 
relatively calm period ahead and his cycles seem to relate to Kondratieff's 
economic cycles. Also, Klingberg's "consolidation" phase in the world cultural 
cycle indicates the possibility of a significant change in attitude. If the indica- 
tions of these theories are valid, and if our foreign policy is managed carefully, 
the United States might be able to avert some of the past problems of extrovert 
abuses in the coming extrovert phase. However, the future of American foreign 
policy cannot be forgotten in terms of the moodlinterest theory, because this 
theory does not conclude with the same optimism as the others and is the one 
which most emphasizes American actions and ideologies. 
AN APPLICATION: AMERICAN FOREIGN POLICY 
ON SIX GEOGRAPHIC REGIONS 
The following section applies the Interests Proposition and the MoodJInterest 
Conflict Proposition to six geographic regions. This application illustrates the 
utility of the propositions in analyzing and prioritizing American foreign policy 
toward North America and the High Seas, Latin America, Europe, East Asia, 
the Middle East and North Africa, and South Asia and Sub-Saharan Africa.64 
Two measures were utilized in this analysis as a check against excessive 
selectivity. First, the number of times a geographic area was mentioned in a 
diplomatic history textbook from 1776 through 1967 was charted by region and 
by mood phase. The same source was used to prepare the event chart for each 
region,65 which facilitated comparison among mood phases and regions and 
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also helped to minimize observations made out of context. The results of this 
study are presented in table 26 (page 189). 
A number of conclusions can be drawn from a quick overview of the table. 
Overall patterns show (1) a significant increase in the level of activity over the 
past one hundred fifty years, (2) a definite alternating up and down pattern in 
activity, both by raw figures and by average of actions per year in each phase, and 
(3) a relatively heavy amount of activity in the first fifty years, most likely due to 
the needs of settling a new nation (note that these actions take place almost 
exclusively in North America and Europe). By regions, the following can be 
seen: (1) U.S. actions regarding North America and Latin America most closely 
follow the alternating introverVextrovert pattern, (2) U. S . actions regarding 
Europe evidence a steady drop between 1776 and 1890, followed by a very sharp 
increase through 1967, and (3) U.S. activity in the Middle East and North 
Africa, and South Asia and Sub-Saharan Africa all show an increase, primarily 
since 1940, whereas East Asia has basically seen a steady increase for more than 
two hundred years. These observations are generally supportive of comments 
raised in the sections on each region. A survey of a variety of literature on United 
States policy toward Latin America, Africa, and South Asia to determine the 
extent to which each of the propositions can be related to such literature supports 
the concept of a public-dominated inconsistency in United States pursuit of its 
geographic interests.66 
North America and the High Seas 
Foreign policy problems in North America and on the High Seas naturally 
posed a greater threat to the United States in its earlier history than today. The 
United Kingdom was responsible for a substantial portion of these problems, 
since it ruled Canada directly until 1867 and had considerable influence on the 
High Seas through the early twentieth century. Although earlier relations with 
France, Spain, Mexico, and Russia also related to the United States position in 
North America and on the High Seas, the emphasis here will be placed on the 
more important relations involving Britain's navy and Canada. 
The Interests Proposition and the Mood/Interest Conflict Proposition can 
be seen throughout the history of the United States' dealings with Canada and 
Great Britain. The moodJinterest conflict is illustrated by the fact that after 
American demonstrations of extroversion, settlements usually favor the United 
States; but after a demonstration of introversion, less favorable settlements are 
usually reached. 
The 1794 Jay Treaty, barely ratified by the Senate in 1795 near the end of an 
introvert phase, settled a number of issues remaining from 1783 and the end of 
the Revolutionary War on terms less than favorable to the United States.67 After 
the Revolutionary War, European powers were rarely in a position to threaten 
United States dominance in North America due to geographic distance. Nev- 
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ertheless, the United States worked to preserve its continental dominance with 
particular intensity during extrovert phases. In 1802-1803 when France was 
contemplating actions in Louisiana, the United States was willing to act to 
protect its position. Likewise, British actions in Texas, Oregon, and Canada at 
times resulted in strong United States reactions. After displaying its extroversion 
in the War of 1812, the United States made favorable settlements in the 
"Friendly" Conventions of 1815-1818. President Adams fumbled on the West 
Indian trade question in 1825, but a more introvert United States under President 
Jackson was willing to settle the matter in 1830, essentially on the United 
Kingdom's proposed 1825 terms. 
The Webster-Ashburton Treaty of 1842, which was a compromise con- 
taining the precise demarcation of the United States border with Canada in the 
area of Maine was signed just before the end of the 1824-1844 introvert phase. 
After demonstration of some extrovert assertiveness, the Oregon boundary with 
Canada was settled on more favorable terms in 1846. A ten-year recipriocity 
treaty was signed with Canada in 1854. The Alabama Claims settlement of 1871 
settled many of the United States-British problems from the Civil War, but there 
was a legacy of unsettled problems with Canada during the 1871-1891 introvert 
phase. An 1893 arbitration settlement was reached concerning sealing in the 
Bering Sea. 
After American extroversion in the Venezuelan Boundary Crisis of 1895 
and the Spanish-American War, a number of other issues were settled. For 
example, fisheries and sealing settlements were made in 1909-1912. United 
States entry into World War I on the British side caused American foreign policy 
toward Britain and Canada to progress beyond the point where any real possibil- 
ity of war existed. Still, fluctuations prove that United States-British and United 
States-Canadian relationships are influenced by the conflict between American 
moods and realistic, politico-military interests. For example, in the introvert 
year 1932 the United States Senate rejected the St. Lawrence Seaway Treaty, but 
in the extrovert year of 1954 an agreement was reached to construct it. 
Today if the United States allows its mood to adversely affect its naval 
power, there is the threat of Soviet denial of freedom of the seas; indeed, during 
the last ten to fifteen years, the Soviet Union has dramatically increased her 
naval capabilities and assertiveness on the high seas.68 
Latin America 
Latin America is of considerable importance to the United States. Since 
World War I when the United States emerged as a world power, foreign policy 
toward Latin America has vacillated in the context of the overall moodlinterest 
conflict. Perhaps unintentionally our Latin American policy has been used to 
balance extrahemispheric policies. Because of weakness elsewhere, United 
States ties with Latin America were strengthened during American introversion 
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prior to World War 11. After 1947-1948, as the United States increased involve- 
ment throughout the world, Latin America tended to be placed on the "back 
burner" and was not moved from that level of importance until it became 
essential to the American interest, particularly during the early 1960s. 
Evidence suggests that the areas which receive a large share of diplomatic 
attention in introvert periods tend to be the same areas that received major 
attention in the previous extrovert period. Thus, as Latin America was a major 
focus of foreign policy during the 1891-1919 extrovert phase, it was also attended 
to fairly often in the 1919-1940 introvert phase. During the most recent extrovert 
phase, however, Latin America received relatively little attention compared to 
Europe and East Asia, suggesting that it might be less popular in the current 
introvert phase. Considering lukewarm support for some of President Reagan's 
attempted actions in Central America, this lack of popularity still seems to be 
the case. However, the strategic importance of Central America and the Carib- 
bean has at times forced strong American action, as during the 1940-1968 
extrovert phase and the post-1968 introvert phase. 
One consistent pattern that the United States has exhibited toward Latin 
America is a greater willingness to become involved in the nations of the 
Caribbean and Central American region than in other Latin American nations. 
This is perhaps due to the idea that the Caribbean Basin is our "third border" 
and that the area has a significant bearing on United States affairs.69 In any case, 
United States inconsistency in foreign policy has had a greater impact on the 
Caribbean and Central America. 
During the 1776-1798 introvert phase America was more concerned with its 
own consolidation than with Latin America; the only exceptions occurred when 
events directly affected this nation, such as those related to the mouth of the 
Mississippi River. As the 1798-1824 extrovert phase grew in intensity, some 
Americans provided help to Latin American forces fighting for independence. 
The Louisiana Purchase was made early in the phase and Florida was obtained 
late in the phase. The Monroe Doctrine, asserting a strong United States role in 
preserving the noncolonial portions of the Western Hemisphere and pledging 
that the United States would not intervene in European internal concerns, was 
proclaimed in 1823 just before the 1824 return to introversion. 
Bickering in Washington delayed the departure of the two American 
delegates to the 1826 Panama Congress of Latin American republics and neither 
delegate ever arrived. As mood would indicate, the Monroe Doctrine was not 
invoked against European actions during most of the 1824-1844 introvert 
phase,70 and Texas was not annexed when the opportunity arose. However, the 
1844-1871 extrovert mood phase saw the application of the Monroe Doctrine, 
American annexation of Texas, acquisition of the present American Southwest 
from Mexico, and a strong post-Civil War indignation over French actions in 
Mexico. 
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In the introvert year of 1873 The Virginius, a ship illegally registered in the 
United States and running guns to Cuba, was seized, and its crew and pas- 
sengers, including eight Americans, were shot; yet public reaction was not 
decisive. The 1871-1891 introvert phase also featured a lack of congressional 
interest in acquiring territory in the Caribbean just before the phase, a relatively 
mild reaction to a French effort to dig a canal across Panama during the middle 
of the phase,'l and sponsorship of a Pan-American conference at the end of the 
phase. These events were mild in comparison to the events in Latin America 
during the 1891-1919 extrovert phase, which featured threats of war with both 
Chile and Britain, and actual war with Spain resulting from Cuban problems 
toward the beginning of the phase; an active American effort to obtain an 
independent Panama to facilitate the building of a canal during the middle of the 
phase; and American intervention resulting in increasing numbers of "protecto- 
rates" during the middle and end of the phase. President Wilson's moralistic 
prodemocracy recognition policy was felt in particular by Mexican governments 
toward the end of the phase. 
United States interventions in Latin America were gradually toned down 
and eliminated during the 1919-1940 introvert phase. The most significant 
events during this period were in Europe and Eastern Asia, but the United States 
mood prevented the application of measures to prevent one-nation dominance in 
these two regions. Perhaps to compensate for weakness in Europe and East Asia, 
the United States pushed for strong, unified Western Hemisphere defense. In the 
1940-1968 extrovert phase, the burst of United States activity that had charac- 
terized the 1891-1919 extrovert phase in Latin America was felt in Europe and 
East Asia. During this period the United States position in Latin America was 
one of a low profile, although action was strong at such times as 1954 in 
Guatemala and after 1959 when communism began to appear in the Cuban 
government. The current introvert phase has seen a push for human rights in 
Latin America by President Carter with mixed results. This push was resisted by 
certain Latin American governments, and recent United States toning down of 
the human rights theme gives evidence of introvert America's reluctance to 
move decisively beyond rhetoric in foreign policy. 
While President Carter did successfully negotiate the Panama Canal 
treaties, neither Carter nor Reagan has had much success in increasing politico- 
military ties to Latin America. As mentioned, Carter's strong human rights 
policies limited his ability to make politico-military advances in the area. 
President Reagan, on the other hand, has used a quieter and less forceful human 
rights stand while trying to form ties, but the American support for Britain in the 
1982 Falklands conflict and the public skepticism about the president's Central 
American policies have so far prevented a great deal of success. 
The immediate strategic importance of Central America and the Caribbean, 
as a geographic area close to one of two world superpowers, creates a residual 
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danger of neglect when the fluctuating moods are focusing mostly on other 
areas. That residual danger was apparent in the development of the Cuban 
missile crisis in 1962. In that case, the U.S. had been too concerned with 
globalism to place a proper priority on its immediate geographic area until the 
Soviets had missiles placed in Cuba. In 1965, due to extreme extroversion, the 
U.S. probably reacted too quickly to events in the Dominican Republic. In 
1983, during the current introvert phase, the U.S. acted to forestall Soviet- 
Cuban activity on the island of Grenada. In that instance, U.S. introversion had 
led the Soviets to think that such a move might be feasible. Because world peace 
is based on stable relationships, U.S. neglect of Latin America combined with 
later corrective actions could be dangerous. 
Europe 
Until 1940 Europe was the center of world politics and, as such, the object 
of a considerable amount of American indignation over its methods of con- 
ducting international political and military affairs.72 Europe was a low priority 
area for direct American effort because American problems with European 
powers usually resulted from situations outside of Europe or on the high seas. 
American involvement in Europe during the 1919-1940 introvert phase was 
concerned with the constant interests of economic or humanitarian issues and 
war prevention agreements. Americans were not interested in politico-military 
alliances that would entangle them in European affairs. Conversely, with the 
beginning of an extrovert phase and America's entry into World War 11, the 
United States became more involved in European affairs. The formation of 
NATO and the Korean war answered the question of whether the United States 
would have a land commitment to the Eurasian continent. 
Indeed, the growth of American involvement in Europe from 1940 to 1968 
can be compared to the growth of American involvement in Latin America from 
1891-1919. There is a striking similarity between the evolution of the United 
States stance in these two different geographic areas during two different 
extrovert phases. In the 1891-1919 mood phase, a change in Latin American 
policy was indicated by a firm United States stance on the Venezuelan Boundary 
Crisis in 1895, followed by the 1898 Spanish-American War. United States 
involvement in Europe from 1940-1968 started with a major war in Europe 
against Nazi Germany, followed by disagreements with the Soviet Union, a 
wartime ally. The bases for a firm stance in Latin America from 1891-1919 were 
United States interventions and the Roosevelt Corollary, which asserted the right 
to intervene. A number of moves, such as standing up to the Soviet Union and 
forming the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, provided a basis for a firm 
stance in the Europe of 1940-1968. Business liberalism was the inspiration for 
President Taft's dollar diplomacy in Latin America and President Eisenhower's 
cost-effective massive retaliation in Europe. Congress soon became extrovert in 
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Latin America as it passed the Lodge resolution, and the post-Sputnik Congress 
was critical of President Eisenhower for inadequate defense measures. The 
1891-1919 extrovert phase in Latin America was capped by President Wilson's 
moralistic admonitions to the Mexicans about democracy during their revolu- 
tion. Similarly, in the 1960s presidents Kennedy and Johnson were admonishing 
Western Europeans to join an Atlantic Community or at least to contribute more 
to their own defense. As Latin America continued to receive attention in the 
1919-1940 introvert period, to the exclusion of some more pressing interests, so 
Europe seems to be continuing to receive attention in the current introvert phase. 
The strategic relationship of the United States to Europe depends in part on 
the U.S. relationship to East Asia. Some strategic policy and Eurasian continent 
questions are best answered in this context. With this in mind, the most logical 
defense plan from the United States' viewpoint, considering American nuclear 
force capabilities, would rely on the United States to provide the strategic 
nuclear capability, accompanied by a conventional capability supplied by the 
Allied nations of the Eurasian mainland. This "massive retaliation" philosophy 
was first articulated by the Eisenhower administration. The United States could 
help in the defense of its areas of interest without maintaining costly conven- 
tional forces. The underlying liberal mood accepts the doctrine of massive 
retaliation in times of extroversion, because the public believes in doing it right 
or not at all. The public is never comfortable with limited war and in times of 
introversion would rather avoid conflict altogether. Eisenhower also talked 
about a presence in new parts of the world at an acceptable cost. As time passes, 
it is becoming more apparent that Eisenhower's message was tough in order to 
appease the growing extrovert mood. However, the mood had not intensified to 
the point that the public demanded action to back up Eisenhower's rhetoric. In 
practice, the Eisenhower administration did not evidence anticommunism so 
much as national interest.73 
During the even more extroverted 1960s under the Kennedy administration, 
the United States developed a flexible response to counter Soviet aggression 
with a response comparable to the challenge. The rationale was that this would 
lessen the chance of the use of strategic nuclear weapons. Kennedy followed the 
globalist rhetoric of the Eisenhower administration, but was forced to pay a 
higher price with a costly flexible response capability. 
During the Kennedy and Johnson administrations the United States ap- 
peared almost equally interested in Laos, Berlin, South Asia, Cuba, and Africa, 
which lessened the priority of Europe. While seemingly abandoning traditional 
geographic priorities for globalism, Kennedy and Johnson assured adversaries 
that American military responses would be equal to the level of the challenge. 
The responsibility for this extroverted policy, however, does not belong to 
presidents Kennedy and Johnson, or to other leaders of the period. The mood/ 
interest theory would argue that Richard Nixon would have had a foreign policy 
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as extroverted as that of John Kennedy if he had been elected to the presidency in 
1960. If blame is to be placed, it would have to be on the extroverted, crusading, 
anticommunist mood of the liberal American public of that time. 
Accordingly, in 1969 President Richard Nixon began a policy more in tune 
with the new introvert mood. Balance-of-power techniques were emphasized to 
lessen the tensions between the United States and the Soviet Union and China. 
The resulting lesser conventional capability could necessitate the earlier use of 
nuclear weapons. President Carter's move to the position of peace by example 
was an expression of the deepening introversion. President Reagan has placed 
more of an emphasis, in rhetoric at least, on containment of the Soviet Union 
rather than human rights.74 However, even President Reagan's flrrnness over 
foreign policy issues has been responsive to public mood, as is evidenced by the 
evolution of his stand on arms control. His rhetoric has not helped our relations 
with Western Europe, though, as they see the Soviets as less of a threat than does 
Reagan. 
A reversal of roles between the United States and Europe has occurred since 
the 1930s when America was doing too little to protect its interests as illustrated 
by the Neutrality Acts. Today, Europe is doing too little to protect its interests 
while the United States carries the burden of Europe's defense. Any military 
confrontation could escalate to the point that the United States itself would be 
destroyed. During the last extrovert phase the United States was too active in 
providing defense for Western Europe, and today could not abandon its commit- 
ment without creating dangerous instability. 
The Eisenhower, Nixon, and Fbrd administrations tended toward meeting a 
military challenge in an all-or-nothing manner, which does not afford much 
flexibility in a given situation and can leave one with only two undesirable 
choices. The Kennedy, Johnson, and Carter administrations tended toward 
meeting a military challenge at the level at which it occurred, which can exhaust 
resources by allowing adversaries to probe specific weaknesses with minimum 
uncertainty and assuring allies that the United States will pick up the slack.75 
Even tendencies between the all-or-nothing and meeting each threat at the level 
at which it occurs have marked  limitation^.^^ President Reagan has been less 
clear about his position on this issue, but he is definitely concerned with 
building a range of nuclear forces and a sustained war-fighting capability. 
Reagan has, however, displayed a belief in linkages between different Soviet 
actions and is linking his policies in various areas together in response. Because 
this differs from the flexible response approach of the Kennedy, Johnson, and 
Carter policy, Reagan appears closer to the positions of the Eisenhower, Nixon, 
and Ford administrations, even though linkage need not involve massive retalia- 
tion. 
Most American analysts believe that the doctrine of mutual assured de- 
struction is operative to the point that the Soviet Union does not need to be 
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matched in every capability. Persons accepting such an assumption can easily 
support a freeze of nuclear capabilities. However, the assumption is disputed by 
some analysts who argue that the Soviets believe in limited nuclear war or that a 
defense such as space-based laser weapons can be devised. If this is the case, the 
Soviet build-up of nuclear weapons must be viewed with alarm. Other analysts 
argue that a no-first-use of nuclear weapons doctrine, possibly combined with 
high technology conventional capabilities, would help in Europe.77 Another 
solution advanced to the nuclear controversy is the high frontier strategy, which 
seeks to utilize United States superiority in space technology to create a 
spaceborne, antiballistic missile defense system, among other ~apabil i t ies .~~ 
Perhaps the solution to the problem lies in reducing the extent of the 
American commitment to the Eurasian mainland: a "Gibraltar" strategy like 
that adovcated by Herbert Hoover in 195079 or a "blue water" strategy like that 
advocated by Walter Lippmann in 1969.80 Under either of these strategies there 
would no longer be an effective American military presence on the Eurasian 
mainland, and militarily the United States would only be concerned with what 
happened outside the mainland. This could force Eurasian allies to develop 
more military capability, reduce prospects for United States involvement in a 
nuclear war, and enable the United States to choose either a nuclear or other 
supplemental response with minimum risk of a protracted limited war. 
The strategy, however, does not account for the effects of a United States 
withdrawal from the Eurasian mainland which would probably include a rise in 
varying proportions of Soviet, Chinese, Japanese, and German power. Note that 
Germany has been crucial to European power balances in this century. If the 
U.S. withdraws its approximately 200,000 troops from West Germany, that 
nation would be placed in the precarious position of having three nuclear powers 
(the Soviet Union, Britain, and France) in its immediate area. Further, the 
strongest of the three, the Soviet Union, is in control of East Germany. At the 
least, U.S. troops would need to be replaced. Should Britain and France grow 
leery of involvement in this situation, West Germany could be forced to increase 
its conventional power to the point of alarming its neighbors or becoming a 
nuclear power. The memories surrounding the start of World War I and World 
War I1 could be particularly dangerous to European and, indeed, world peace. A 
situation threatening one-nation dominance of Europe could possibly develop. 
The Gibraltarlblue water strategy might relieve the United States of some 
immediate responsibilities, but long-term difficulties are likely to change in 
form rather than intensity. 
The mature Atlantic alliance is currently facing an uncertain future. It was 
formed with the idea of common sacrifice with a shared view of a Soviet threat. 
Progressively the alliance has changed into a defense with a disproportionate 
American sacrifice, in part because the U.S. sees a greater Soviet threat than do 
the E~ropeans.~' This new situation points out that what one generation and 
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what one country chooses as priorities may not be another generation's or 
nation's choice.82 The question for the coming decade is whether United States 
mood swings and European-American differences of opinion can be modified 
and NATO revitalized. 
East Asia 
The conflict between American mood and realistic, rational interests has 
been apparent in United States policy in East Asia (China, Japan, Southeast 
Asia, and Northeast Asia). Historically, Europe has been a higher priority to 
Americans than has been East Asia. Most Americans are of European rather 
than Asian ancestry, and American policy regards the consequences of United 
States-European relations as more far-reaching than the consequences of United 
States-East Asian relations. However, Americans have a particular fascination 
with China and, before the current communist regime came into power, directed 
a considerably more enthusiastic humanitarian effort toward China than toward 
most of the rest of East Asia. 
The second extrovert phase was characterized by Commodore Perry's 
mission to Japan. A continuing American presence in China was strengthened 
by treaties granting the United States most-favored-nation trading status, along 
with other privileges, especially in Chinese cities previously closed to Amer- 
icans. During the third extrovert phase an assertive United States acquired 
Hawaii and the Philippines and proclaimed the Open Door policy toward China. 
The introvert mood after World War I evidenced United States withdrawal 
from most world politico-military affairs. America did remain somewhat vig- 
ilant in East Asia, and Japan viewed this as a threat, but the American public saw 
no need for military commitments and lacked sufficient armaments and resolve 
to back a strong policy. At the same time, the United States was anxious to give 
the Philippine Islands independence. It is not surprising, considering the mood 
which dominated American thinking, that Japan attacked Pearl Harbor in 
December 1941. 
The fourth extrovert phase began with World War 11. American emphasis on 
European involvement rather than Asian involvement illustrates the priority that 
United States policy gave Europe over Asia. In 1949, with the defeat of 
Nationalist China, America's special fascination with China was transformed 
into a special dislike. The United States initially hoped that the Chinese brand of 
communism might balance the Soviet brand, but in 1949 this was not perceived 
as a realistic pos~ibility.~~ The extrovert mood allowed Secretary of State Dean 
Acheson to establish a defense perimeter which included the nations of Japan, 
the Philippines, and Australia. 
The apparent communist response to this perimeter was a North Korean 
attack against South Korea in June of 1950. The United States, in an intensifying 
extrovert mood, was the cornerstone of a United Nations effort to combat the 
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attack. The North Koreans were pushed deep into their own territory until 
Chinese "volunteers" intervened and stalemated the war around the original 
38th parallel dividing line between North and South Korea. A settlement was 
reached in July of 1953. 
The American public mood grew increasingly dissatisfied during the two 
and one-half years of inconclusive stalemate, which cost the lives of 54,000 
Americans. The liberal aversion to limited war held firm, even in the midst of an 
extrovert phase. However, the extroversion that predominated did not allow 
America to forget its military commitment. After Korea, American defense 
strategy changed to massive retaliation, indicating that the United States might 
respond with its nuclear arsenal to a communist challenge and did not intend to 
fight another limited Korean-type war. However, largely unnoticed by the public 
was the possibility that the United States might not respond at all or might again 
respond in a limited manner. 
Soon the new American strategy in Asia faced a major test. By 1954 the 
French effort in Indochina was crumbling, and direct American assistance was 
requested. The Eisenhower administration, not wanting another situation like 
Korea, decided that indirect American assistance after French withdrawal might 
be enough to handle the problem. The 1954 Geneva Accords established a 
communist North Vietnam and a noncommunist South Vietnam with provisions 
for free elections in 1956. The United States soon began providing indirect 
military assistance to Laos and South Vietnam. Cambodia, governed by the 
unpredictable Prince Sihanouk, had an irregular interest in American aid. The 
United States had, in essence, taken a limited risk gamble that a limited 
commitment to Indochina would help prevent communist dominance in East 
Asia.84 For numerous reasons, including the fact that the United States and 
South Vietnam did not sign the 1954 accords, the promised free elections were 
not held in Vietnam. 
American policy in mainland Southeast Asia was more ambiguous than 
ambitious. American reluctance to get involved directly related to definite 
desires for peace in the area and a minimum commitment of American effort 
while still containing communism. However, direct support of the indigenous 
people of the area was necessary for a successful American effort. In essence, 
the United States had four potentially contradictory policies: containment, 
maintaining general peace, minimum effort, and indigenous support.85 These 
four 1954 policies replaced earlier American policies of containment, peace- 
fully resolving colonialist-nationalist disputes, avoiding direct American re- 
sponsibility, and aiding the people of the area in a missionaqdhumanitarian 
sense.86 The years 1948-1950 saw the containment of communism gain support 
as the situation in China continued to deteriorate. 
The American extrovert mood gained such strength that containment could 
not be down-played prior to 1968. Simultaneously, the United States escalated 
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all four 1954 policies until 543,500 American troops were in South Vietnam at a 
cost of up to $28.8 billion annually. 87 After 1968, the United States deescalated 
all four policies at once until communist military efforts decided the issue in 
1975. This unintended situation can be viewed as the logical result of inconsis- 
tent American policies dictated by changing moods reacting to complex events. 
The business liberals who were naturally strong in the Eisenhower, Nixon, and 
Ford administrations tended a bit more toward the minimum effort than the 
indigenous support policy, while the reform liberals in the Kennedy and Johnson 
administrations evidenced a bit more interest in indigenous support than mini- 
mum effort. Still, all four policies were almost simultaneously escalated and 
deescalated in the Southeast Asia region. 
The important question currently is whether the United States would be 
prepared to take a more active role if required by a changed East Asian power 
balance. If Japan, China, the Soviet Union, and India remain in their present 
configuration, the current degree of American introversion toward East Asia 
may be relatively harmless. But if the multipolar balance of power falters, 
America could be in a difficult position. Indeed, the United States has had 
numerous economic problems with Japan. Events and situations change rapidly, 
but the United States has so far had enough leeway in the current introvert phase 
to give limited politico-military attention to Asia. The danger is that an extreme 
introvert mood could blind Americans to events upsetting the current precarious 
balance, such as a Sino-Soviet reconciliation, a strong Japanese military role, or 
Russian preoccupation in European affairs accompanied by a strong Chinese 
airlsea capability. 
Strong American introversion in a world where possibilities such as the 
above might materialize could threaten one of America's major foreign policy 
interests-prevention of one-nation dominance in East Asia. A very real poten- 
tial for misunderstanding exists because of the vast differences between United 
States and East Asian cultures. The importance first accorded by President 
Carter to moving toward withdrawal of ground forces from Korea as opposed to 
moving toward settlement of the Taiwan issue is one example of how misunder- 
standing might have presaged ill will for America's future in this area. The 
unsettled Taiwan issue had the potential for a much greater challenge to United 
States interests than did maintaining ground forces in Korea.88 
President Carter's December 1978 recognition of the Peoples Republic of 
China seemed to acknowledge this reality, but recent developments in Sino- 
American relations continue to demonstrate the possibilities for tense situa- 
tions. Adding to the general volatility of the situation, of course, were Chinese 
difficulties with =etnam and the Soviet Union. President Reagan at first made 
and then curtailed moves toward friendlier de facto relations with Taiwan, which 
are viewed very negatively by the Chinese. In general, Reagan has continued to 
pay some attention to American interests in East Asia, perhaps, as with Europe, 
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because the area was of such great interest during the most recent extrovert 
phase. 
There are several reasons why the Sino-American relationship has oscil- 
lated so much: America's fascination with China, complimentary and contradic- 
tory economic and strategic interests, differing views towards human rights and 
the role of government, the Taiwan situation, and different cultural values are 
among the most important. One certainty is that the United States cannot allow 
its moody fluctuation to neglect its interests for too long, for the relationship 
could possibly alter Soviet-American relations. The United States is also cur- 
rently working indirectly with the ASEAN Organization (Philippines, Sin- 
gapore, Thailand, Indonesia, and Malaysia), in part because Soviet involvement 
in Vietnam presents a problem. This relationship in turn keeps the United States 
from drifting too far from China, despite difficulties. 
A weak American response based on a long-standing pattern of introvert 
phase actions to a challenge requiring a strong Ameican response could be 
particularly dangerous. This is especially true if "during the final third of the 
twentieth century, Asia, not Europe or Latin America, will pose the greatest 
danger of a confrontation which could escalate into World War III."89 
The Middle East and North Africa 
Although analysis of previous regions has looked primarily at the impact of 
overall public mood, an understanding of the impact of particular groups also is 
important to the analysis of United States policy in the Middle East and North 
Africa. 
The general public mood is dominant over particular interests in the 
determination of American Middle Eastern policy; thus, general mood condi- 
tions the influence of Americans strongly supportive of Israel. Because more 
Americans are interested in foreign policy during extrovert periods than introvert 
periods, during extrovert phases particular groups are less likely to have an 
influence since general public concern is so much stronger. Nonetheless, 
particular groups may have influence during extrovert periods if they agree with 
the general public mood, as was the case with Americans of East European 
origin during the last extrovert phase. During introvert phases, particular interest 
groups may be allowed strong influence because the general public shows a lack 
of concern or consensus. The result in the Middle East is a moralistic American 
position that backs Israel at the cost of energy supplies and good relations with 
allies and at a time of decline in Israel's international support. 
The shift between the 194CL1968 extrovert and post-1968 introvert phases 
has been accompanied by an increase in the influence of the pro-Israel lobby. 
This increase can be compared to the growth in influence of ethnic American 
lobbies after World War I and their continued strength until after the Pearl 
Harbor attack, when the generalized public mood lessened their influence.90 It 
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is also important to note that just as these lobbies were stronger in the 1920s and 
1930s, 1981 case studies on this subject suggest that the lobbies are again more 
important in this introvert phase than in the 1940-1968 extrovert phase.91 
Whether or not this is the case,92 the fact that the subject is again being 
considered is worth noting. 
America has not consistently followed its interest in the Middle East and 
North Africa, which is to maintain an area open to the United States and its 
allies. In the past this was a level-two interest as described by Bernard Gordon; 
yet it is now at an intermediate stage and seems to be moving closer to a level- 
one interest, such as the Western Hemisphere, Europe and East Asia.93 During 
the 1940-1968 extrovert phase, the major link of the Middle East and North 
Africa to American interest was the need to prevent the spread of communism to 
Arab countries. Recently, however, emphasis has been placed on the continued 
availability of oil. Another link between the Middle East and American interests 
is the danger of escalation of a Middle Eastern conflict to the point of a United 
StatesSoviet confrontation. 
America followed its interests during the early years of the 1940-1968 
extrovert phase. Americans were sympathetic to the plight of the Jewish people 
in World War I1 and their desire for a homeland, and more practically the Jewish 
vote could not be ignored in the U.S. election of 1948. But most Americans 
realized that it was in America's interest to continue good relations with Arab 
countries to prevent the spread of communism. There emerged in the 1950s an 
even-handed United States diplomatic balance between a pro-Israel and a pro- 
Arab position. This policy was due in a large part to a balance between a concern 
about the spread of communism into any Arab country and most Americans' 
support of Israel. Under this even-handed policy, the United States refused to 
join in the British-French-Israeli effort against the United Arab Republic in 
1956. 
A crucial strategic consideration in the area is that the Arabs and Iranians 
control the vast majority of the land, people, and energy resources. Since the 
June 1967 war just preceeding the 1968 change in American moods, the United 
States has become Israel's primary, major power backer in the world. America 
has done what most of its citizens who express opinions believe morally right, 
contrary to some professional military and diplomatic advice and at the expense 
of strained relations with allies and the possibility of a renewed oil embargo. 
Efforts by former president Gerald Ford and his secretary of state Henry 
Kissinger to mediate between the Arabs and the Israelis, while providing 
substantial aid to both sides, were an attempt to achieve balance in American 
Middle East policy. The maneuvering room available to the president and his 
secretary of state was limited by the obvious strength enjoyed by pro-Israel 
forces in the Congress. The economic effectiveness of the Arab oil weapon 
(demonstrated since 1973) and recent division within pro-Israel forces has 
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lessened this strength, although not to pre-1968 levels. While the United States 
is at least informally committed to the nation of Israel in any major conflict in 
the Middle East, necessary attention to economic matters has meant that the 
energy problem is increasingly important to governmental policy. Egyptian 
President Sadat's 1977 visit to Jerusalem forced the United States to resume the 
mediator role between the Arabs and the Israelis, but with less control over the 
situation than previously. The Carter administration resumed the mediation role 
it had temporarily downplayed in favor of a general peace effort. The 1978 
United States military plane sales to Egypt and Saudi Arabia, as well as to Israel, 
and the 1981 sale of Airborne Warning and Control Systems (AWACS) radar 
planes to Saudi Arabia, illustrate reduced enthusiasm for a strong pro-Israel 
stance in the face of some division within the ranks of Israel's friends. 
The 1978 Camp David agreements represented a potential breakthrough on 
the road to peace in the Middle East, but in the 1980s the United States must still 
try to reconcile the Israelis and the Arab nations in the face of increasing 
problems. The 1981 Israeli attack on and destruction of Iraq's nearly completed 
nuclear reactor, the assassination in 1981 of Egyptian President Anwar Sadat, a 
major figure in the peace efforts, and instability and foreign presence in 
Lebanon all serve to severely complicate United States efforts for peace. While 
Secretary of State Kissinger and President Carter were both personally active in 
the Mideast peace efforts, President Reagan has operated mostly through envoys 
and regular diplomatic channels. Placement of U. S. marines in Lebanon in 1982 
as part of an international peacekeeping force illustrates continued American 
interest in the Middle East. However, strong opposition led to their eventual 
withdrawal from Lebanon in 1984. 
Tbe current introvert phase has allowed pro-Israeli groups to gain power. 
However, if Israel relies too heavily on this support, it may find that this same 
introversion keeps the United States from backing its promises in a decisive 
manner. Should the pro-Israel lobby clash with the general public mood, Israeli 
supporters would lose, as has happened in the past. American support for Israel 
is necessary to maintain the power balance in the region so that Israel will not 
have to rely on its reported nuclear ability. However, in the largest sense, the 
United States has more to gain from inducing a settlement than from having its 
policy fluctuate between strong and weak Israeli support. It must be kept in 
mind that our interest is to maintain the Middle East and North Africa as areas 
open to the United States and its allies. 
South Asia and Sub-Saharan Africa 
America's definable foreign policy interest in South Asia is to insure that 
the area remains open and does not upset the balance of power in East Asia. 
Likewise, in Sub-Saharan Africa, America's interest is to maintain an open area. 
Mood has not been as obvious a force in the formulation of policy for either 
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geographic area as in other places because South Asia and Sub-Saharan Africa 
have not been considered areas of priority in American foreign policy. Nev- 
ertheless, public mood has influenced American interaction with both areas. 
During the 1919-1940 introvert phase, one of the reasons the United States 
refused to join European alliances was that it did not want to support the 
perpetuation of European colonialism in these areas. The United States not only 
wanted to av id  entanglement in European affairs, but also in South Asian and 
Sub-Sarahan African affairs. The United States usually supported independence 
from European Colonial rule first for South Asia and then for Africa as it was 
granted to major countries in these regions during the 1940-1968 extrovert 
phase. 
South Asia was of the most concern during the 1940-1968 extrovert phase 
when President Eisenhower's secretary of state John Foster Dulles built a ring of 
American alliances around the communist world. John F. Kennedy's globalist 
activity fed interest in Ahca  as well. The Eisenhower administration supported 
the formation of the Baghdad Pact (later CENTO) and SEATO. India's opposi- 
tion to the alliances created ill-will between the United States and India, but the 
Kennedy administration hoped to cure this by emphasizing humanitarian con- 
cerns for the people of South Asia in hopes of stopping the spread of commu- 
nism. In 1960 the Eisenhower administration would not give direct assistance to 
the strife-tom Congo (now Zaire) government, but it did support United Nations 
assistance. The Kennedy administration actively urged United States assistance 
to various newly independent Sub-Saharan African governments. In 1965 one of 
several Pakistan-India conflicts arose over Kashmir; the United States, whose 
extrovert mood was beginning to expire, stopped providing military aid to either 
side. The predictable result of this action was that India was drawn closer to the 
Soviets and the Pakistanis closer to the Chinese. During the last decade of the 
1940-1968 extrovert phase America was concerned about the spread of commu- 
nism as black nations became independent from colonial rule in Sub-Saharan 
Africa. However, toward the end of the decade the Johnson administration was 
necessarily cool to possible involvement in matters related to the 1967 Congo 
crisis after there was a strong negative congressional reaction to his decision to 
send three transport aircraft to the area.94 
In the current introvert phase the United States has been even less willing to 
have a politico-military presence in Africa and is therefore more tolerant of 
Soviet and Cuban involvement than it was during the preceeding extrovert 
phase. This lessened degree of action is illustrated in South Asia by America's 
largely verbal stance on the 1971 India-Pakistan war; the United States had tilted 
toward Pakistan which was split into Pakistan and Bangladesh as a result of the 
war. In South Asia the current introvert concerns of the United States are peace 
maintenance, humanitarian support for the people, and improved relations with 
India. In 1975 the United States was unwilling to become involved in Angola 
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even though the Soviets and Cubans were heavily involved. Although recent 
United States policy has not prevented large-scale Soviet and Cuban interven- 
tion in Somalia, Ethiopia, and Angola, the issue has not been ignored. Resolu- 
tion of the 1977 and 1978 conflicts in Zaire was left largely to European and 
African powers. 
Related to less United States involvement are the United States views 
regarding the support deserved by the United Nations, a body in which African 
nations in particular have a strong voice. In the United States, support for the 
United Nations generally has declined during the current introvert phase. 
Foreign economic aid needed by countries in South Asia and Sub-Saharan 
Africa has remained unpopular.95 Further, the net flow of official United States 
development assistance as a percentage of gross national product generally has 
been declining, especially in relation to other donor nations.96 
American liberal moods affect policy through a changing emphasis in 
South Asia and Sub-Saharan Africa. During the 1940-1968 extrovert phase, 
liberal Americans expected these nations to share concern about the threat of 
communism-an expectation not always met, as in the case of India. In the 
current introvert phase, liberal Americans, with varying degrees of emphasis, 
expect these nations to share the American concern about peace. Thus, in the 
conflict between white- and black-ruled Africa, the United States emphasizes 
peace while black nations emphasize justice. In recent years, and especially 
during the Third World-conscious Carter administration, the United States has 
increasingly tilted toward black-ruled Africa, though the Reagan administration 
has slowed down this trend. South Africa is now the only remaining white-ruled 
nation on the continent, and the United States has emphasized a peaceful 
settlement of this issue. 
The constant United States interest in an open area requires some military 
preparedness and willingness to take strong actions. However, congressional 
strength in introvert phases can curtail already established United States pro- 
grams as well as prohibit new assertive actions. Congressional veto of the Ford 
administration's efforts to aid noncommunist forces in Angola is one example. 
Congress has also been assertive with foreign aid programs for South Asia and 
Sub-Saharan Africa. 
The American interest in keeping South Asia and Sub-Saharan Africa open 
has not been abandoned during the recent rise of introversion. In the short-term, 
the dependence of the United States and its allies upon Middle Eastern oil 
necessitates American concern about nearby South Asia and Sub-Saharan 
Afnca. In the long term, the natural resource potential of the area necessitates 
American concern. The United States presence at Diego Garcia is a desirable 
safeguard in view of Soviet involvement in African nations such as Angola and 
Ethiopia. Such United States action also is related to maintenance of freedom of 
the seas. 
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An increasingly interdependent world requires enough American action to 
achieve interests even in low priority geographic areas like South Asia and Sub- 
Saharan Africa. Declining American willingness to take politico-military ac- 
tions in the two areas is potentially dangerous. 
This anlysis of the Interests Proposition and the MoodJInterest Conflict 
Proposition as related to American foreign policy toward six geographic regions 
indicates that the propositions are useful for long-term analysis. The nation's 
constant interests are definable and at times are pursued properly by United 
States foreign policy. Geographic regions can be stratified by the importance 
and the amount of action it takes to pursue American interests in each area. At 
times American foreign policy emphasizes one geographic area to an excess or 
to the neglect of American interests in another area. The best way to see the 
overall workings of the Interests Proposition and MoodJInterest Conflict Propo- 
sition is to look at the balance among U.S. policies toward each of the 
geographic areas at various points in time. The MoodIInterest Conflict Proposi- 
tion when applied to diplomatic history illustrates the ongoing struggle between 
America's interests and its fluctuating moods. 
4. Mood/ Interest Pluralism 
The Public Rule Proposition of the mood/interest theory maintains that the 
public mood is a dominant force in American foreign policy, limiting govern- 
ment action. United States government institutions have evolved in a liberal 
environment; the liberal's distrust of power is evidenced by a penchant for 
democratic and limited government with power divided among its various 
components. The founding fathers, taking such views into account in the 
Constitution, divided the conduct of foreign policy primarily between the 
executive and legislative branches by a complex set of checks and balances. 
This joint conduct of foreign policy became confused in practice and strongly 
subject to the pervasive liberal public mood. 
EXECUTIVEILEGISLATIVE RELATIONS 
The effects of mood fluctuation upon executive/legislative relations in Amer- 
ican foreign policy have been particularly important, which is the basis for the 
ExecutiveILegislative Proposition of the moodlinterest theory. The major mood/ 
interest pattern regarding these two governmental branches are: (1) the relative 
roles of the Congress and the president in foreign policy formulation are directly 
related to public moods, and (2) although the president always remains influen- 
tial, the Congress has its greatest foreign policy strength during introvert moods; 
the president has his greatest foreign policy strength during extrovert moods. 
One foreign policy scholar, Michael Roskin, has identified Congresses since the 
1870s as either "cooperative" (generally corresponding to the extrovert mood 
phases of the mood/interest analysis) or "obstructive" (generally corresponding 
to introvert mood phases).' The Executive/Legislative Proposition is well sup- 
ported historically; exceptions have occurred, but a general pattern is clear. 
During an extrovert mood phase, the public is not only willing, but anxious, 
for the United States to assume a significant role in international affairs, 
whether it be "Manifest Destiny" or "Guarding the Free World." The sense of 
urgency implied by such stirring slogans allows little patience for the ponderous 
workings of a legislature divided by its numerous and diverse membership. 
Thus, foreign policy tends to be delegated to the chief executive, who com- 
mands a large bureaucracy and can move without the time-consuming con- 
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sensus-building necessary for congressional action. The president has more 
freedom to act and can do so with a dramatic flair, appealing to the adventurous 
imagination of an extrovert public. In order to satisfy the public demand for 
quick action, the Congress, with a large legislative workload, is often forced to 
let some foreign policy powers slide over to the White House where the decision 
need only be made by one person. Because of public pressure, the Congress 
tends to approve presidential action in extrovert phases and may even encourage 
more extreme action. Congress prodded cautious presidents prior to the War of 
1812 and the Spanish-American War during the first and third extrovert phases. 
During the last extrovert phase, Congress encouraged a cautious President 
Eisenhower to raise defense spending, and the McCarthy hearings stimulated an 
increasingly anticommunist position in American foreign policy. 
Generally speaking, however, the executive needs little prodding during 
extrovert phases. Examples of strong executive leadership are apparent in each 
of the extrovert phases throughout American foreign policy history. During the 
1798-1824 extrovert phase, President Jefferson commenced an undeclared war 
with the Barbary state of Tripoli (1801) and President Monroe issued the Monroe 
Doctrine (1823), without prior congressional approval. In 1846, at the start of the 
next extrovert phase, President Polk sent American troops into disputed territory 
near the Mexican border on his own initiative, thus precipitating hostilities with 
Mexico. War was subsequently declared by the C~ngres s .~  Later in that extrovert 
phase, the Civil War was conducted principally by President Lincoln, who 
assumed broad war powers from an obliging C~ngress .~ 
In the extrovert year of 1900 President McKinley, without congressional 
approval, sent 2,500 American troops to China to join an international force in 
quelling the Boxer Rebellion. McKinley's successor, Theodore Roosevelt, or- 
dered troops ashore in Panama without congressional approval, issued the 
"Roosevelt Corollary" of the Monroe Doctrine in his 1904 annual message, and 
sent the American fleet around the world to impress other powers after a hesitant 
Congress agreed to the idea. President Wilson, belatedly backed by the Con- 
gress, initiated armed action in Mexico later during the same extrovert phase.4 
The leadership roles of Wilson in World War I, Franklin Roosevelt in World War 
11, Truman in the Korean war, and Kennedy during the conflict in Vietnam 
dominated Congresses which were usually acquiescent. President Johnson, 
while possibly not intending to take such a leadership role when he first entered 
office, felt compelled by circumstances and an increasingly extrovert mood to 
lead the country in its fight against communism in Southeast Asia. The 1968 
shift to introversion was accompanied by an increase in the foreign policy 
assertiveness of the Congress, felt by President Johnson and especially Presi- 
dent Nixon. During extrovert phases, the dominant role of the chief executive in 
foreign policy is rarely decisively challenged on politico-military matters.5 
During the most recent extrovert phase there was an increase in executive 
agreements (bypassing the Congress). Most military interventions since World 
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War I1 have been largely executive acts, subsequently funded by the Congress to 
insure the safety of United States troops. However, along with the shift of 
attention to the president goes an increase in accountability. Should a majority 
party president deviate too far from the public mood, the minority party has a 
chance to win the presidency, as in the cases of Dwight Eisenhower succeeding 
Harry Truman in 1953 and Richard Nixon succeeding Lyndon Johnson in 1969. 
During an introvert phase, on the other hand, congressional power in 
foreign policy usually increases. The Congress is well equipped to support the 
types of policies advocated by the public mood. Being slow to act and encum- 
bered by complex procedures, the Congress can easily refuse to support 
presidential initiatives in foreign policy. The Congress can also assert its right to 
be consulted because the public is not impatient for action. Congressional 
workload is less of a limitation during introvert phases simply because it does 
not require the same degree of preparation to downplay presidential requests for 
authority, reject treaties, or to queston appropriations for overseas politico- 
military activities as is required to enact decisive new programs. 
The result of the congressional role during introvert phases is the restriction 
of foreign policy activity. More assertive congressional actions regarding major 
United States armed actions overseas can be seen during introvert phases than 
during extrovert  phase^.^ The attitude of the Senate toward treaties is a somewhat 
more complicated subject because of the several different types of treaties as 
well as the complex dynamics of Senate-White House intera~tion.~ In general, 
the Senate has been most assertive regarding politico-military matters during 
introvert phases. 
The introvert assertiveness of the legislative branch is apparent in past 
American introvert phases. Under the Articles of Confederation during the first 
part of the 1776-1798 introvert phase, legislative bodies were so strong that a 
policy consensus was nearly impossible to achieve. In the 1824-1844 introvert 
phase, President Jackson carefully referred to the Congress foreign policy 
questions that involved the possibility of war, considering declaration of war and 
"all the provisions for sustaining its perils" to be a congressional prer~gative.~ 
The Congress proved perfectly willing to accept this responsibility, as evidenced 
by the Senate's unanimous rejection of President Jackson's 1834 request to take 
tough measures against France, which had delayed in making restitution for 
American property destroyed during the Napoleonic wars.9 
During the third introvert phase, presidents, wary of congressional power 
after Andrew Johnson's impeachment, trod carefully in their foreign policy 
dealings. The Senate, Arthur Schlesinger, Jr., notes, "freely exercised its 
power to rewrite, amend, and reject treaties negotiated by the President. Indeed, 
it ratified no important treaty between 1871 and 1898."1° Later, in reacting to 
President Wilson's internationalism, the Congress of the fourth introvert phase 
assumed a strong role in formulating foreign policy, so strong that "at times it 
almost seemed that two foreign offices vied with each other at either end of 
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Rnnsylvania Avenue." Indeed, Senator William E. Borah of Idaho, chairman 
of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee for nearly ten years, conducted some 
of his own international diplomacy.ll Isolationist senators, despite the conflict- 
ing opinions of presidents and pressure groups, ardently and successfully 
opposed United States participation in the World Court.12 The Nye Hearings of 
the mid-1930s reminded those in authority of the investigative powers of the 
Congress and set a strong introvert tone which cautioned against any obvious 
expressions of extroversion. In the late 1930s, the Congress enacted the Neu- 
trality Acts, helping to insure that President Roosevelt would not compromise 
the introvert public mood at that time. 
Although congressional assertiveness has not been strictly confined to 
introvert phases, careful study reveals definite trends which might be expected 
to continue in the current introvert phase. An increase in congressional power 
relevant to the president's strength in foreign affairs is one of the clearest 
indicators of an introvert mood. Although the extent of congressional power may 
be debated, the relative foreign policy roles of Congress and the president have 
obviously been altered in the decade and a half since the end of the last extrovert 
period. Such change has led to a significant amount of new literature on the 
subject. l3 
Randall B. Ripley identifies four models of congressional involvement in 
policy making. l4 Although Ripley argues that all four models are in operation in 
different policy areas at all times, these models are useful for classifying recent 
literature regarding foreign policy formulation. The first model, which some 
analysts argue has been and will remain the basis of foreign policy, is executive 
dominance.15 Analysts supporting this view say that the executive is the 
primary source of foreign policy power, and apparent trends other than this are 
either tempoary or nonexistent, although fluctuations might occur. A second 
model which several contemporary analyses indicate is the growing trend in 
foreign policy is congressional dominance, which argues that Congress is the 
major policy initiator.16 Some argue that such presidential weakness is un- 
wise.17 The remaining two models are joint program development, where 
Congress and the executive work together on policy, and stalemate, where the 
two branches work against each other thereby producing no policy. These last 
two models can be combined to form a co-determination model,'* which holds 
that Congress and the executive share policy-making authority 
Although siding with one or another of these models when analyzing 
foreign policy in recent years is not easy, one consideration is clear: the amount 
of literature produced on the subject indicates that legislative-executive rela- 
tionships have changed. Indeed, some recent empirical studies demonstrate how 
the role of Congress has changed.19 However, the mood/interest proposition that 
1968 marked the beginning of a new introvert mood indicates these changes are 
part of the pattern of foreign policy history for the last two hundred years. If the 
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pattern continues, Congress can be expected to continue to have at least the 
current level of influence in foreign policy matters until there is a mood change. 
As mentioned above, it may be difficult to determine the extent of congres- 
sional foreign policy power but events, such as the late 1970s Angola situation, 
show that Congress is indeed able to set some foreign policy When the 
executive branch attempted to conduct a secret war in Angola by supporting one 
faction in a civil war, Congress, seemingly reflecting an introvert mood, 
exposed the situation and forced a halt. As Neil Livingstone and Manfred Von 
Nordheim note, "Any future covert action undertaken by the executive branch 
will have to be relatively small and unimportant or Congress will uncover it and 
expose it to public scrutiny."20 President Reagan found this out regarding 
operations in Nicaragua in 1983 and 1984. Obviously, the Congress does have 
i n f l ~ e n c e . ~ ~  
Similarly, Congress has taken the initiative to limit presidential military 
action through the passage of the 1973 War Powers Act, which provides a formal 
mechanism to help the Congress say "no" to executive military initiatives 
abroad.22 Indeed, a 1978 study noted that President Carter operated under more 
than seventy congressional foreign policy constraints, and advocated repealing 
only three.23 Likewise, a 1981 study notes what is termed a "Congressional 
Spring," a sigificant growth in the exercise of congressional control of foreign 
policy from 1968 to 1978. The study also argues that Congress's new asser- 
tiveness is not likely to be reduced.24 In the past eight years public support for 
this congressional role has remained high. Public opinion polls in 1974, 1978, 
and 1982 found that public support for a more important role by Congress in 
foreign policy ranged from 43 percent to 48 percent. A stronger role for 
Congress ranked second of the twelve institutions offered as choices to have 
more influence in 1974 and 1982, and was third-ne percentage point behind 
the president-in 1978. The choice continually given the most support for a 
stronger role was public opinion.25 In terms of the moodlinterest analysis, the 
movement to congressional power started with the introvert mood in 1968, and 
the new relationship probably will remain until the start of extroversion. 
A look at President Reagan's actual, as opposed to contemplated, involve- 
ment in El Salvador and Central America shows that congressional control has 
not decreased. Perhaps executive acceptance of much of the current congres- 
sional role reflects a hope to prevent additional restrictions. On the other hand, 
President Reagan has very meticulously taken into account how Congress 
operates, especially in terms of its foreign policy powers. Thus, Reagan may 
have achieved some more leeway in these matters at the expense of giving 
Congress more of what it wants in the first place.26 In any case, congressional 
assertiveness reflects the return to introversion, and may in turn help stimulate 
extreme introversion if the Congress acts as it has during previous introvert 
phases.27 
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It should be noted, however, that some of Congress's gain in power over 
foreign policy matters has been compensated by court rulings in favor of the 
president. Of several examples concerning President Carter, two that stand out 
are the challenge by a business of Carter's actions in settling the Iranian hostage 
crisis in 1981 and Senator Barry Goldwater's challenge of Carter's termination of 
the Mutual Defense Treaty with Taiwan in 1978; in both cases, the courts upheld 
presidential authorityz8 Similarly, the Curtiss-Wright case, decided by the 
Supreme Court in 1936, four years before the end of the fourth introvert phase, 
yielded increased authority for the president. Although the actual decision had 
to do with approving Congress's right to delegate certain foreign policy powers 
to the president, the rationale behind the decision was more significant. In 
essence, the argument was that the head of government has certain inherent 
powers necessary for dealing with the current nation-state system, and that these 
powers and needs of the nation-state system antedate the restrictions imposed on 
the president by the Con~ti tut ion.~~ A fourth example of court rulings that 
benefit the president is the 1983 Supreme Court's decision that struck down the 
legislative veto. The exact scope of this decision is still unclear, but it could 
involve such important legislative curbs on presidential power as the 1973 War 
Powers Resolution provision that allows Congress to direct the president to 
remove troops engaged in foreign hostilities without congressional authoriza- 
t i ~ n . ~ O  Here it can be seen that sometimes, when foreign policy formulation 
leans heavily toward legislative control, the court process in the American 
system can work toward striking a balance. 
Stalemate is a likely condition when and if two disagreeing governmental 
branches each have significant power in a democracy and refuse to compromise. 
Even compromise often leads to little substantive change. The moodlinterest 
curve shows a rise and plateau effect when combined with rising interests. Part 
of the plateau effect could be due to stalemate or small changes during introvert 
phases when policy is made by both the president and the Congress. 
Liberal distrust of governmental institutions has created a balance which 
encourages both the legislative and executive branches to follow the public 
mood. In extrovert phases, the legislature usually goes along with a fast-acting 
executive who is responding to public mood. In introvert phases, the slow-acting 
legislature usually sets a tone in accord with the public mood, and most 
executives find it prudent to accommodate that tone. 'Ihe high probability of 
competition for public favor, if one branch deviates from public mood, probably 
precludes a joint legislative/executive attempt to harness the public mood. Is 
such an attempt feasible within the executive branch alone? 
PRESIDENTIAL LEADERSHIP STYLES 
In 1975 Samuel Huntington wrote, "to the extent that the United States has been 
governed on a national basis, it has been governed by the pre~ident."~' The 
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president indicates the direction of United States foreign policy, but is in turn 
guided by the public mood. Having gained office in part by virtue of his 
closeness to that mood, the president, necessarily knowledgeable in the machi- 
nations of politics, aims to please the e l e ~ t o r a t e . ~ ~  If he fails in this endeavor by 
being unable to respond to changes in public mood or by initiating policy 
drastically out of line with the prevailing mood, he will be replaced. There has 
never been a shortage of potential candidates for president, and the public 
usually has the opportunity to choose one who is attuned to its liberal mood. 
An effective president must be good at interpreting contradictory signals 
from short-term public opinion. For example, in a nationwide March 1978 poll, 
NBC News asked about the likelihood that the United States would become 
involved in a war in the next three years. Over half of the respondents replied that 
war was likely. A month earlier, the Gallup poll reported that only 9 percent 
rated foreign policy as the nation's most important problem.33 Recent public 
opinion studies show that the importance of foreign affairs jumped for a time in 
1980, but that it soon dropped again.34 The president is thus forced to decide 
how much emphasis to place on foreign policy in order to head off what the 
majority of people see as an impending threat of war, as opposed to economic 
problems which have been the nation's most important concern in recent years. 
Presidential perceptions of overall mood can be a crucial ingredient in such 
presidential choices on difficult issues. Thus, in an indirect manner, presidents 
are prone to follow mood when making foreign policy decisions. 
Almost anything that the president does in a decisive manner will increase 
his public support, at least temporarily, but will this support be sustained upon 
further consideration of the president's action by the public? Again, the underly- 
ing public mood will have much to say in the ultimate determination of whether 
the president's decisiveness was really wise. 
A matter that became increasingly important during the post-World War I1 
growth of the foreign policy bureaucracy was presidential management style. 
The interaction of a president's style and the public mood indicates that mood 
plays a dominant role, although style variations can have an impact on policy. 
Major style considerations include decision-making mechanisms and types of 
informational advice received by the president. Comparisons of the styles of the 
Kennedy and Johnson administrations as opposed to the Eisenhower and Nixon 
administrations provide a clear contrast in styles of managing the large foreign 
policy bureaucracy that has characterized the United States since World War 11. 
One view of presidential styles widely accepted by American political 
scientists is that of Richard Neustadt, who argues that a president should 
encourage informal competition among his advisors to insure that all pertinent 
information gets through to him.35 This argument is similar to the capitalistic 
faith that unencumbered economic competition will best serve the public, and is 
a strong argument wherever meaningful competition is assured. Domestic 
policy is one area of assured competition; Americans have a continual interest in 
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domestic affairs and major domestic interest groups are skilled at making 
known their desires. However, such is not the case with foreign policy. Both 
presidents John Kennedy and Lyndon Johnson followed much of Neustadt's 
organizational advice while involving the United States in Vietnam. There are 
inevitably many different ideas about techniques for handling foreign policy 
crises, and an activist group of foreign policy advisors selected during a period 
of extroversion is likely to present a variety of short-range advice reflecting the 
public mood. Presidents Kennedy and Johnson received such a variety of short- 
range advice, more on tactics than on overall strategy, from their decision- 
making systems of competitive advisors. 
It would be beneficial for the president to receive a diversity of long-range 
advice, in addition to short-range advice, some of which might question the 
wisdom of the current mood. Advice given by groups active in long-range 
planning, such as the professional military, and groups having regular contact 
with long-term foreign trends, such as the intelligence community and the State 
Department, is complex but should be heard regularly as well. These groups can 
offer a variety of reasoned alternatives which are formulated independently of 
American public mood. 
During the height of the recent extrovert phase, the type of advice most 
needed was that emphasizing caution, particularly as it related to Vietnam. 
During the 1963 controversy over the efficacy of the South Vietnamese regime 
of President Diem, General Paul Harkins repeatedly posed the question of what 
would follow a Diem o~e r th row.~~  Without an authoritative answer to this 
question, the overthrow was permitted, and the United States was drawn deeper 
into the conflict. Two years later, CIA Director John McCone cautioned against 
becoming involved in an indecisive land war from which we "will have extreme 
difficulty in extracting ourselves. "37 This warning was ignored. During the 
same year, Under Secretary of State George Ball expressed grave reservations 
about U.S. policy toward Vietnam.38 Failure to heed such cautions might have 
been inevitable in view of the prevailing extrovert mood, but these examples 
nevertheless show the potential value of long-term advice offered independently 
of the public mood by bureaucratic agencies like the professional military, State 
Department, and the intelligence community. Admittedly, other bureaucratic 
advice was less than cautious, and all that can be asserted here is its value in 
some instances. An introvert illustration of the value of some bureaucratic 
agency advice is provided by Samuel Huntington, who says that in the late 
1930s the military was more realistic than the 
Followers of Neustadt would perhaps raise the objection that President 
Kennedy and especially President Johnson did not tolerate individuals who 
dissented from dominant administration thinking and that this intolerance was a 
mistake. Practically, it is unrealistic to expect a president to keep those who 
disagree with his policies as members of his inner circle, or even to retain people 
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who anger his supporters. However, a president could realistically decide to 
listen to his bureaucracy on a regular basis even when they are not all in accord. 
Finally, over-dependence on a set of advisors to the exclusion of the bureaucracy 
is not politically expedient since implementation of major policies requires 
bureaucratic cooperation. 
If agencies that must execute policy are brought into the decision-making 
process, then they at least are aware of current policy. An activist style can 
unfortunately make it difficult for those implementing policy to determine it, 
because of the premium placed on flexibility in foreign policy by top officials. 
Without clearly defined objectives, policy can too easily become structured by 
immediate events which may have disastrous consequences, as in the United 
States conduct of the Vietnam war. 
The regularized and formalized decision-making structures used by the 
Eisenhower and Nixon administrations were valuable because they brought a 
variety of long-range viewpoints into the system. The National Security Council 
system introduced ideas from the professional military, the State Department, 
and the intelligence community. During the Vietnam war, advice offered by 
these sources which suggested extremely risky actions was usually rejected by 
the Eisenhower, Kennedy, and Johnson administrations, although some risky 
actions were taken. Cautious advice was more often heeded by Eisenhower's 
apparatus than by Kennedy's or Johnson's. In 1954, for example, the Joint Chiefs 
of Staff called Indochina "devoid of decisive military  objective^,"^^ and 
Eisenhower did not grant the French request for aid. However, Eisenhower's 
preference for agreed-upon solutions did tend to prevent the bringing of options 
to his attention. 
President Richard Nixon took office just after the change of the foreign 
policy mood from extrovert to introvert. He preferred a regularized structure like 
that of President Dwight Eisenhower, but required his National Security Council 
to proffer alternatives from which he could choose. Nixon's modification of the 
Eisenhower system worked quite well although eventually the Nixon system 
became dependent upon one person-national security advisor, and later secre- 
tary of state, Henry Kissinger. Kissinger's conservative realism at least provided 
some balance to the liberalism of the public mood. Whereas Eisenhower was 
served well by cautious advice which could temper the growing public extrover- 
sion of his time, Nixon was best served by consideration of realistic alternatives 
which satisfied the new introvert mood of his time. The extent to which 
Eisenhower or Nixon benefitted from their particular structure, as opposed to 
their position in relation to public mood is debatable, but each of their systems at 
least provided regular consideration of extra-mood viewpoints. 
An important variable in presidential advisory systems, as analyzed by 1. 
M. Destler, is "how much particular Presidents have favored formality and 
regularity in the flow of analysis and advice to them. " Destler ranks Eisenhower 
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as making the most use of regularized channels, and Kennedy as making the 
least, with Johnson tending more toward Kennedy. Another variable which 
Destler deems important is "how widely Presidents have wished to cast their 
nets for advice. " Kennedy is ranked highest and Nixon lowest in this considera- 
t i ~ n . ~ l  The important factor here is that Kennedy, while looking for a wide range 
of advice, took it only within the context of the liberal public mood, minimizing 
regular and more conservative input.42 Eisenhower, on the other hand, gave 
greater weight to these extra-mood opinions and Nixon, while consulting fewer 
advisors, had in those few advisors some viewpoints independent of the public 
mood, in part because of Kissinger's c o n s e ~ a t i s m . ~ ~  
The Carter administration preferred a style closer to that used by Kennedy 
and Johnson. Lawrence Korb notes this change in studying the number of 
Presidential Review Memoranda (PRM) issued to the National Security Council 
by President Carter during his first year in office. President Carter issued only 
thirty-two PRMs during his first year in office, while Henry Kissinger, as the 
assistant to the president for National Security Affairs, issued eighty-five 
similar requests during the first year. Korb wrote, "The President thus appears to 
be moving away from the NSC process to the informal arrangements which 
characterized the Kennedy-Johnson years. "44 While Carter indeed spoke of 
reducing the NSC's dominant position, in the end he gave assistant for National 
Security Affairs Zbigniew Brzezinski an even greater role than Kissinger had, 
making him the first in that position to have cabinet rank.45 Yet, it can be argued 
that this still accords with Carter's activist style, in that Brzezinski was not an 
extra-mood force; as with most of Carter's NSC, he did not deviate from Carter's 
policy or public mood. This distinguishes Brzezinski from Kissinger in that the 
latter's balance-of-power approach often dictated actions and methods deviating 
from the dominant mood. 
President Reagan, on the other hand, did significantly reduce the role of the 
national security assistant, especially as far as public exposure is concerned, as a 
result of the general feeling that the assistant's power had gotten out of hand in 
recent years.46 Reagan's general style in foreign policy seems rather to be that of 
a delegator, more so than any president since Eisenhower. Like a typical 
consolidator president, Regan prefers a variety of input to provide foreign policy 
options from which he can choose. A system with varied inputs can inherently 
include conflict. Such conflict has been apparent at times in the Reagan 
administration, but it should be viewed as a natural outgrowth of a system that 
allows for different sources of input.47 Although his system is not as structured 
as Eisenhower's, it is clear that a delegator like Reagan cannot follow an activist 
~ t y i e . 4 ~  
Some changes in the Reagan foreign policy administration shed light on the 
system toward which Reagan is working. In early 1982, National Security 
Assistant Richard Allen resigned. He was replaced by William Clark who, 
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though he was formerly Reagan's deputy secretary of state, did not have a 
professional background in foreign policy. Then, in the summer of 1982, 
Secretary of State Alexander Haig resigned and was replaced by George Shultz. 
In both of these changes, the question of foreign policy authority was involved 
to some degree, and the change was from a strong personality to more of a "team 
player" type.49 In late 1983 Clark replaced Interior Secretary James Watt, and 
Robert McFarlane took Clark's position as the national security assistant. The 
Reagan National Security Council apparatus has a great deal of power while 
retaining a low public profile.50 Consequently, Secretary of State Shultz is 
viewed more as a mediator and implementer while the president and his aides set 
the broad outlines of U.S. foreign pol i~y.~ '  This evidences the fact that Reagan 
is pursuing an authority balance in his foreign policy system, leading to a variety 
of input sources.52 One such source can be seen with Reagan's tendency to 
appoint national commissions to offer alternatives when his foreign policy 
decisions are too unpopular with Congress or the people. For example, he 
appointed commissions to study the MX missile issue and American involve- 
ment in Central America. 
Alexander George's study of presidential decision-making suggests the 
desirability of collegial decision-making and some structured multiple ad- 
vocacy. These possibilities represent ideals which would take considerable 
presidential effort to realize, as George himself notes. Nevertheless, George's 
work represents an important contribution that takes advantage of much presi- 
dential experience. Such research might provide an opportunty for merging the 
advantages of the activist and consolidator style in the context of mood, but it 
would require a degree of presidential fine tuning of which little has been 
realized.53 
A president is naturally unlikely to appoint diversity to his inner circle, but 
should perhaps aim to introduce diversity into the decision-making system 
through regularized procedures. The independent advice of the military, State 
Department, and the intelligence community is at least given regular considera- 
tion in consolidator decision-making systems. The overbearing influence of 
public mood can be countered to some extent when such consideration is given. 
Bureaucratic perspectives alone, however, cannot balance the liberalism of a 
president responding to public mood. All that they might do is temper it. The 
relationship of bureaucratic and other important American institutions to public 
mood must be analyzed to explain why. 
THE FOREIGN POLICY BUREAUCRACY 
The foreign policy bureaucracy can be a means of public influence on American 
foreign policy. In one sense, many American bureaucrats, who themselves can 
reflect public mood, are involved in foreign policy decision-making. A presi- 
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dent who deviates from public mood can expect indirect difficulties from some 
bureaucrats who might, for example, communicate to a receptive Congress and 
press. The possibility of such communication can restrain actions by the 
president. 
In another sense, the foreign policy bureaucracy includes those groups 
most likely to surface ideas not necessarily subject to the prevailing public 
mood: those professional bureaucrats who are ahead of or behind the public 
mood, government personnel who have frequent contact with foreign govern- 
ments, and the professional, naturally conservative, military. These are precisely 
the groups that would have influence in a presidential advisory structure 
featuring regularized channels. This type of presidential advisory system is 
supported as a possible means of minimizing problems presented by public 
mood. 
Although the United States foreign policy bureaucracy, including the State 
Department, the military, and the intelligence community, has a great deal of 
potential for decisive participation in foreign policy decision-making, it is less 
powerful than is commonly asserted. Because the president and his advisors 
make the ultimate decisions regarding major issues,54 attempts to attribute 
major policy decisions to bureaucratic-political organizations are misleading. 55 
However, the bureaucracy can be quite powerful in policy-making when there is 
not an immediate public concern.56 This is not contrary to the argument that the 
public determines foreign policy since the public, in essence, abdicates its 
authority and policy-making power at such times. The concept of the president 
as ultimate authority is also wholly in accord with a mood-oriented theory which 
argues that the public controls American foreign policy because the president is 
elected by the public, whereas the continuing bureaucracy is not. 
The question of the proper bureaucratic role in foreign policy is compli- 
cated by the build-up of the United States foreign affairs bureaucracy since 
World War II.57 This bloated structure makes it difficult to induce creativity and 
often relegates the bureaucracy to opinions which can be agreed upon by several 
persons with minimum difficulty. Such opinions lessen its potential both in 
gaining presidential attention on major issues where alternatives are needed and 
in realizing imaginative solutions to small problems. The structure does, 
however, usually minimize grave errors and works against hastily formulated 
policies. These several considerations are in harmony with arguments regarding 
presidential style because an agreed-upon solution still has the potential to bring 
up important considerations apart from public mood, and such a solution works 
against hasty change. 
The Department of State is the logical bureaucratic agency to check United 
States foreign policy moods, but it is inhibited by a number of  consideration^.^* 
For instance, Foreign Service officers are predominantly reform liberals.59 This 
is a disadvantage in terms of a balanced liberal perspective on policy options, 
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but increased business liberal representation alone could not check the influ- 
ence of public moods. Another consideration which limits the State Depart- 
ment's ability to play a stronger foreign policy role is the tendency of Foreign 
Service officers to view themselves more as grand policy makers than as 
technical administrators. That perspective, only partially valid at best, creates 
some dissonance with other elements of the foreign policy decision-making 
apparatus, especially the president and his experts; it has already been sug- 
gested that major policy decisions most often are made in the White House 
rather than by the State Department, with a direct concern for public mood in 
any case. When the grand policy maker image of the State Department conflicts 
with that of the mood-oriented president, the latter naturally wins. 
Modem foreign policy complexities and State Department reluctance to 
assume managerial responsibilities combined to necessitate post-World War I1 
formation of a number of governmental agencies with foreign policy-related 
responsibilities, independent or quasi-independent of the State Department. 
These agencies naturally have their own interests, and foreign policy decisions 
can represent compromises between agency interests. As a result, the State 
Department is the subject of considerable intermural bitterness which limits its 
role in policy-making. Under a strong secretary, the State Department can 
assume its most important position; however, secretaries are given strength by 
virtue of their relationship with the president, who usually is very close to the 
public mood. 
Bert Rockrnan notes the recent competition between the State Department 
and National Security Council over foreign policy. He states that even with the 
Reagan administration's diminished overt role for the president's national se- 
curity assistant, it is recognized that foreign policy power has been steadily 
drifting away from the Department of State and toward the National Security 
Council since the Kennedy administration. The president and his team of 
advisors have become bolder in the type of foreign policy that they advocate 
while the Department of State has become more r e~ t r a ined .~~  This conclusion 
indicates that the State Department is even more cautious than the president; 
however, it also might indicate that in a few instances the department is less 
likely to support change, which generally has been moving in an introvert 
direction. 
A most important role of the State Department and its Foreign Service 
officers is that of a force which can work to see that due account is taken of 
world events and the thinking of foreign governments in the formulation of 
American foreign policy. The strength of American liberalism can prevent 
consideration of such aspects without a vocal State Department. In the end, 
American policy rightly will be based on the will of its people, but the insights 
that can be gained from the regular contact between the State Department and 
foreign governments are an important policy influence. 
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The military, a significant potential force within the foreign policy bu- 
reaucracy, tends to be conservative by nature and consistently offers a variety of 
foreign policy alternatives to decision makers independent of the public mood. 
The dominant liberal society, however, considers such conservative thinking 
alien and seeks to either assimilate or isolate it6' At various times there have 
been attempts on the part of liberal society to civilianize the military, resulting 
from a fear of independent armed forces, lack of understanding of the military 
role, and more recently, perceived dangers of a "military-industrial complex." 
Such civilianizing compromises the military's natural conservatism and reduces 
its ability to provide alternative viewpoints. The military tends to be most 
conservative when it is isolated, as it usually is during introvert phases.62 
This analysis suggests that even if the military were allowed a role in foreign 
policy making, the resulting conservative policy would not long be compatible 
with a liberal society. Soon the military would be either assimilated in the liberal 
mainstream (more likely in an extrovert phase) or again isolated (more likely in 
an introvert phase) by the liberal society. With the reinstitution of the traditional 
pattern of a volunteer standing army, the military faces isolation once more from 
the mainstream of American society, and it seems likely that its conservative 
contribution to the range of viable foreign policy options will be downplayed as 
in earlier times in American history. 
A third possible source of advice in the foreign policy bureaucracy inde- 
pendent of the public mood is the intelligence community, primarily the CIA. 
However, intelligence community activities are generally directed by the presi- 
dent, who, of course, is responsive to shifting public moods. This is clearly 
illustrated by application of the moodlinterest analysis. Growth and expansion 
of the powers of the intelligence community coincided with the extrovert cold 
war events from 1947 to the late 1960s, which suggests that the growing extrovert 
rnood of the American public helped in the development of the intelligence 
community and muted strong criticism of its necessity and usefulness. As the 
extrovert anticommunist mood grew, the intelligence community grew. Para- 
military operations, not directly related to the information-gathering mandate of 
intelligence, were accepted perhaps because they were in accord with the public 
mood, excessively extrovert from 1962 to 1968. At this point, many question- 
able activities of the CIA were uncovered; however, due to the growing extrover- 
sion of the time, the public was not interested in enacting control measures.63 
When the public rnood changed around 1968, however, there was increasing 
public dissatisfaction with the activities of the intelligence community. Perhaps 
much of this criticism stems from public application of introvert values to 
actions taken by the intelligence community during an extrovert phase. In any 
case, President Gerald Ford in 1976 initiated more action by executive order to 
reform and reorganize the intelligence community than had any other president 
in the previous twenty-nine years. Jimmy Carter followed in 1977 by ordering 
the most sweeping reorganization in thirty yearsa In early 1978 the reorgan- 
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ization was approved by the president. Control in the form of new supervision 
and tougher regulations was consolidated under CIA Director Stansfield Turn- 
er.65 This was in accord with an increased introvert desire to curb abuses. The 
Reagan administration has sought some adjustments to these controls, but the 
intelligence community remains under tight control, as demonstrated by the 
congressional furor over the CIA role in the mining of Nicaraguan ports in 
1984.66 
Intelligence agencies continue to operate in the context of a suspicious 
public mood. The intelligence community, like the State Department and the 
military, has the potential to offer a variety of independent foreign policy 
alternatives, but it too is subject to the prevailing public mood. A policy overly 
influenced by a necessarily secretive intelligence community would be unlikely 
to be long-sustained by a free and dominantly liberal society. The most that can 
be expected from the intelligence community, therefore, is objective information 
on foreign countries. Other actions expected of the community vary according to 
public mood. 
It must be emphasized that the foreign policy bureaucracy is staffed by 
members of the public. This human aspect means that the bureaucracy promotes 
public desires at the same time that it introduces other considerations into policy 
making. Members of the State Department, military, and intelligence communi- 
ty bureaucracies are strongest when they reflect public mood and weakest when 
they are apart from it. While the president controls their actions, they can expose 
presidential deviations from mood to public scrutiny. 
Thus, the three segments of the foreign policy bureaucracy theoretically 
capable of offering policy alternatives to check the extremes of mood are 
constrained in doing so. To begin with, each of the three segments of the 
bureaucracy must operate in the context of the public mood. There are important 
situations in each segment: the State Department could use more diversity 
within the liberal tradition and major organizational reforms; the military is apt 
to become either assimilated or isolated by the dominant liberal society; and the 
intelligence community's role varies with public mood. Increasing the size of 
the bureaucracy is no solution for mitigating the effects of mood fluctuation 
because the State Department, the military, and the intelligence community 
already have sufficient personnel. The possibilities of a major reorganization 
effort likewise are limited. A president cannot easily find the time or the 
resources to trim and redirect the activities of a large and dispersed bureaucracy 
which is willing to fight to maintain its size and status; his time is too divided by 
the duties of his office and the complexities of American politics, as illustrated 
by President Carter's experiences with reorganization. The most that can be 
expected is that the State Department will see that the thinking of foreign 
governments is considered, the military will surface some conservative view- 
points, and the intelligence community will provide reliable information. 
In terms of the current introversion, the present bureaucratic situation might 
124 Mood/Interest Pluralism 
be healthy insofar as the inertia of the foreign policy bureaucracy works to slow 
shifting American policies-a phenomenon which can be helpful when the 
public mood is favorable to policies outside the zone of United States interests. 
Perhaps this will temper the probable public desire to have policies that are more 
introvert than is in the American interest. The prospects, however, are that the 
public mood will continue to win over the bureaucracy, as it did when the desire 
of a substantial part of the foreign policy bureaucracy to continue fighting the 
cold war was moderated after the recent public mood shift to introversion. The 
realizable role of the United States foreign policy bureaucracy is to execute 
policy within set guidelines and offer needed alternatives for consideration by 
the president. This role is limited, but within the framework of the mood/interest 
analysis can be of considerable importance. 
THE MILITARY AND BUSINESS 
One of the most often identified national security relationships is that between 
the military and business. There are many views of this situation, some of which 
speak of active conspiracies. A more sophisticated version might be as follows: 
The military desires the most recent, up-to-date weapons systems available. 
Large businesses and industries, through contacts with the military and govem- 
ment officials, obtain contracts at high profit rates to build such weapons or 
equipment. Many foreign policy agencies support this military-industrial com- 
plex for purposes such as aiding allies, gaining foreign policy leverage, and 
improving balance of payments. All of this can be said to contribute to the 
world's conflicts and draw the U.S. into unwise military involvements. Such 
collusion is often cited as one way the public is prevented from asserting itself. 
All of this could be unrepresentative of public mood. In reality, the situation is 
far more complex. 
Before World War I1 a basic conflict existed between American business 
and the professional military. American liberals of both types were distrustful of 
the traditionally conservative military. The United States operated with a small 
standing military supplemented by a large militia, or reserve force. Large 
professional military establishments were viewed in the same critical light as the 
European penchant for war. The American business liberal was a producer of 
goods and services in the modem tradition, while the professional military was 
identified with the ancient tradition as a destructive force.67 
Many reform liberals, however, and a number of business liberals as well, 
believed there was decisive collusion between business which profited from war 
and the military. The Senate Nye Committee investigations of the mid-1930s 
helped popularize a belief that tied munitions makers to American involvement 
in World War I. This belief, which gained widespread support, stated that 
"Merchants of Death" had sold more to the British side than to the German side 
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and that American intervention on the British side was prompted by the 
necessity to protect loans granted by Americans for British war purchases. The 
broad public acceptance of such notions helped to consolidate the American 
introvert mood in the latter half of the 1930s, when Congress passed a series of 
neutrality acts designed to prevent the possible recurrence of such events. After 
the start of the 1940-1968 extrovert phase, the munitions makers theory was 
discredited and the blame was more properly assigned to the German launching 
of unrestricted submarine warfare just prior to American entry into World War 
I.68 
Since World War 11, the need for a more permanent United States military 
preparedness has been acknowledged by more observers. In order to maintain 
adequate standing military manpower, the draft existed from 1948 to 1973, five 
years into the current introvert phase. Weaponry became more sophisticated and 
of even greater strategic importance, necessitating a large armaments industry. 
President Eisenhower's "Farewell Address" warned against the potential dan- 
gers involved with these changed circumstances, which were said to have 
created a military-industrial complex whose influence needed to be monitored. 
' The dangers of the military-industrial complex cannot be ignored, even 
though President Eisenhower issued his warning at a time of increasing extrover- 
sion, making it more appropriate then than now. Today's introversion serves as a 
significant check on the influence of military-business groupings, just as the 
munitions makers were checked by the introverts of the 1 9 3 0 ~ ~ ~  The military- 
industrial complex which exists today, although more sophisticated than pre- 
vious military-business relationships, must compete with other highly 
sophisticated complexes.70 Additionally, while some segments of the business 
community benefit from military contracts, a larger and more significant part of 
the community has to help pay for this benefit in the form of taxes. 
Another indicator of the actual relationship between business and the 
military can be observed in some of the theories regarding the military- 
industrial complex advanced during the 1960s, noting which ones have best 
indicated events during subsequent years. Such an exercise indicates that 
pluralist theorists who emphasize that business and the military can have 
separate ideas and interests were much more indicative of future trends than 
theorists emphasizing military-business collusion.71 
Various tendencies of the past few decades question general theories of 
business-military collusion. During most of the 1940-1968 extrovert phase the 
Republican party, the party which is linked most to the business liberal com- 
munity, generally advocated a lower level of military effort than did the Demo- 
cratic party.72 In fact, congressional Democrats often urged the business liberal 
Eisenhower administration to spend more money on defense. At the height of 
the last extrovert phase, reform liberal Democrats supported a large and active 
military establishment. As another example, Republican presidents Eisenhower 
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and Nixon had a defense strategy oriented to a one and one-half war situation; 
the strategy of Democratic presidents Kennedy and Johnson, on the other hand, 
was oriented to a two and one-half war situation, employing more conventional 
weapons and thus generating more business for the conventional armaments 
industry. To be sure, business liberals sometimes have been more supportive of 
the military than reform liberals, as is the case with President Reagan today, but 
this is not a general pattern. Recent documentation of the many sides of the 
business liberal can be found in a 1975 study by Bruce M. Russett and Elizabeth 
C. H a n ~ o n . ~ ~  These considerations question the analyst who is quick to link 
business and the military in decisive collusion. 
Some recent studies have also noted something of a relationship between 
the military and business, but their findings do not point to a conspiratorial, 
profit-making partnership. One study concludes that the so-called military- 
industrial complex is "a rather amorphous, loosely structured entity" which 
"grew out of the needs of foreign policy, and not vice versa. "74 Other studies 
note how established relationships between business and the military have 
resulted in various problems.75 Still, none of these studies documents the 
decisive impact of a self-motivated, self-interested military-industrial complex. 
Business-military ties might be helpful during an introvert phase insofar as 
they could temper introversion; the greatest danger would be during an extrovert 
phase, when the potential for a dangerous "reform liberal-military" complex is 
at least as great as that of a dangerous "business liberal-military" complex. 
Business liberals are constantly on guard against excessive costs, but reform 
liberals have fewer economic qualms when they perceive the military as advanc- 
ing their goals. Further, since they too as liberals are hostile to the military 
function, reform liberals are unlikely to understand it and will either defer to the 
military on too many issues or attempt to civilianize it. Either alternative can 
undermine military profes~ionalism.~~ 
The business liberal, also distrustful of the military, has been no more likely 
than the reform liberal to defer to the military or civilianize it during extrovert 
phases. A number of neo-Hamiltonians, like Theodore Roosevelt, engaged in 
some civilianization of the military at the turn of the century, indicating that 
such a propensity is possible. However, actions when business liberal President 
Eisenhower was in office for eight peacetime years around the middle of the 
1940-1968 extrovert phase and when business liberal President McKinley was in 
the White House during the Spanish-American War indicate that business 
liberals are no more prone to overly defer to, or civilianize, the military than are 
reform liberals.77 Business liberals did not control the White House during the 
most active parts of the last four American wars (World War I, World War 11, the 
Korean war, and the Vietnam war) and were suspicious of the Kennedy-Johnson 
civilianization of the military during the height of the most recent extrovert 
phase, while many reform liberals supported it. 
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These observations simply do not indicate an overwhelming difference 
between business and reform liberal attitudes toward the military. Neither is 
there any indication that business liberals are more prone to support military 
action; in fact, unrestrained by matters of cost, reform liberals may take up the 
military banner with less hesitation. Conversely, business liberals might be a 
little less prone to abandon the defense industry during times of introversion. 
Both forms of liberalism have an inherent aversion to the use of military 
persuasion, but are willing to employ it if ideologically justifiable. The mood/ 
interest theory thus questions the concept of a "military-industrial complex" 
determining politico-military action and allocates the responsibility to the 
shifting public mood. 
THE AMERICAN PRESS 
The news media in the United States are an important force in insuring that the 
liberal public mood determines the direction of American foreign policy. 
Generally, reporters are not professional foreign policy analysts. Rather than 
reaching their positions on the basis of their foreign policy expertise, they have 
usually worked their way up through the journalistic ranks. Thus journalists, 
more so than government professionals, usually are typical of public mood. 
Walter Cronkite noted that most newsmen "come to feel very little allegiance to 
the established order. I think they're inclined to side with humanity rather than 
with authority and institutions. "78 This aversion to authority and identification 
with humanity is reflective of the public liberalism. The press feels a loyalty to 
the public that necessitates prompt reporting of presidential or congressional 
deviations from public mood. 
A free press can select what to report and how to report it. The merest 
mention of the possibility of implementing extrovert action during an introvert 
phase, for example, can instantaneously become a major public concern by 
means of a provocative, front-page headline.79 This media advantage is es- 
pecially important in television news programs, in which time is very limited. 
What the newsperson decides to include in a sixty-second segment may have 
significant impact on public perceptions of an event. Further, because the public 
does not choose the news to which it is exposed as in the print media, television 
tends to encourage opinions where there were formerly none;80 thus mood 
could become even more difficult to change as more people have firm opinions. 
Television news programs, dependent upon good ratings for their very survival, 
must necessarily be reflective of public mood and eager to report any govern- 
mental deviations from the mood. 
One method the press, especially the print media, uses to help maintain 
public control over foreign policy direction is leaks of guarded official informa- 
tion. Leaks were quite common during the recent shift to introversion; some 
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bureaucrats in touch with the public mood and reporters together expressed 
dissent in such form to bring the nation's leaders back in accord with the public 
mood. The Pentagon Papers had a significant effect on American attitudes 
toward the Vietnam war; domestically, press revelations in the Watergate scan- 
dal contributed to President Nixon's downfall. 
The power of the American press is usually exercised responsibly. However, 
in a democracy dominated by liberal public mood, responsibility can be 
interpreted to involve firm advocacy of the will of the people regardless of 
consequence. "Yellow Journalism" intensified the 1891-1919 extrovert phase 
through its advocacy of war with Spain. In the mid-1930s press coverage of the 
Senate Nye Committee reports helped to make the munitions makers theory of 
the causes of World War I standard with the American public. During the 
intensifying years of the 1940-1968 extrovert phase, sensational newspaper 
reports of Senator Joseph McCarthy's anticommunist accusations helped to 
draw President Eisenhower and the business liberals firmly into extroversion, 
thus prodding the entire country into firm anticommunism. 
Throughout American history the press, rather than restraining excesses of 
public mood, has generally spurred them on; on the other hand, the press at 
times has realized early the dangers of excess and fueled the public's mood shift, 
as in the final years of the most recent extrovert phase when the press began 
reporting skeptically on the Vietnam war. The American system of a free press, 
operated by people reflective of the public mood, is unlikely to be changed in 
the near future. Although it cannot be depended upon to counter early the 
recurring extremes of American liberalism, it can be entrusted to insure that 
leaders follow shifting public mood. 81 
CONGRESSIONAL ACTIONS AND PROPOSED 
CONSTITUTIONAL AMENDMENTS 
Whenever attention is strongly drawn to a foreign policy matter, the public can 
become quite assertive. It will seek to control its leaders when it perceives that 
they have varied too much from the public mood, but with varying amounts of 
effort depending on the time and circumstances within the mood. 
An amendment to the United States Constitution is the ultimate means of 
assuring government adherence to the public mood. At times in recent Amer- 
ican history, amendments have been proposed to arrest governmental deviation; 
the most significant are the Ludlow Amendment of the late 1930s and the 
Bricker Amendment of the early 1950s. Although neither one was adopted, 
national leaders cannot ignore the supporting rationale and public assertiveness; 
they also must bear in mind that such an amendment could yet be passed. This 
threat helps ensure continued presidential and congressional responsiveness to 
the shifting mood of the American public. 
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During the 1919-1940 introvert phase, people reacted against American 
participation in World War I, and it was widely believed that a small number of 
munitions makers and their backers had caused the president to ask for, and 
Congress to agree to, a declaration of war. Prevention of future wars would 
require restrictions on the actions of both the president and the Congress. As one 
consequence, the Ludlow Amendment to the United States Constitution was 
proposed, declaring that the United States could not go to war without an 
affirmative vote of the people, except in case of attack by outside powers on the 
Western Hemisphere or an attack on United States territory. This concept had 
widespread public support82 and almost received a majority vote of the House of 
Representatives to discharge it from the House Rules C~rnmi t t ee .~~  In spite of 
strong public support, however, by 1938 when the House vote was taken enough 
governmental measures had been passed and assurances of good faith made to 
console the public in the defeat of this measure. If the vote had been taken before 
the public had been at least somewhat placated, the amendment might have 
passed. Certainly the experience kept the Roosevelt administration cautious in 
foreign policy. In retrospect, the passage of such a measure could have hastened 
rather than prevented American involvement in World War 11. Knowledge that 
the United States would not respond to provocation except by a direct vote of the 
people would have provided additional encouragement to the German and 
Japanese adventurism which caused American involvement in the war. 
After World War 11, a number of business liberals and states rights souther- 
ners became alarmed over the use of the treaty power and executive agreements. 
Executive agreements, which are similar to treaties but do not require ratifica- 
tion by the Senate, were particularly questioned, and the increased power of the 
president became suspect. With some intense support, the Bricker Amendment 
to the Constitution, which was to go through several versions, was proposed in 
1951. Emphasis was on control of the activities of the executive, in contrast to 
the Ludlow Amendment's emphasis on control of a particular power of both 
executive and legislative leaders. The Bricker Amendment aimed at subjecting 
treaties and executive agreements to increased constitutional and legislative 
scrutiny, and its practical effect would have been to make it extremely difficult 
for the president to conduct American foreign policy. The country was divided 
over such a measure in an extrovert phase. Reform liberals and the executive 
branch led the opposition to the amendment. The executive branch, however, 
was particularly careful not to deviate from public mood, a consideration which 
might explain a good deal of the Eisenhower administration's public reluctance 
to tackle Senator Joseph McCarthy or sign the 1954 Geneva Accords on 
Indochina. In the end, the attempt to have a version of the amendment referred to 
the states was defeated in the Senate by a narrow margin.84 If the amendment 
had been successfully referred, it is probable the states would have ratified it 
since it also increased their power. The need for action against communism, the 
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opposition to the amendment by business liberal President Eisenhower, and the 
ever-clearer dictates of the growing extrovert mood helped dissuade the public 
from pursuing the measure. Support for the amendment faded as the 1940-1968 
extrovert phase took greater hold. 
Proposed constitutional amendments, whether ultimately passed or not, are 
a very powerful method of curbing governmental deviation from public mood. 
Less severe means, such as congressional acts and resolutions, can also be 
useful for such a purpose. The 1969 National Commitments Resolution and the 
1973 War Powers Act are examples of the public mood asserting itself through 
congressional restraints on the president. 
The Vietnam war, like World War I, provoked a reaction away from 
extroversion but, unlike World War I, the Vietnam war had not been declared by 
Congress. This distinction is important because the public directed its efforts in 
the late 1960s and early 1970s largely toward controlling the executive, even 
though indications are that before public support eroded the Congress would not 
have hesitated to declare war had it been asked. In fact, the Gulf of Tonkin 
Resolution and subsequent voting of appropriations can be viewed as congres- 
sional support for the war. 
As public enthusiasm for the Vietnam venture waned, however, so did 
congressional support. The Senate in 1969 by a vote of 70 to 16 adopted the 
National Commitments R e s ~ l u t i o n ~ ~  to press for congressional involvement in 
major foreign policy decisions. Four years later, with substantial public support, 
the War Powers Act was passed to insure that the Congress would participate in 
deliberations on future wars. Major support for such legislation came from the 
reform liberal community, a major source of opposition to the earlier Bricker 
Amendment; this community had become concerned, however, with preventing 
another limited war situation. Some reform liberals went so far as to worry that 
the legislation delineated too many presidential powers. Some business liberals, 
more apt to support remnants of the 1940-1968 extroversion, were less enthusi- 
astic about the legislation. Nevertheless, the solidifying introvert mood and the 
Nixon administration's continued assertion of executive prerogatives in foreign 
policy gave the War Powers bill enough support to pass both houses of Congress 
over a presidential veto and become law in 1973. The act, as intended, helped to 
keep secretary of state Henry Kissinger in line with the public's increasing 
introversion. If the War Powers Act had not achieved this result, a constitutional 
amendment could have been proposed. At the very least, these measures 
demonstrate that the public will assert itself against its leaders when it perceives 
its will has been or is being violated. 
PRESIDENTS AND MOODS: WHO RULES, AND HOW? 
American presidents are of political necessity most often creatures of the public 
mood in foreign policy.86 Usually elected in part as a result of their closeness to 
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public mood, presidents throughout American history have felt its impact 
through checks and balances, which keep them engrossed in problems of the 
day. Although presidents have little time to wony about subsequent historical 
analysis of their performance, such analysis may hinge in part upon the public 
mood prevailing during their tenure in office. Thus, public mood has contrib- 
uted to disaster for some presidents and great accomplishment for others. 
One crucial period for presidents is the time of a foreign policy mood shift 
from extroversion to introversion, or vice versa. Throughout American history, 
presidents have faced similar dilemmas at such times. They have found that the 
mood which existed when they assumed power and on which they had based 
their policies disappeared during their term in office. Does a president then 
change policies in order to conform to public perceptions or cling to those 
policies once believed sound? Presidents who have chosen the latter course have 
paid for it with a loss of public support. 
Such situations are particularly difficult when a president has been suc- 
cessfully promoting extrovert policies and discovers that his support is weaken- 
ing. The most recent examples are presidents Woodrow Wilson and Lyndon 
Johnson. Both presidents led the United States into war with strong public 
support for their policies. In the process of "selling" the public, they heightened 
unrealistic expectations. Woodrow Wilson led the American public to believe 
that the United States could fight one war and thus make the world safe for 
democracy. Lyndon Johnson thought that the United States could "win the 
hearts and minds" of the Vietnamese people as it showed them how to fight 
communism. Both goals were formulated during the height of extrovert phases; 
neither was fully realizable. Both of these reform liberal presidents saw an 
important portion of their reform liberal support crumble as a result of their 
foreign policy actions. Both presidents remained true to their extrovert causes at 
considerable cost as previous supporters abandoned them and as opponents 
seized political opportunities. The problem, thus, was not one of presidents 
changing policy, but rather one of the American public changing its liberal 
mind. In both cases the American public mood prevailed. The United States 
never formally joined the League of Nations and the United States, in frustra- 
tion, abandoned South Vietnam. 
The inconsistencies in United St~ies  policy as a result of these two instances 
are pronounced. President Woodrow Wilson was a world leader in drafting the 
covenant of the League of Nations, and yet his own country was the only major 
power never to join. President Lyndon Johnson led the United States into a 
larger military commitment in South Vietnam in order to keep the country 
noncommunist, but less than a decade later the United States was not even 
willing to maintain the equipment levels of the South Vietnamese armed forces, 
and the country steadily succumbed to communists. 
At the start of an earlier introvert phase, President John Quincy Adams was 
not particularly successful with foreign policy. This is puzzling, because Adams 
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had previously been a successful secretary of state and diplomat. The problem is 
clarified by noting that Adams served as secretary of state and diplomat during 
an extrovert phase, and this service could have posed difficulties in pleasing the 
introvert public during his presidency. 
At the start of the 1871-1891 introvert phase, a disappointed President 
Ulysses S. Grant saw the Senate table his strong efforts to annex the Dominican 
Republic in 1871, although it had supported the purchase of Alaska in 1867. 
Viewed in terms of the mood curve, the above inconsistencies in foreign policy 
are actually very American and very regular. Generally speaking, one could say 
that strong-willed presidents, reluctant to lose their extrovert glory, are least able 
to adapt a new-found introversion and create the most long-range repercussions, 
as with Wilson and Johnson. Weaker presidents, such as Grant, have trouble 
adapting also, but eventually do so. 
Presidents also seem to have difficulty adjusting to a shift from introversion 
to extroversion. The one exception is President Franklin Roosevelt, who had 
inclinations toward an extrovert policy but was restrained by his emphasis on 
getting the United States out of the Great Depression of the 1930s. Although he 
followed well the public shift to extroversion in 1940, previous presidents at 
similar times had difficulties. The presidential election after the 1798 beginning 
of the first extrovert phase (1800) saw the defeat of incumbent president John 
Adams. Corresponding to the 1844 change in mood, the presidential election 
that year saw a change in political parties, with James Polk coming into the 
White House on an expansionist Democratic platform. Following the third shift 
to extroversion, incumbent president Benjamin Harrison, who might have been 
too far ahead of public mood, was defeated in 1892 and the White House 
changed parties, as it had in 1888 and did again in 1896. Most American 
presidents at times of mood change experienced great difficulty, and, in most 
cases, the incumbent or his party lost the ensuing presidential electi~n.~'  
Presidents who did not assume office until after a mood phase had solid- 
ified seem to have succssfully adjusted personal convictions in order to follow 
the public mood. Although Andrew Jackson had aggressively pursued Indians 
beyond United States borders into Florida during the first extrovert phase and 
even risked war by hanging British instigators, he followed introvert foreign 
policies after his election to the presidency in the introvert year of 1828. 
Democratic President Grover Cleveland, who was elected for the second time in 
1892, was not generally considered an extrovert; yet he took a strong stand in the 
extrovert year of 1895 against Great Britain during the Venezuelan Boundary 
Crisis. In 1954 Senator Lyndon Johnson was one force preventing unwise U.S. 
involvement in Indochina, but a decade later he led an increasingly extrovert 
public into greater participation in the Vietnam War, pursuing extrovert policies 
even after public enthusiasm had begun to wane. Throughout the middle years of 
the last extrovert phase, Richard Nixon was an ardent anticommunist; nev- 
Presidents and Moods 133 
ertheless, assuming the presidency at the beginning of an introvert phase, he 
opened the way for improved relations with communist China. The most 
politically expedient course a president can follow is adherence to the liberal 
public mood. 
Credibility gaps are often mentioned in analyses of American presidents 
and their foreign policies. Presidents are said to be less than candid with the 
public, making adverse public reaction most understandable. However, these 
credibility gaps can be related to changing public moods. President Franklin 
Roosevelt was criticized for making unnecessary concessions to the communists 
during World War 11. Since public mood did not move back into the United 
States interest zone until 1947, two years after Roosevelt's death, part of his 
reasoning undoubtedly was related to making allowances for the introvert 
sentiment remaining in the United States during the war. President Dwight 
Eisenhower, whose passive foreign policies were at variance with some of his 
firm anticommunist rhetoric, did not have a credibility gap, perhaps because his 
rhetoric was ahead of the public mood, which grew more anticommunist during 
his term in office. President Lyndon Johnson had a foreign policy credibility gap 
during his final years in the presidency which was identified and exploited. His 
rhetoric trailed behind the less anticommunist American public mood toward 
the end of his term in office. Perceptions of foreign policy credibility gaps can be 
as much related to whether a president's thinking is ahead or behind the liberal 
public mood as they are to whether a president is actually credible. 
Occasionally a president will make a rare decision which seems to go 
against public opinion. Historian Ernest R. May has written: "Looking back 
through American history, one can almost count on one's fingers the number of 
occasions when American statesmen made major decisions that they thought 
contrary to the public will. "88 Presidential policy decisions which lie outside of 
the foreign policy parameters, even when the president knows public views on 
an issue, cannot automatically be seen as a refutation of the Public Rule 
Proposition. The public ultimately desires change, and what is favorable to 
public opinion in the short-term can be unfavorable when viewed in a long-term 
context. Polls constantly change, but the president was elected by the people and 
is likely to have a general idea of public desires. In conflicts between opinion 
and policy needs, the president acts as a reasonable interpreter of what the 
public wants in the long-run. 
An example of this type of decision making is provided by the Panama 
Canal treaties. When the Carter administration had to make the decision 
whether or not to back the treaties in the spring of 1977, public opinion polls 
showed that Americans were overwhelmingly opposed to turning ownership 
and control of the Panama Canal over to the Republic of Panama.89 The Carter 
administration knew that the possibility of conflict with other nations existed if 
the issue was not settled and was cognizant of the diminishing desirability of 
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U.S. ownership of the canal; thus, the administration had to choose between the 
short-term desires of the public and its long-term goals. The Carter administra- 
tion backed ratification of the compromise treaties in seeming defiance of 
public opinion but in ultimate accord with the public mood. One might argue 
that the Carter administration sold the public on a policy, but it would be more 
appropriate to say that the administration made a long-range interpretation of 
public desires regarding all aspects of the situation. Most of the discretion 
exercised by the Carter administration on this matter concerned timing of the 
treaties, rather than substance. 
Another type of situation which might have a relationship to foreign policy 
cycles is a major domestic scandal at the national level. The administrations of 
Ulysses Grant, Warren Harding, and Richard Nixon, each during the early years 
of an introvert phase, faced a domestic scandal of major proportions. One can 
speculate that these types of scandals relate to a public demand that those 
coordinating policy exhibit and follow high standards of official conduct, an 
expectation which can suffer neglect during extrovert phases when attention is 
focused on foreign affairs. 
Presidents who are given the opportunity by an extrovert mood to assume a 
role of aggressive leadership fare better in later historical analyses than do their 
introvert counterparts. A president in the top third (or top twelve) of those in the 
posterity rankings in table 18 served at the start of six of the eight major 
American wars since 1789. 'Ihe presidents presiding over the major annexations 
which composed the Continental United States (Washington-unification of 
the thirteen colonies; Jefferson-the Louisiana Purchase; and Polk-Texas, 
Mexican Cession, and Oregon) were all ranked in the top third. This posterity 
relationship is also apparent with those presidents who served during the first 
stage of an introvert period. Richard Nixon, Ulysses Grant, and Warren Harding 
received the lowest three posterity ranks. 
The degree of license given presidents in the pursuit of foreign policy, their 
success or failure in that field, their ability or that of their party to retain the 
highest office, the extent to which they must compromise personal conviction in 
order to function, public estimates of their candor, historical analyses of their 
performance-all hinge in part upon the constant fluctuation of American 
foreign policy moods manifested in liberalism. 
American Introversion 
The year 1968 can be documented as the end of the last extrovert phase. Is 
America in a period of introversion that will end in an extreme which fails to 
protect American politico-military interests, as happened in the late 1930s? 
Probably so, if the United States remains as curiously predictable as it has in the 
past. In a nuclear age this is particularly dangerous. Not much time is left in this 
introvert phase for an extreme, but an extreme is possible and may happen 
suddenly and with little warning. It may be recognized as an extreme only in 
retrospect. 
To adequately assess the current American mood it is necessary to view 
mood in a composite manner, as the product of various experiences rather than a 
single experience. The moodlinterest theory therefore stresses the difference 
between long-term mood and short-term opinion. A mood at a given time is a 
composite of many different indicators, any one of which occasionally might 
deviate from the composite mood. Scientific public opinion polls, although 
useful in composite to indicate thinking at specific points in time, were not taken 
during the first three-fourths of U.S. history. Therefore, the most appropriate 
comparison with the past is of American foreign policy, as determined by the 
liberal public during the previous periods of American introversion. 
TRADITIONAL AMERICAN INTROVERSION 
The historical operation of American introversion provides important clues 
regarding the development of the current introvert mood. American liberal 
introvert phases have been characterized by a similarity in the nature of diplo- 
matic events. Such phases usually show little aggressiveness, feature no 
annexed territory, and focus upon preventive settlements and the maintenance of 
existing relationships. Also, introvert phases have often been characterized by 
more restrictive immigration legislation than have extrovert phases. 
In introvert periods American presidents have been peacetime presidents,' 
generally concerned with limiting the development or expansion of American 
politico-military concerns beyond the borders of the United States. Having lived 
through a period of extroversion, each has been aware of the problems that 
developed from the extremes at the conclusion of the phase. In order to prevent 
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similar difficulties, they have looked to George Washington's advice: "The 
great rule of conduct for us, in regard to foreign nations, is, in extending our 
commercial relations, to have with them as little political connection as possi- 
ble. So far as we have already formed engagements, let them be fulfilled with 
perfect good faith. Here let us stop."2 
Presidents who have served near the time of a mood change from extrover- 
sion to introversion have faced intense problems. Woodrow Wilson and Lyndon 
Johnson lost support when their views did not adjust according to public mood 
and saw their extrovert worlds crumble. Each of the last three introvert phases 
(1871-1891, 1919-1940, and 1968 to the present) included a major domestic 
scandal during its early years. One can speculate that public attention, quite 
concerned during extrovert periods with foreign policy actions, is redirected 
during introvert periods toward the personal conduct of its leaders. Similar 
undesirable behavior might have been present in other leaders at other times but 
received less attention because of the emphasis on foreign policy characteristic 
of extrovert moods. 
Treaties have been a major tool of foreign policy throughout United States 
history, although they are increasingly being supplanted by executive agree- 
ments. The character of major treaties and agreements differs according to the 
type of mood orientation. Conclusive treaties or agreements, such as annexa- 
tions, are more likely in extrovert phases and preventive treaties or agreements 
are more likely in introvert phases. Such preventive documents include Jay's 
Treaty in 1794 with England, the 1831 Claims Convention with France, the Pan- 
American Conference of 1889 with its agreement to establish the Pan-American 
Union, the Kellogg-Briand Pact of 1928, and the Strategic Arms Limitation 
Talks (SALT) of the 1970s. 
The frequency of U.S. use of armed forces abroad has been another 
indicator of introversion; during introvert phases, Americans are less prone to 
resort to force in international dealings. Admittedly, the existence of nuclear 
weaponry since 1945 minimized the number of American military ventures 
abroad during the last extrovert phase. American presidents, fortunately, have 
not been willing to risk nuclear war in order to redress an insult to the flag or to 
punish hostile indigenous inhabitants, actions that were taken without fear of 
serious repercussions during the first one hundred fifty years of United States 
history. Analysis of uses of armed forces abroad during the three introvert and 
three extrovert phases between 1798 and 1939, however, yields a definite pattern: 
the three extrovert phases featured an average of 1.44 uses of military force 
overseas per year; the three introvert phases had less than half that number-.69 
uses per year.3 
Major armed intervention abroad has not been a prominent United States 
policy during introvert phases, although it has resulted occasionally as a carry- 
over from policies initiated during extrovert phases. American reactions to 
unfavorable or threatening international events, particularly during the two most 
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recent introvert phases, often have been characterized instead by verbal con- 
demnations or statements of dissatisfaction. These responses include the Hoov- 
er-Stimson Doctrine (1932), the "Quarantine Speech" (1937), and current 
condemnations such as those of North Korea for the Pueblo seizure (1968), the 
Soviet Union and Cuba for intervention in Angola and Ethiopia, and Soviet 
Union for the invasion of Afghanistan. Most major U.S. armed interventions 
abroad have taken place during extrovert phases. 
Another familiar response to conflicts in introvert phases is neutrality. 
Neutrality has also been present in extrovert phases, but has not usually been as 
well defined and final. Each extrovert phase has included a war which the United 
States had tried to avoid during the previous introvert phase. In 1793 the United 
States proclaimed neutrality in the Anglo-French conflict, but during the 
following extrovert phase fought an undeclared naval war with France and the 
War of 1812 with Great Britain. During the second introvert phase the United 
States government was neutral in the Mexico-Texas conflict, even to the point of 
seizing Texan vessels attempting to sever the Mexican lifeline in the Gulf of 
M e ~ i c o . ~  Yet, during the initial years of the following extrovert phase, the Texas 
situation culminated in the Mexican War. The United States avoided war with 
Spain following the 1873 seizure of a ship illegally registered in the United 
States and the execution of her partially American crew during a Cuban 
insurrection, but fought the Spanish-American War after the sinking of the 
battleship Maine in Havana Harbor in 1898. American attempts to remain 
neutral through the Neutrality Acts of the late 1930s did not keep the United 
States out of World War 11. All major American wars have begun during 
extrovert phases, although they were perhaps kindled during introvert phases. 
Another characteristic of introversion has been an emphasis on arms control 
and disarmament. Most successful advances in this area have tended to occur 
toward the beginning of introvert phases, when demands of the public corre- 
spond more closely to realistic opportunities. As the United States progresses 
further into an introvert mood, public demands become more and more unre- 
alistic. Toward the end of an introvert phase, public mood can become so 
unrealistic that American governmental institutions are limited to only uni- 
lateral action, since other countries will not concur in the policies called for by 
extreme American introversion. 
The United States was a major participant in and signatory of the Wash- 
ington Conference agreements in 1921-1922, was active in the crafting of the 
1928 Kellogg-Briand Pact which outlawed offensive warfare, and signed the 
London Naval Conference agreement of 1930. However, once the strong intro- 
version of the 1930s took hold, the United States acted most often in a unilateral 
manner. The Neutrality Acts of 1935-1937 included regulations regarding 
American provision of arms to belligerent groups in the hope that this would at 
least avert American involvement in any war. 
During the last decade of the 1940-1968 extrovert phase, a few arms control 
138 American Introversion 
agreements, such as the Antarctic and Limited Test Ban Treaties, were con- 
cluded; such action continued as the extrovert mood yielded to the current mood 
of introversion. A 1967 treaty signed by the United States prohibited nuclear 
weapons in outer space. During the present introvert phase the United States has 
undertaken ambitious efforts; these include the Nuclear Non-Proliferation 
Treaty, a new biological warfare agreement, Strategic Arms Limitations Talks 
and other agreements with the Soviet Union, exploration of the possibility of 
mutual and balanced force reductions in Europe, and the 1975 United States 
ratification of the 1925 Geneva Protocol on gas and bacteriological warfare. It is 
worth noting that the SALT I agreement was settled early in the current introvert 
phase (1972) with relative ease. The SALT I1 treaty, however, struggled through 
the middle stages of the current mood and was never formally ratified. Similarly, 
part of the American public has recently begun calling for a United States 
Soviet freeze of all nuclear weapons testing, production, and deployment; 
however, whether or not the proposal will be negotiated remains to be seen. 
During extrovert phases American interest in arms control and disarma- 
ment generally lessens. During these times, American interest in such measures 
usually is limited to those applying primarily to other nations or those measures 
of obvious benefit to the United States. For example, the 1817 Rush-Bagot 
agreement restricting United States and British naval forces on the Great Lakes 
was beneficial to U.S. security. The United States was particularly active in 
helping other nations solve disputes during the middle and latter part of the 
1891-1919 extrovert phase, even though having no direct stake in some of the 
settlements. In 1946, the year after the United States dropped the atomic bomb 
on two Japanese cities, it sponsored the Baruch Plan which called for the 
establishment of a United Nations agency to control nuclear energy activities. 
On the one hand, adoption of this plan would have weakened the United States 
since it had demobilized conventionally and depended on its atomic position to 
balance Soviet power on the Eurasian mainland. On the other hand, the plan 
would have served the United States interest insofar as it required that any 
atomic weapons-controlling authority be satisfactory to the United States before 
American sacrifices would have to be made, and would have kept atomic 
weapons out of the hands of others. The 1940-1968 extrovert phase was not 
solidified until 1947, and by then the United States had lost some interest in the 
plan; thus it does not constitute an exception to the generalization about less 
arms control and disarmament interest in extrovert phases than in introvert 
phases. 
American attitudes toward international law and organization appear in- 
consistent. The United States, like most nations, tends to support and oppose 
international law and organization as it suits national interests and con- 
~enience .~  However, the United States differs from most other nations in that its 
inconsistencies often stem from the foreign policy moods manifested in liber- 
alism. 
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Throughout most of its history, the United States has been a strong advocate 
of international law. Americans have believed that the rule of law can solve 
international problems, particularly those of the often warring nations of Eu- 
rope. However, when international law is applied to the United States, the usual 
tendency is to make absolutely certain that the rulings do not impede U.S. 
contributions to world peace or overall interests, as perceived in the light of 
American foreign policy moods. The United States Senate, with its treaty 
ratification power, is in a strong position to assert the nation's right to determine 
when to submit to international judgment, since treaties are a primary source of 
international law. The Senate has been most protective of American sovereignty 
during introvert phases, but in extrovert phases assertive policies conducted by 
the executive branch are frequent. Becoming increasingly active in the world 
balance of power in more recent times, the United States has tended to view 
international law in a more pragmatic manner. 
As international organizations have grown in importance, they have in- 
creasingly been the object of the inconsistent attitudes of American moods. 
President Woodrow Wilson was the world leader in the formation of the League 
of Nations, but was unable to lead his own country to join. The United States was 
cooperative while Wilson helped to draft the proposed covenant of the league, 
but with the mood change to introversion during 1919, the Senate rejected the 
covenant. America cooperated with the League of Nations in the 1920s, but its 
support faded during the 1930s when the introvert mood became strongec6 
During the first years of the 1940-1968 extrovert phase, special care was 
taken in the drafting of the United Nations charter to insure that it would be 
acceptable to the United States Senate following World War 11. This, coupled 
with the growing American mood of extroversion, made the United Nations 
attractive to the Senate and a majority of Americans. Once the United Nations 
was in existence, the United States was able to exercise leadership so as to be on 
the winning side of most votes. However, as extroversion progressed to an 
extreme during the 1960s, America lost support in the international organiza- 
tion as other countries found it difficult to agree with increasing American 
assertiveness. This was particularly evident among Third World nations, many 
of which had not entered the United Nations until the early 1960s and then came 
into contact with a strongly extroverted United States. As a result, Americans 
became frustrated by the seeming uncooperativeness of the United Nations. 
The American mood changed from extroversion to introversion during 
1968. Since that time the Third World has grown stronger and more assertive in 
the United Nations and American frustrations have increased. Current Amer- 
ican policy works within the United Nations with reservations, not unlike the 
informal American cooperation with the League of Nations in the 1920s. A 1981 
public opinion poll shows that while 77 percent of the American public supports 
continued United States membership in the United Nations, less than 50 percent 
feel the United Nations has been effective in most areas of involvement.' In 
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recent years the United States has been slow to recognize world opinion of 
Israel. American willingness to defend Israel's rights in the United Nations is 
not unlike the unilateral Hoover-Stimson Doctrine which simply refused to ac- 
cept the results of Japanese aggression in the early 1930s. The American view of 
Japanese aggression and the ostracization of Israel could well be correct; the 
American willingness to undertake a unilateral approach to such problems 
rather than to emphasize work within the frustrating structure of international 
organizations is far more characteristic of an introvert mood than an extrovert 
mood. 
The Neutrality Acts of the late 1930s were an extreme manifestation of 
American introversion. They soon were demonstrated to be an unrealistic 
answer to dealing with the world events which culminated in World War 11, 
revealing the costs of such a policy: the neglect of the United States' interests in 
Europe and East Asia. 
THE CURRENT INTROVERT PHASE 
A considerable body of evidence suggests that the current introvert phase has 
been firmly implanted and generally growing in intensity. An early indication of 
the mood shift to introversion occurred with the decidedly introvert reaction to 
the July 1967 crisis in the Congo (now Zaire).8 The early 1968 Tet offensive in 
Vietnam was the prelude to a political year which evidenced a marked lack of 
support for President Johnson and his extrovert Vietnam policies. From May 
1967 to August 1968 there was a dramatic shift from a majority of Republicans, 
Democrats, and Independents supporting the war to a majority of each opposing 
it.9 Business liberal Richard M. Nixon was elected at least partially and 
significantly on his pledge to end the war in Vietnam. A study conducted from 
September 1968 through September 1969 identified a post-Vietnam, noninter- 
vention syndrome on the part of those groups directing American foreign 
policy.1° In his 1970 book, The Hidden Crisis in American Politics, Samuel 
Lube11 states that a "desire to impose some manageable limit upon our role in 
policing the peace was shared quite generally by . . . both critics and supporters 
of the Vietnam War."" A book entitled No Clear and Present Danger, which 
appeared in print in 1972, was written by Bruce Russett in 1971 as a skeptical 
view of American entry into World War 11. Its dedication reads: "For Mark and 
Daniel, No foreign wars for them."12 Such views usually surface in introvert 
phases just as views critical of "isolationists" most often surface in extrovert 
phases. 
By 1973 the American direct military commitment in Vietnam was brought 
to an end. As the defense establishment was significantly reduced in size, the 
draft ended. The Congress passed the War Powers Act in 1973 restricting the 
power of the president to engage in prolonged politico-military activities. Leslie 
Gelb concluded in that year that "increased emphasis on domestic priorities and 
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wariness about foreign military involvements seem to be a trend, not a fad."13 
Bruce Russett has identified "a marked shift away from acceptance of the 
political 'responsibilities of world power' " which "appears likely to be preva- 
lent for a long period." Russett also projects the Klingberg data on the 
percentage of State of the Union addresses devoted to foreign affairs,14 indicat- 
ing that we have indeed embarked upon another introvert phase. Klingberg 
updates his analysis by analyzing international as opposed to domestic content 
of annual presidential messages from 1967-1983, inclusive. He found that of all 
messages during these years only President Carter's 1980 message devoted more 
time to international than domestic issues. The next highest international 
percentage in those years was 45 percent in President Johnson's 1967 message. l5 
Steven Hildreth, in a 1981 report, writes that introversion is likely to remain 
strong through the 1980s.16 In addition, both official development assistance 
(ODA) to other countries as a percentage of gross national product and Depart- 
ment of Defense (DOD) outlays as a percentage of total United States govern- 
ment federal outlays have declined since the latter years of the 1940-1968 
extrovert phase. l7 
Recent works note a lack of consensus in American foreign policy.18 A lack 
of consensus makes extroversion difficult and introversion likely, because if an 
agreement on policy cannot be reached it is most likely that the ensuing conflict 
will allow for little to be done in the international arena. George H. Quester, in 
American Foreign Policy: The Lost Consensus, cites the late 1960s as a time 
when American foreign policy took a turn inward and states "the American 
public in the 1980s remains confused, and deeply divided, about the goals it 
wishes to serve in the world. "I9 This continuing lack of consensus in American 
foreign policy can be viewed as normal introversion within the framework of the 
mood/interest theory. 
Another strong indicator of the current introvert mood is the prominent 
foreign policy role of the Congress, a clue to public mood which has proved 
reliable historically. As suggested by the Executive/Legislative Proposition of 
the moodlinterest theory, in the last decade and a half Congress has made better 
use of its ability to limit executive politico-militw activities than prior to 1968. 
Should the introvert mood continue, the Congress can be expected to continue 
its policy effectiveness. 
An example of introvert congressional assertiveness, and itself indicative of 
the progress of this introvert phase, is former Secretary of State Henry 
Kissinger's difficulties toward the end of his term in office. Although his 
balance-of-power approach to foreign policy brought America back from its 
liberal excess of extroversion, further public movement toward introversion 
caused Kissinger's conservative policies to lose support.20 He and President 
Gerald Ford, when 1976 found the United States fully in its current introvert 
orientation, were prevented by the Congress from quietly supporting one 
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Angolan faction in the face of large-scale Soviet and Cuban intervention in favor 
of another faction. In contrast, when the Congolese "Force Publique" revolted 
and Belgian troops intervened in July of 1960, the United States played an 
active, nonmilitary role in the crisis.21 The Eisenhower administration in the 
extrovert year of 1960 had to resist public and congressional pressure for a more 
militant, anticommunist role. 
A like voice can be heard from both former presidents Ford and Carter on 
the issue of constraints imposed upon them by the Congress. Carter showed 
concern, warning, "There's a trend in Congress that is building up that puts too 
much constraint on a president to deal with rapidly changing circumstances." 
This statement points in the same direction as Ford's comment that "Congress 
has encroached much too far on the prerogatives of the executive . . . to conduct 
foreign policy. "22 Despite these complaints, public support around 1976 
seemed to be in favor of a more dominant role for the Congress in the making of 
foreign A later nation-wide study showed that in 1978, 43 percent of 
the public felt Congress should play a more important role in foreign policy, 
compared to 44 percent for the president.24 In 1982,44 percent of those polled 
in a national survey believed that Congress should play a more important role in 
foreign policy, compared to 39 percent for the president.25 Overall, such surveys 
indicate that the public is generally satisfied with a balance that includes an 
important role for Congress. 
President Carter and the Congress each demonstrated important introvert 
traits in their approach to United States defense policy. Carter halted develop- 
ment of the B-1 bomber and deferred development of the neutron bomb. He 
proposed to withdraw United States ground troops from South Korea, but had to 
delay because of congressional resistance and reluctance to pass military aid 
bills for South Korea. The Congress asserted itself on the issue of arms sales, 
which made it difficult for the president to push through such sales as military 
aircraft to Middle Eastern nations. Congress also forced modification of some 
sales, such as airborne warning and control systems to Iran. It took a major 
effort by the Carter administration to push the Panama Canal treaties through, 
and the Senate never ratified the SALT I1 treaty.26 Complex legislative-ex- 
ecutive relations most often give the edge to introvert policies, since new 
programs need some agreement before they can be enacted. 
President Reagan's approach to foreign policy has involved stronger rhet- 
oric, but his foreign policy actions generally have not been more extrovert than 
other recent  president^.^^ Although Reagan's more extrovert rhetoric indicates 
that perhaps he is beginning to recognize the need for better protection of 
American interests, it is obvious that the introvert public and the Congress are 
staying his hand to a large degree.28 Some of the foreign policy actions that 
Reagan did get through Congress were accomplished with his ability to work 
through the complexity of legislative-executive relations and his ability to tailor 
his proposals to satisfy an introvert Congress. 
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The current introvert mood working through Congress and through the 
public to limit presidential action is reflected in the recent United States 
involvement in El Salvador. President Reagan's attempt to provide extensive aid 
to center-right regimes in the El Salvador conflict was met with strong public 
disapproval and soon d o ~ n p l a y e d . ~ ~  Even the issue of Cuban and Soviet 
expansionism could not elicit public support; as one author noted, "Floating El 
Salvador as a red menace to our security has had all the success of an iron 
balloon. "30 Reagan has found it even more difficult to aid the forces fighting 
against the Nicaraguan government. Indeed, congressional assertiveness led 
President Reagan to appoint a commission headed by former Secretary of State 
Henry Kissinger to try to formulate an acceptable policy for Central America. 
Obviously, Reagan's strong talk cannot overcome the introvert mood dominat- 
ing the American public. In fact, Reagan himself may have some introvert 
orientations from his upbringing in the M i d w e ~ t . ~ ~  
The moodlinterest theory contends that short-term indicators, such as 
public opinion polls, are not alone reliable clues to the direction of foreign 
policy mood; however, importance is generally attached to polls. 
Defense spending is one issue on which public opinion is often in transi- 
tion. The seemingly paradoxical "belligerent isolationists" of past history are 
witness to the fact that public support for defense spending need not correlate 
with foreign policy mood. From 1937 to 1939, years of extreme introversion, 
only 5 to 20 percent of the American public favored reducing military spend- 
ing.32 The percentage favoring reduction even in the cold war years fluctuated 
from nearly zero to over 30.33 The current introvert phase began with a definite 
increase in public demand for less defense spending;34 in fact, Bruce Russett 
and Miroslav Nincic noted in a 1976 article that surveys conducted since 
December 1968 regularly discovered that 40 to 50 percent of the populace 
wanted defense spending reduced.35 By 1976-1977 opinion polls indicated, 
with some fluctuation, that the public was gradually drifting away from a 
philosophy of reduction to one of maintaining levels of military strength. The 
Gallup organization from 1969 to mid-1977 determined that those who thought 
that too much was being spent on defense fluctuated from 52 percent in 1969 to 
23 percent in 1977,36 and Potomac Associates surveys discovered that those 
who wanted defense spending reduced or ended altogether gradually decreased 
from 42 percent in 1972 to 24 percent in 1976.37 This does not seem surprising 
in view of the fact that defense spending declined from a wartime level of 9.3 
percent of GNP in fiscal year 1968 to 5.2 percent of GNP in fiscal year 1977.38 
Similarly, Louis Harris and Associates surveys place those desiring de- 
creased defense spending at 30 percent in December 1976, dropping to 19 
percent in July 1978, and falling further to 9 percent in November 1978; those 
supporting increased defense spending went from 28 percent to 38 percent and 
finally to 52 percent on the same dates. It is worth noting that according to the 
same surveys these changes in attitude toward defense spending correspond 
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closely with changes in public perceptions of American strength. As support for 
increased defense spending rose, percentages of the public who felt that the 
United States military defense was weaker than that of the Russians rose from 30 
percent in December 1976 to 34 percent in July 1978 and to 43 percent in 
November 1978. Likewise, the drop in support for decreased spending corre- 
sponds to a drop in the public feeling that the United States defense system was 
stronger than that of the Russians: from 23 percent to 20 percent to 15 percent on 
the same dates.39 Since 1978 public support for increased defense spending has 
continued to rise, to as much as 50 percent or more in 1980 and early 1981,40 
though one study notes a sharp decline by late 1981.41 
Public opinion on defense spending may have leveled off at a position of 
maintenance. One poll shows that in 1982,24 percent of those surveyed thought 
that too much was being spent on defense while 21 percent felt that too little was 
being spent. However, a much larger percentage, 52, felt that the amount being 
spent on defense was about right.42 This leveling off of those who wish to spend 
more on defense may be due to the Reagan administration's emphasis on 
military spending. The public may believe, because of Reagan's strong rhetoric 
and his actual increase in the defense budget, that enough has been done to 
bolster American forces. This belief is reflected by a 1983 study that shows that 
the percentage of Americans who feel the United States is about as strong/ 
almost as strong as the Russians has risen from 40 percent in January 1980 to 51 
percent in March 1983.43 
Figure 7 shows percentages of Americans supporting increased defense 
spending from 1935 to 1982, on the basis of a recent study combining public 
opinion polls.44 What is implied by these fluctuations in public opinion? It is 
certainly not the direction in which the public foreign policy mood is moving. 
Regular fluctuations within a mood prevent the direct correlation of public 
opinion on defense spending to foreign policy mood. It alone, therefore, is not a 
reliable indicator. 
Another area of interest is the willingness of the American public to use 
military force abroad, particularly to help friends. A Time-Louis Harris poll 
printed in May 1969 showed that, of twenty-two possibilities outside of the 
United States itself, only in the cases of Canada and Mexico were a majority of 
Americans willing to use American military force to repel an invasion by 
outside communist military forces.45 Recent data, however, indicates an in- 
creased willingness to defend United States allies: a 1976 survey found that 56 
percent of the American public favored defending its major European allies in 
case of attack by the Soviet Union, and studies in February and July 1981 note 
that 51 percent and 53 percent, respectively, would support deployment of U.S. 
troops if the Soviet Union or communist China invaded Western Europe. 
Although only 45 percent in 1976 favored defending Japan under similar 
circumstances, that figure climbed to 74 percent by 1980. Also in 1980, 64 
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Figure 7. Support for Increased Defense Spending, 1935-1982 
Source: Farid Abolfathi, "Threats, Public Opinion, and Military Spending in the United 
States, 1930-1990,'' in Threats, Weapons, and Foreign Policy (Sage International Yearbook 
of Foreign Policy Studies, vol. 5), eds. Pat McGowan and Charles W. Kegley, Jr. (Beverly 
Hills: Sage Publications, 1980), pp. 98-99. For a 1980 and 1982 update, see William Schneider, 
"Conservatism, Not Interventionism: Trends in Foreign Policy in the 1980s, in Eagle De- 
fiant: United States Foreign Policy in the 1980s, ed. Kenneth A. Oye, Robert J .  Lieber, 
and Donald Rothchild (Boston: Little, Brown, and Co., 1983), p. 36. 
percent were willing to send troops to protect the Persian Gulf, an area which 
previously was not of such importance to the United States.46 In a 1982 poll 65 
percent of those surveyed favored sending U.S. troops if the Soviet Union 
invaded Western Europe and 51 percent if the Soviets invaded Japan. Of the 
other eight possibilities offered, including the Persian Gulf, less than 40 percent 
of those polled favored sending U.S. Troops.47 
Comparison with similar studies in the years immediately preceding World 
War I1 indicates that support of allies alone, like defense spending, is not an 
adequate indicator of foreign policy mood. From November 1938 to July 1940, 
American willingness to defend Brazil and Mexico skyrocketed (from 27 to 55 
percent and from 43 to 76 percent, respectively), and willingness to protect 
Canada jumped 15 percentage points. In April 1975 public willingness to come 
to Brazil's defense reached a low of 15 percent, while Mexico and Canada 
retained the highest but not very impressive percentages of 42 and 57, respec- 
t i ~ e l y . ~ ~  It is apparent that American willingness to defend allies can vary 
according to public perceptions of actual threat and is not alone an indicator of 
public foreign policy mood. Further, it must be remembered that introvert 
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phases do not preclude meeting present commitments as much as they do 
acquisition of new commitments, and in the current introvert mood the public 
has not shown a willingness to support new  commitment^.^^ 
Another important indicator is analysis of what the public perceives as the 
most important problem facing America. Analysis of the years from 1941 to 
1967, inclusive, shows that an international problem was rated most important 
for twenty of the twenty-seven years; whereas from 1969 to 1983, inclusive, a 
domestic problem was rated most important for eleven of the fifteen years.50 A 
1976 survey of the relative importance of thirty-one problem areas discovered 
that the first international affairs item was ranked as eleven after ten domestic 
 problem^.^' Likewise, a 1982 analysis of surveys between 1974 and 1982 shows 
that public concern for United States relations with other countries and the 
possibility of getting into another war consistently ranked between sixth and 
twelfth in a list of twelve items containing ten domestic concerns.52 The details 
of this analysis are presented in table 27 (page 190). A 1983 poll found that only 
16 percent of those surveyed thought that foreign affairslnational defense was the 
most important problem facing the country today, while 84 percent thought that 
economic needslissues were the most important problem.53 
While the most important issue area alone cannot indicate mood, it would 
seem to be one of the more important factors. For example, in reference to the 
1940 mood change, from March 1939 to October 1941 the percentage of the 
American public indicating they would vote against American entry into war 
against Germany and Italy registered a small decrease from 83 percent to 79 
percent.54 In sharp contrast, the percentage regarding a foreign policy issue as 
the most important problem facing the American people jumped from 14 
percent in January 1939 to 81 percent in November 1941. However, the limita- 
tions of this dramatic indicator are pointed out by a later survey. In October 1945 
the percentage of the American people naming foreign problems as most 
important was down to 7,55 while at the same time the United States was 
beginning to assume a role as a world superpower. Also, the importance of 
foreign affairs in the public opinion jumped drastically in 1980 in response to the 
Soviet invasion of Afghanistan and the Iranian hostage crisis, but fell back to 
previous low levels almost immedia te l~ ,~~ as Americans had not yet exited from 
the intmvert phase. Events in Grenada and Lebanon, as well as concerns about 
possible nuclear war, moved foreign policy issues up on the list of public 
concerns in late 1983.57 Only time will tell whether such movement indicates a 
long-term trend. 
Zbigniew Brzezinski, who would later become President Carter's national 
security advisor, wrote in the summer of 1976 about a number of politico- 
military and a few economic matters on which the public was less international 
than it had been previously. His most optimistic words concern a constant public 
support for international human rights efforts and a heightened public concern 
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over new global problems such as energy, inflation, and food.58 In terms of the 
mood/interest analysis, which contends that economic and humanitarian con- 
cerns are not subject to the same variation as politico-military concerns, his 
optimism is overstated in the context of overall foreign policy. 
None of these indicators alone can accurately and consistently point toward 
overall politico-military foreign policy mood. The most useful polling data may 
be that gathered in composite, such as some Potomac Associates efforts, which 
identifl a significant growth in isolationist sentiment from 1964 to 1974.59 
Indications are that the internationalist to isolationist movement leveled off 
during 1974-1976,60 and has reversed (moved back toward internationalism) 
between 1976 and 1980.61 Three factors, however, should be noted regarding 
this reversal and the moodlinterest theory: first, the introvertlextrovert di- 
chotomy used in the moodlinterest theory, unlike the isolationistlinterna- 
tionalist dichotomy, concerns foreign policy actions relative to United States 
interests at a particular time in history rather than to some sort of absolute 
definition; second, an introvert mood, whereby politico-military interests are 
not adequately pursued, does not require a pure isolationist consensus but rather 
can consist of a lack of an extrovert consensus; and third, the moodlinterest 
theory does contend that elements of extroversion begin seeping into the public 
mood toward the end of an introvert phase, and vice versa, without changing the 
political effects of the dominant mood. 
The above material just touches upon the opinion data available. Its purpose 
is not to be comprehensive, but rather to indicate that it is difficult to prove or 
disprove a foreign policy mood based on such data. Indeed, even indicators 
other than opinion polls may differ from overall mood. Historically, temporary 
ups and downs during a phase are not uncommon, as Frank Klingberg's 1952 
analysis indicates. h g u l a r  fluctuations of some individual indicators charted 
in his historical analysis of foreign policy mood phases are apparent.62 U1- 
timately one must avoid concentrating on relatively short spans of time and 
endeavor to look at the long-term picture. 
Perhaps reliable clues regarding current American introversion can be 
gained from determining whether similarities exist between situations toward 
the latter end of previous introvert phases and the present situation, for if the 
present introvert phase started in 1968, past patterns would dictate that it is now 
more than two-thirds over. 
Halfway through the first introvert phase, operating as a loose confederation 
with little diplomatic prestige, the United States was understandably hesitant to 
be assertive in world affairs. The French Revolution, beginning in 1789, mus- 
tered a great deal of sympathy from the fledgling nation, but military aid was not 
offered to assist the revolutionaries. 
The 1824-1844 introvert phase saw the United States siding vocally with the 
more liberal democratic regimes of Europe. Sentiments were aroused on behalf 
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of the Greek rebels fighting against Turkish rule. And in 1830 President Jackson 
and members of his Cabinet did not hesitate to appear at rallies supporting the 
July revolution in France.63 No military action was taken, however, to support 
such foreign democratic causes. Similarly, the Carter administration started out 
questioning repressive governments and sympathizing with dissidents. How- 
ever, its enthusiasm diminished and little thought was ever given to the possibil- 
ity of military intervention even in the name of humanitarianism. President 
Carter's reluctance to use military force was highlighted by his statement that 
"we do not want to send our military forces into Africa to meet the challenge of 
Soviet and Cuban intrusion. ' ' ~ 5 ~  Still there was a limit to American introversion 
during the 1824-1844 introvert phase, as there is now. President Jackson pressed 
claims owed by France in the face of war talk and a reluctant Senate prior to final 
resolution in 1836. President Carter vocalized his concerns over Soviet-Cuban 
moves in Africa, allowed United States military planes to transport foreign 
troops to help Zaire, and supported increased United States aid to help African 
countries defend themselves. Along the same lines, President Reagan worked to 
provide military support to center-right regimes in the El Salvadoran civil 
conflict, but that support was limited by an introvert mood. 
Another step in the historical analysis of the middle and late stages of 
introvert phases brings us to the early 1880s, a decade into the 1871-1891 
introvert phase. The United States at this time showed little enthusiasm for the 
worldwide colonialism perpetrated by the European powers. Naval moderniza- 
tion, however, was belatedly begun in the early 1880s after the United States 
realized that several South American republics had stronger navies.(j5 A parallel 
can be drawn to recent increases in public approval of defense spending; such 
concern in 1881 did not herald the beginning of a period of extroversion and, 
likewise, need not to do so now. Humanitarian concern in the 1871-1891 phase 
was especially apparent in 1882 when, after Senate approval, President Arthur 
officially proclaimed that the United States would adhere to the international 
Red Cross covenant.66 
Ten years after the start of the 1919-1940 introvert phase, Herbert Hoover 
was president and the American public, still discouraged over World War I, 
showed little interest in the affairs of Europe and Asia. Although conceding that 
the United States had not done its part in the past to insure world peace and to 
encourage international cooperation in humanitarian, cultural, and crime-pre- 
ventive associations, Hoover insisted upon keeping his nation apart from future 
politico-military rivalries in Europe.(j7 
At similar points in the progression of different introvert phases, Presidents 
Hoover and Carter have a number of similarities. Sons of farmers, both men 
were educated as engineers and became successful businessmen. Hoover was 
the first president elected from west of the Mississippi River, Carter the first 
from the Deep South since Zachary Taylor. Each man succeeded a "white 
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knight" president who, in turn, had succeeded a president ruined by a scandal in 
his administration. Both Hoover and Carter, skilled administrators and strong in 
religious belief, demonstrated strength on humanitarian issues: Hoover served 
as chairman of the American Relief Commission following World War I and of 
the Famine Emergency Commission after World War 11; Carter's stance on 
human dignity and human rights is well known. The Hoover administration 
significantly increased the acreage of national forests and parks; Carter likewise 
was strong on environmental issues. The Hoover-Stimson Doctrine of 1932 
proclaimed that the United States would not recognize the results of Japanese 
aggression in the Far East. President Carter exhibited a similar tendency to 
formulate policy by unilateral declaration in his first few months in office; 
although this tendency later diminished, he never abandoned it. Indeed, his 1980 
reactions to the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan could be viewed as an updated 
Hoover-Stimson Doctrine insofar as the Carter response made use of the 
nonmilitary capabilities of the United States while hinting at military reaction if 
the situation expanded. International economic problems consumed much of 
the energy of both leaders, although Hoover confronted more severe problems. 
Both Hoover and Carter emphasized international disarmament; Hoover's 1932 
proposal to the General Disarmament Conference suggested that "the arms of 
the world should be reduced by nearly one-third, "68 and Carter voiced similar 
strong aspirations in the nuclear age, stating in his inaugural address that "we 
will move this year a step toward our ultimate goal-the elimination of all 
nuclear weapons from this Earth. "69 Both Hoover and Carter, generally reluc- 
tant to compromise their idealism, demonstrated in foreign policy a somewhat 
less than realistic grasp of the complexities of international politics. 
finally, each introvert phase has ended in excessduring these periods the 
United States clearly has not done enough to protect its national interests. 
Toward the end of the first introvert phase, President Washington issued his 
neutrality proclamation with regard to the conflict between England and France. 
The position of a neutral desiring trade with both sides was difficult to maintain. 
Although some long-standing differences with the British were settled by the 
Jay Treaty, the compromise barely passed the Senate in early 1795. From 1795 to 
1797, the United States also agreed to tribute treaties with three Barbary states. 
The nation had betrayed its interests in Ereedom of the seas in too many 
instances. 
In 1836 Texas achieved independence after a bitter struggle with Mexico. 
Although the undeclared neutrality of the United States was laxly enforced on 
land, the mood of the United States was introvert and annexation was not 
forthcoming. Britain indicated willingness to protect Texan independence and 
Mexico threatened war should the United States annex the new nation. Tensions 
with the British over the involvement of individual Americans in Canadian 
insurrections grew, yet the United States government continued its endeavors to 
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enforce strict neutrality. The United States also experienced boundary problems 
with Britain, particularly in the areas of Maine and the Oregon Territory. A 
settlement regarding the Maine boundary was reached in 1842, but it met with 
great popular dissatisfaction. Clearly, American foreign policy actions in the 
latter part of the 1824-1844 introvert phase were overly restrained. 
During the 1871-1891 introvert phase, the United States had a relatively 
consistent disinterest in world affairs, even though European powers were 
increasing their influence throughout the world. American military strength, 
especially naval, was downplayed in favor of internal industrial and commercial 
growth. United States foreign policy interests were neglected most toward the 
end of the phase, since European imperial assertiveness was continually grow- 
ing without an appropriate American counterbalance. 
The Neutrality Acts of the late 1930s, demanded by strong introvert sen- 
timent, were an extreme of introversion that proved to be most damaging. These 
acts, which prevented the United States from protecting its interests in both 
Europe and Asia, were an irrational solution to the politico-military maneuver- 
ings of the world powers at the time-maneuverings that in due course would 
ignite into World War 11. 
Evidence of current dissatisfaction with the international situation can be 
seen in the United States' willingness to withdraw from organizations like the 
International Labor Organization, the International Nuclear Regulatory Agen- 
cy, and the United Nations Educational, Scientific, and Cultural Organization. 
Another manifestation of introversion is the Reagan administration's refusal to 
accept the Law of the Seas Treaty as negotiated by previous administrations. The 
strength of the nuclear freeze movement can be viewed as the product of the 
frustrations of many Americans with the nuclear arms race, an unfortunate 
power reality. Such measures are compatible with mid- to late-stage introver- 
sion. 
Although extremes occur toward the end of each introvert phase, it is 
important to realize that in the long-term view of the mood/interest theory, 
circumstances leading to those extremes could be set in the middle third of the 
introvert phase. According to the theory, the middle of an introvert period is 
when public mood and realistic short-term interests most closely coincide. The 
least amount of foreign policy activity occurs in the middle third, illustrating 
this fact. Thus, introvert policies meet with less immediate international reac- 
tion than at previous times. As the introvert mood grows, foreign policy patterns 
continue to develop in the direction set in the middle stage, and the United States 
is carried into extreme introversion. Expectations of other countries formulated 
during second stages may need to be corrected by a rise in action during the last 
third of a phase despite the increasingly introvert mood. The United States is 
comfortable with doing less in the international arena during second stages and 
the rest of the world comes to take this lack of action for granted, insufficiently 
considering American interests during the third stage. Thus, the United States is 
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forced to increase its actions to cope with a weak image initiated by the little 
action taken in the second stage. Since the world misunderstands American 
mood fluctuation, the beginning of extroversion can be the time of greatest 
danger. Throughout introvert phases, the world becomes accustomed to the 
United States' lack of concern about its interests and takes advantage of the 
situation. When the American mood changes, the United States may use 
military force against those unsuspecting countries who are taking advantage of 
it. 
One contention of the moodlinterest theory is that such excesses at the end 
of a phase do not necessarily go totally unnoticed; undoubtedly someone 
recognizes the growing threat, but the momentum of the dominant mood at the 
time overwhelms such recognition. If the United States is now moving into the 
latter stages of an introvert phase, as the mood/interest theory suggests, it might 
be hearing the beginnings of a reaction to the extreme introversion. It appears 
that this is indeed the case. For example, the recent movement for a nuclear 
freeze has been gaining nationwide support, but those arguing the dangers of 
such a policy have at least commanded some attention. Also, some have noted 
that since the mid-1960s the Soviet Union has gained a dangerous superiority in 
military capabilities over the United States, to the point that even Reagan's 
proposed increases are insufficient to meet the threat.70 Indeed, it could be 
argued that the difference between President Reagan's foreign policy rhetoric 
and action evidences this fact: being closer to the foreign policy scene, Reagan 
and his advisors recognize to some extent the need to protect our interests, but 
the dominant introvert mood in the public and Congress prevents such action. 
Similarly, warnings against the current direction of American foreign 
policy are appearing in other places. In a recent address, analyst Midge Decter 
argued: 
The fact of the matter is that in a world more and more of whose real estate is coming 
to stand in the shadow of the Soviet empire . . . the United States has only rwo choices of 
policy . . . (a) we have the option to do everything in our power to undermine the 
economic, political, and military strength of our enemy . . . or (b) we have the option of 
accommodating ourselves to the ever-increasing spread of the enemy's power, a power 
which at this moment threatens to castrate our friends and allies and, after them, us.71 
Perhaps such strong statements, and the fact that they go largely unnoticed, are 
indicative of the extent of current introversion. Unfortunately, if America is in an 
extremely introvert mood, the likelihood that such a condition will be recog- 
nized in time is small. Also, a recent study noted that "political science elites" 
have a tendency to side together in significant proportions on many issues.72 If 
this is the case, and if these elites are responsible for a large share of the 
interpretation of the current situation, this could be another obstacle to recogni- 
tion of current introversion. 
By thus comparing current introversion with that in the same stage of 
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development in past introvert phases, no indication is found that the current 
mood phase has dissipated. The danger of a strong introversion similar to that of 
the 1919-1940 period is significant. This is not to say that today's introversion is 
akin to that disastrous period immediately preceding Pearl Harbor, but rather 
that it is generally similar to the introversion of the mid 1930s. Early introversion 
helped temper the extreme extroversion of the late years of the 1891-1919 
extrovert phase;73 extreme introversion was not to come until 1935.74 Extreme 
introversion in the current phase, in accordance with the historical analysis of 
the mood/interest theory, could very well be the United States' mood during the 
next several years. 
In the current introvert phase, the intense concern about politico-military 
power which is so typical of extrovert phases has been reduced. Although talk of 
the importance of maintaining strength is still prevalent, talk of the possible use 
of American military power has greatly declined. The current introversion has 
been fostered by business liberals who want to advance peace by making trade 
concessions to the Soviet Union and by reform liberals who want to advance 
peace by using economic power to liberalize the Soviet attitude toward human 
rights. These diverse methods make the current degree of liberal convergence 
on introversion not quite as strong as the degree of convergence in the late 1930s, 
when business liberals wanted to insure peace by denying our economic power 
to warring nations and reform liberals wanted to insure peace by leaving other 
nations alone. America today probably has not reached such extreme introver- 
sion, but it could in the near future. Major indications are that the current 
introvert phase is clearly established, generally progressing in intensity and, so 
far, following the basic pattern of liberal mood alternation evidenced historically 
in American foreign policy. 
ARGUMENTS AGAINST THE RETURN 
OF EXTREME INTROVERSION 
Care must be taken to avoid confusion caused by the use of strong words. For 
example, use of the word isolationist is confusing simply because introvert 
Americans have not wanted to be isolated as much as they have wanted introvert 
responses to politico-military problems. Use of isolationist makes the danger of 
extreme introversion all too easy to dismiss. Globalism as well could be 
approached in a simplified manner in order to dismiss a possible return of 
extreme extroversion. In order to avoid such confusion, the moodlinterest theory 
has minimized use of the globalist/isolationist terminology. The theory does not 
argue that there has ever been a strictly defined, pure isolationist period, but that 
there have been times when the United States has not done enough to protect its 
politico-military interests and that such a shortcoming could happen again. 
American foreign policy analysts often argue that it is impossible to return 
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to the isolationist posture of the 1930s. This argument, however, does not 
repudiate the application of the mood/interest theory to modern American 
foreign policy: the extremes of the current phase may not duplicate those of the 
last period of introversion, but they need not do so in order to be historically 
consistent; all that is required is that the United States fail to do enough to 
maintain its foreign policy interests. 
In fact, such a shortcoming could just as easily happen now as in past 
introvert phases, since protection of the United States interests now requires a 
more active politico-military role. In every introvert phase extremes have oc- 
curred in part because the United States has had to do more than in the preceding 
introvert phase to protect its interests. For instance, the American interest in the 
prevention of one-nation dominance in Europe in the late 1930s realistically 
required that the United States unite with Great Britain and France to oppose 
German designs. Currently, the same interest requires more-that the United 
States not only cooperate in the defense of Europe, but that it assume the 
leadership role. Likewise, management or curtailment of the increasing pro- 
liferation of nuclear weapons throughout the world requires leadership by major 
powers. 75 
In a similar manner, Herbert Spiro notes changes in the relationship 
between the public and foreign policy since the cold war era. The writer notes 
that considerations such as Henry Kissinger's performance in foreign policy 
matters and the increasing complexity of foreign affairs have led to greater 
expectations, greater interest, and greater knowledge of foreign policy activities 
by the public. These changes will significantly affect the development of any 
new foreign policy consensus.76 In terms of the mood/interest theory, this 
analysis supports the contention that the current introvert phase is somewhat 
different from past introvert phases, and the greater demands and interest in 
foreign policy contribute to the likelihood that support for extrovert policies will 
not consolidate into a consensus for several years. 
These considerations are not, however, intended to suggest that patterns 
evident in previous introvert periods should be disregarded. Rather, the mood/ 
interest theory contends that introvert moods are typified by certain general 
characteristics, the sum of which leads to neglect of real American politico- 
military interests, even though exact circumstances may be different in different 
introvert phases. Thus, by extrapolating general characteristics from previous 
introvert phases, one can compare them to those of the current introversion. 
With this in mind, some of the recent literature covered in Chapter 1 could 
be looked at in terms of the present introvert phase. A majority of the recent 
writing on the American public's attitude regarding foreign policy concludes 
that America is currently internationalist, not isolationist. However, as men- 
tioned above, the internationalist/isolationist (or globalist/isolationist) di- 
chotomy can be misleading. If we look to the isolationists of the 1930s and filter 
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out general characteristics, we can see many parallels with the so-called 
internationalists of current times. 
Manfred Jonas defined five categories of 1930s  isolationist^,^^ and there 
are similarities to elements in the current introvert phase. Jonas's foreign- 
oriented isolationists, who were sympathetic to the Axis powers or the Soviet 
Union, are comparable to today's American Communist party. Belligerent 
isolationists who vigorously supported defense of American rights and inter- 
ests, reliance on international law, and nineteenth-century unilateral policies are 
similar to those elements of the public today which support outdated cold 
war-era policy. Isolationists that Jonas called timid were willing to surrender 
some traditional American rights to minimize direct contact and entanglement. 
Comparable feelings are voiced today by those who are willing to sacrifice some 
interests in the name of compromises, i.e., arms control agreements. Jonas's 
radical isolationists wanted to avoid war to facilitate establishment of new social 
order in America (the New Deal vs. military spending). A similar sentiment 
today is expressed by the reform liberal emphasis on social programs rather than 
military spending. Conservative isolationists were afraid that war would destroy 
the old order and institutions which needed to be preserved (war effort vs. free 
enterprise and business interests). The same basic position is taken by business 
liberals today. 
Jonas's categories have many similarities with three recent studies, all of 
which conclude that America is predominantly internationalist. Maggiotto and 
Wittkopf, Holsti, and Mandelbam and S ~ h n e i d e r ~ ~  all note the loss of con- 
sensus in American foreign policy and divide the different elements into 
factions that they label as one or another brand of internationalism. However, 
these branches of internationalism have common characteristics with those 
elements Jonas labeled isolationist. The Maggiotto and Wittkopf label of 
internationalists is the only label that does not include an element that can be 
related to one of the Jonas categories. The point is-regardless of the labels- 
that there are very few pure isolationists or pure internationalists. This lack of 
purity results in a division of the public into factions that current analysts prefer 
to call predominantly internationalist. However, almost all of the elements 
include some isolationist sentiments. In the American system of government, a 
lack of consensus, such as the one that currently exists, can lead to a deadlock 
that effectively becomes an introvert policy. Thus, the degree of convergence on 
introversion does not have to be as great as the degree of convergence on 
extroversion. 
In essence, during the late 1930s introverts saw a choice between peace and 
war, and chose peace. Dissenting extroverts saw a choice between democracy 
and dictatorship, and chose democracy.79 Both peace and democracy are liberal 
choices. It is reasonable to assert that today's introvert Americans see a choice 
between peace and war, while extrovert Americans see a choice between 
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American democracy and Soviet dictatorship. As in the late 1930s, the argu- 
ment centers on which choice is the more relevant one. 
Although the speech was written almost two hundred years ago, George 
Washington's Farewell Address contains some surprisingly relevant ideas which 
apply to the past decade and a half in American foreign policy. Washington 
supported the fulfillment of existing commitments and the expansion of com- 
mercial relations, yet asked that no new political commitments be made. The 
United States has continued to support such commitments as NATO and pursues 
expanded commercial relations with other countries, but since 1968 has not 
committed itself to new politico-military obligations except those necessary to 
meet previous commitments. Washington advises the United States to have no 
permanent enemies; similarly, efforts have been made in the past decade to 
breach the gaps separating the United States from such rivals as the Soviet 
Union and the People's Republic of China. Humanitarian concerns are ex- 
pressed by Washington and such concerns remain important. Thus, comparison 
of similarities in the introvert advice of George Washington and the foreign 
policy of the United States since 1968 supports a continuation of past patterns.80 
Few people are eager to accept the suggestion that the public might cany 
American foreign policy into another period of extreme introversion. Many 
arguments have been raised and differences noted in order to demonstrate why 
such a revision is not likely. The most common of these are examined below and 
answered by application of the moodlinterest analysis. 
One difference between the introverts of the 1930s and those of today is that 
the latter often are most upset by politico-military policies of the United States 
and the Soviet Union, whereas the former were most upset by policies of 
European nations. This might indicate that the United States is not duplicating 
the path of the 1930s. However, it is more accurate to view American introvert 
criticisms in the light of America's liberal view of power. Before 1940 the 
international center of power was Europe, and liberal concerns about such power 
were directed there during times of introversion. Today the United States and the 
Soviet Union are the international centers of power and, consistent with liber- 
alism, today's introverts direct their criticisms at both powers. Differing objects 
of criticism simply do not indicate that the United States will avoid extreme 
introversion in the future. 
The critique of the American power center of world politics today might be 
said to make Americans less nationalistic than when they opposed the European 
power center of the 1930s. However, both introvert phases are supported by 
arguments evidencing varying degrees of nationalism. Nationalist elements in 
both phases have included the idea that America must take care of itself before 
other countries and have a military capability focused on its own defense. 
Nonnationalistic arguments can be seen both in the 1920s argument that the 
League of Nations unwisely preserved the status quo of European rule over the 
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world, preventing self-determination for many people, and the 1970s argument 
that developing nations should be able to determine their destiny without 
American military oversight. In fact, there seems to be a good degree of 
continuity over time between introvert rationales; for example, John Cooper, Jr., 
showed "how the isolationists of the 'Great War' established all the rationales 
that would be used by their successors down to Pearl H a r b ~ r . " ~ ~  
Ihe  pressures resulting from the advent of the nuclear age lead to an 
argument against the return of extreme introversion: it is too risky for the United 
States to withdraw from the central role in a world with self-destructive 
capabilities. Before 1945 the United States could exist in isolation and feel only 
limited effects of international disputes. The nation was protected by geography, 
having weak neighbors to the north and south and expansive oceans to the east 
and west. In a power-political sense, the shield of the British navy for most of 
American history provided sufficient indirect protection of our shores to allow 
periodic entrances and exits from world politics. Since 1945 the situation has 
changed, making the United States one of the two most powerful nations in the 
world. Nuclear weapons and other advances in military technology make it 
exceedingly difficult to limit the consequences of a future war. The argument 
continues that the American public cannot avoid foreseeing the dire results of 
introversion and will therefore refrain from it. The mood/interest theory, how- 
ever, maintains that even though the United States' role as a world leader and the 
danger of nuclear weapons no longer allow it to alter its foreign policy without 
worldwide repercussions, the ability to do so remains. The freedom of political 
movement that the United States enjoyed earlier, thanks to geography and the 
British navy, has continued because of nuclear superpower status. What nation 
would challenge a United States determined to withdraw from the world center 
stage? Superpower status does not preclude the ability to revert to extreme 
introversion-it might even enhance that ability. 
The contention that the world has become increasingly dependent on the 
United States in so many areas that its role is indispensable is based more on 
dogma than on history, and is reminiscent of some people's view of nineteenth- 
century Britain. No nation is indispensable. If one nation steps out of the 
limelight, other world powers will become more assertive and move closer to 
center stage. George Modelski's theory of long cycles in world politics argues 
that this has happened regularly throughout recent history, with one nation 
holding a position of world dominance for a little more than one hundred 
years.82 Communist powers are known for their ability to move into vacuums. 
An intensifying of American introversion could also provoke more assertive 
behavior in such countries as West Germany and Japan, or provide more 
incentive for the formation of a powerful United States of Europe. In any event, 
the "indispensable America" argument seems unwarranted. 
A similar argument advanced is that the United States is now part of an 
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economically interdependent world and cannot retrench. However, the mood/ 
interest theory contends that American liberal moods operate differently from 
tariff fluctuations, business cycles, and most other economic indicators. Re- 
gardless of mood, economic interests have been fairly consistently pursued 
throughout American history, though they gain emphasis during introvert pha- 
ses. There is no persuasive evidence that economic prosperity depends upon 
politico-military position in the world, as demonstrated by the present-day 
health of the West German and Japanese economies. Liberal America views 
politico-military and economic interests as being separate from each other; in 
fact, American politico-military introversion coupled with active American 
commercialism in an economically interdependent world is believed to be 
possible.83 
On a related topic, Jon Alexander and Tom Darby offer the idea that the 
spread of American technology has developed into a type of American imperi- 
alism. The study notes that the last extrovert phase was followed by a period of 
detente and a technological race. It was America's technological superiority, the 
authors argue, that brought China into a "tacit alliance" with the United States, 
and "henceforward, Americans came to understand that they could more easily 
spread their empire through technology than through terror."84 The mood/ 
interest theory, however, would construe modem technological exchanges as a 
form of economic activity, not exactly as imperialistic advances. Thus, ties with 
China would fall into the characteristic pattern of an introvert mood. Also, 
continuing shifts in Sino-American relations show that the technological 
bridges are none too secure. 
It can be asserted that Americans have altered their ideology to the extent 
that it might be called a form of socialism. If this were the case, it would be 
plausible to argue that Americans are no longer subject to the liberal extremism 
in foreign policy evidenced in the past. However, the "socialism" in the 
"welfare state" begun in the 1930s is and has been a domestic phenomenon with 
no outward manifestations in foreign affairs behavior. Further, it lacks some 
major characteristics of the socialism manifested in other countries.85 This 
weak "socialism" is a poor candidate to subdue the transcendent liberalism that 
has thrived for at least two hundred years and whose major values seem to 
remain among the vast majority of Americans. The argument that socialism has 
replaced liberalism as the dominant ideology is not relevant to American 
behavior on the international scene. 
Some might view the isolationists of the 1930s as simple-minded people 
who did not understand the real nature of the world. This would be a matter of 
historical bias and easily refuted. Isolationists of the 1930s were a complex and 
far from homogeneous group. As noted earlier, Manfred Jonas lists five major 
types of isolationists in his study of the latter half of the decade: foreign- 
oriented, belligerent, timid, radical, and c o n s e ~ a t i v e . ~ ~  Gabriel Almond lists 
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the following five type of isolationists in his 1950 study: communist elements, 
noncommunist Wallacites, reactionary-nationalists, pacifists, and the extreme 
 internationalist^.^^ A variety of both reform and business liberals was repre- 
sented among these groups, and all embraced the isolationist cause for diverse 
and often sophisticated reasons. 
Senator William Borah (R-Idaho), who served several years as chairman of 
the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, certainly is one of the best known 
isolationists of the interwar period and typifies the complexity of American 
introvert thought. He was a reform liberal senator who voted for American 
participation in World War I, voted against the 1917 Espionage Act, called for a 
clear statement of war aims, supported amnesty for World War I political 
prisoners, and opposed the Treaty of Versailles in part because he was con- 
cerned that it was a vengeful peace that guaranteed European dominance over 
the colonial world. On other issues, Borah offered a resolution for establishment 
of relations with the Soviet government in 1922 (he believed that 140 million 
people could not be outlawed if peace were to be maintained in Europe), 
opposed United States membership in the World Court, denounced American 
intervention in Nicaragua and extraterritorial rights in China, supported the 
Kellogg-Briand Pact to outlaw offensive war, and regularly implied that Euro- 
pean disputes prior to World War I1 were just more European power politics. 
Many intellectuals considered him the conscience of national politics because 
of his willingness to take an independent stance on important issues. Borah has 
been roundly criticized for his statement that Britain was behind Hitler after the 
German invasion of Czechoslovakia, but he was motivated in part by the belief 
that a secretly plotting Britain would allow Hitler a free reign in central Europe 
as long as it could insure the safety of its empire. He also recognized Hitler's 
potential in Europe and expressed the hope that the German chancellor would 
modify his character enough to take a place in history alongside Charlemagne.88 
A belief that Borah was "simple-minded ignores the complexity and 
sophistication of his record on American foreign affairs. Another isolationist 
leader, Senator Arthur Vandenberg (R-Michigan), also exhibited a complex 
official record on foreign policyg9 Vandenberg, Borah, and other Americans of 
the time made typically American liberal errors in judgment. The fact that these 
introverts of the 1930s were not simple-minded argues the possibility that 
intelligent, reasoning people in our time might enter upon another era of 
extreme introversion in which American interests are not adequately main- 
tained. 
One argument that could be raised against a return of extreme introversion 
in moodJinterest terms is that, whereas in past introvert phases the United States 
has been a growing power and has used introversion as a respite from dynamic 
expansion, requirements for United States actions are no longer growing. This 
may be so, but instead of negating a return of introvert excesses, this argument 
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simply reduces the danger inherent in those extremes. If the amount of action 
required to protect American interests is leveling off or decreasing, some 
introversion may keep the nation from taking overly aggressive foreign policy 
action. Ihus, some introversion in a time of steady or diminishing requirements 
for action could be beneficial for United States interests. However, successful 
introversion could add enough fuel to the introvert fire that the United States 
might not do enough to meet its interests. Thus, counting on declining 
requirements for action to check introversion is a dangerous gamble that could 
easily backfire. Indeed, this author sees a continuing rise in the actions required 
to meet United States interests in an increasingly complex world. 
That events have caused the United States to mature is one final argument. 
One can claim that although the United States acted in accordance with 
fluctuating moods in the past, it has now matured, learned its lessons from the 
past, and is not destined to repeat past mistakes. This is wholly in keeping with 
the optimism which is so much a part of the American liberal heritage. Just as 
extrovert rationales such as William McKinley's religiously inspired 1899 sup- 
port of the Philippine acquisitiong0 and introvert rationales such as the 1930s 
isolationism appear peculiar and outdated to us today, so might Lyndon 
Johnson's desire to win the hearts and minds of the Vietnamese people and the 
current preference for introversion appear equally dated in the future. This 
analysis suggests that it is more accurate to state that arguments in behalf of both 
introversion and extroversion have themselves become more complicated and 
mature. The nation could be experiencing a new and more sophisticated type of 
introvert rationale that will lead to another extreme of introversion which 
Americans do not yet recognize as fitting the traditional pattern of fluctuating 
liberal moods in foreign policy. 
Interestingly, a number of foreign policy writers, such as Bruce Russett and 
Zbigniew Brzezinski, acknowledge a changed public mood even though an 
optimism generally surfaces that the depth of this change is limited.91 However, 
at present the introvert mood is past the two-thirds point in terms of the past 
mood phases identified in Klingberg's analysis. I he  optimism of Americans is 
all too characteristic of liberalism and needs to be balanced by a degree of 
pessimism in order to produce a reliable analysis. 
Why would it be impossible for America to go through another period of 
introversion culminating in extremes outside of its national interest? America 
still has a dominant liberalism. The mass public still sets the parameters for 
foreign policy and the leadership of the country is in no position to deny mass 
desires. Presidential decision-making is a complex matter that does not indicate 
a reversal of moods, particularly since presidents are usually elected as a 
product of mood. Congressional assertiveness, a normal feature of introvert 
phases, projects rather than arrests public mood. Bureaucracy does not offer a 
realistic prospect of preventing extreme moods. The move to introversion has 
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generally continued as in the past and there seems to be no reason why it does 
not have the potential to go to an extreme; all the while, American international 
behavior could remain curiously predictable. 
It must be concluded, however, that the moodlinterest analysis cannot 
predict the future. Any of its tenets may eventually be discarded: world events 
could make continuing shifts impossible; American liberalism could be aban- 
doned for a new ideology; the time spans of the phases could narrow to ten years, 
or six years, or one year. However, the essential argument of the moodlinterest 
theory remains valid: the forces pointing toward a return to extreme introversion 
are greater than is commonly recognized and a faith that this will not happen is 
not fully justified. The long-standing pattern of recurring extremes needs to be 
broken if American interests are to be realistically pursued in the future. 
6. Conclusion 
This book presents and defends the moodlinterest concept as a valid interpreta- 
tion of American foreign policy. The Introduction identified the six propositions 
of the moodlinterest theory and argued that such long-range analyses are vital to 
a balanced foreign policy perspective. Chapter 1 defined American liberalism 
and demonstrated how it has been reflected in alternating American foreign 
policy moods for more than two hundred years. The second chapter showed how 
independent methodologies also support the moodlinterest theory. Other influ- 
ences on foreign policy were also described, but liberalism was discovered to be 
the crucial influence. 
Chapter 3 defined the politico-military interests of the United States, 
described their incompatibility with basic American liberalism, and showed 
how their successful pursuit has been periodically negated by liberal public 
moods. The chapter noted economic and humanitarian interests and how their 
compatibility with American liberalism has, for the most part, spared them from 
the regular fluctuations in mood characteristic of the pursuit of politico-military 
interests. American wars, the most notable expression of the pursuit of politico- 
military interests, were seen to relate to the moodlinterest framework. A 
geographic application of the Interests Proposition and MoodIInterest Conflict 
Proposition demonstrated that the theory can be applied to specific areas of U.S. 
concern. 
Chapter 4 described various tools that the public possesses to insure that its 
mood is implemented in foreign policy, such as the president, the Congress, the 
bureaucracy, the press, and proposed constitutional amendments. If one of these 
forces fails to respond to public mood, it can be brought into line by the other 
forces. The electorate selects leaders exemplifying its moody liberalism. Cur- 
rent American introversion was then explored in Chapter 5, which began with an 
examination of the characteristics of past introvert phases. A subsequent histor- 
ical comparison concluded that the United States is currently in a middle to late 
stage comparable to past introvert phases. Arguments that the phase will not 
intensify to a dangerous extreme were refuted, leaving strong indications that the 
United States in this decade may again fail to adequately protect its politico- 
military interests. 
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THE LONG VIEW 
The mdin t e re s t  theory indicates that policy makers cannot ignore internal 
indicators, especially public mood, in the formulation of foreign policy. Con- 
stantly changing short-term opinion should not be allowed to eclipse long-term 
moods, which can be better appreciated when viewed as a continuation of 
historical trends. 
Policy makers can also benefit from an understanding of the all-embracing 
nature of American liberalism. The public is not likely to change its liberal 
ideology; its expectations are not easily satisfied, and once the public rolls 
toward a liberal objective, it is not likely to stop until it has overrun realistic 
goals and is in the extremes of a foreign policy mood. Successful policy makers 
must satisfy liberal idealism, and thus retain their policy-making position, while 
still pursuing realistic foreign policy goals. Such a task is difficult at best. 
The mdin teres t  theory suggests that the current congressional foreign 
policy assertiveness is to be expected during an introvert phase and, if history is 
a guide, congressional assertiveness will contribute to future extreme introver- 
sion. A balanced view of the strengths and weaknesses of the Congress, the 
presidency, and other foreign policy-making institutions is best obtained 
through a long-range analysis such as the moodlinterest theory. Executive 
excesses during the Vietnam era should be contrasted with legislative excesses 
during the late 1930s to promote valid conclusions on the balance of legislative 
and executive powers. Policy extremes like those taken by the executive during 
the height of extroversion and conversely, the legislature during the height of 
introversion, might be avoided by improved public understanding of moods. 
The constancy of American economic and humanitarian concerns is, on the 
whole, commendable; the real challenge facing the American public is to view 
politico-military interests with a similar consistency. Motivations behind the 
United States contribution to world peace differ greatly from those of other 
countries whose international relationships are stabilized by considerations 
such as weakness necessitating accommodation of more powerful neighbors, 
geographic location which restricts policy flexibility, authoritarian rulers who 
impose their will in a consistent manner, and diverse ideologies which necessi- 
tate compromise and limit foreign policy extremes. Thus, many countries less 
liberal than the United States have more consistent foreign policies.' 
In order to make a greater contribution to international peace and stability, 
America needs a more consistent foreign policy. Each major shift of American 
foreign policy necessitates a new set of relationships with governments less 
subject to liberal mood shifts and therefore rarely sympathetic to American 
foreign policy dilemmas. These public mood and foreign policy shifts involve 
dangers of instability which could lead to war; yet the American liberal public 
mood continues to fluctuate. Policy makers aware of the dangers of these 
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fluctuations can work at encouraging maintenance of politico-military interests 
at realistic levels. 
Admittedly, a nuclear war, a drastic change in American ideology, or some 
other unexpected consideration could permanently interrupt the undulating 
moodiness of the American public. There are no strong indications of such an 
approaching disruption, however. The only apparent solution is to harness the 
public mood or at least modify it so that its extremes are still within the bounds 
of the reality-interest zone. 
Policy makers need to recognize this problem. Someone has to worry about 
what to do in the next ten years, the next twenty years, and the next fifty years. 
Someone aware of the dangers of long-range tendencies, such as those posited 
in the moodinterest theory, should begin work now on preventive action lest 
American policy makers be forever doomed to putting out small fires whose 
smoke obscures the wider blaze. The mood/interest theory does not pretend to 
be the answer to tomorrow's problems; but policy makers who ignore the portent 
of long-range considerations will continually help create tomorrow's problems. 
RESEARCH PRIORITIES 
From a research perspective, if the moodinterest concept is valid and long- 
range moods are important, this work is merely a start in the right direction. It 
has been suggestive of the potential value of researching foreign policy moods 
in a specific manner rather than the more common practice of accounting for 
them in a general sense. In the process of preparing this work, the author has 
considered research possibilities related to each of the six propositions. 
In the Public Rule Proposition, the relative influence of the elite as opposed 
to mass is difficult to discern. The argument of the proposition is that the mass is 
more important than commonly acknowledged. Once this is accepted, the 
research question becomes one of the mechanics of elite-mass interaction. 
Assertions made here could be examined with an eye toward clarifying the 
nature of limits set by the mass and the realm of choice available to foreign 
policy leaders. Research on activities of competing potential elites also would 
help describe the operation of moods. 
The Liberal Moods Proposition noted that moods were manifested in 
American liberalism. At times, the author has speculated that moods were 
caused by American liberalism. However, more research is needed for a cause to 
be stated with certainty. A first step would devise empirical tests which would 
point to the more promising hypotheses. This is, of course, easier said than 
done; indeed, Chapter 1 noted important differences between opinion and mood 
with the latter being less tangible. 
The Interests Proposition says that the U.S. has definable interests. Is there 
any way to apply interests in specific terms to specific current cases? What is the 
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possibility that the degree of U.S. action necessary to realize interests might 
level off or decline in view of our current world position? If this does happen, 
what are the implications for mood? Economic interests generally are secondary 
to politico-military interests, but there are some interesting relationships be- 
tween the mood/interest analysis and long cycles by N. D. Kondratieff that need 
to be further researched. 
'Ihe MoodIInterest Conflict Proposition hypothesized that there was a 
fundamental conflict between liberal moods and interests as defined by power 
politics. If so, is there a viable way to lessen this conflict? If mood and interest 
do not fit as the hypothesis has speculated, what are other viable explanations? 
'Ihis work assumed that the U.S. must compete in the world of power politics. 
Some would question such an assumption, but still might view mood as an 
important concept. Is there a way to make a specific interpretation of mood 
without relation to interest? 
One field which has seen a lot of recent research is executive-legislative 
relations in foreign policy. If the Executive/Legislative Proposition is valid, it 
needs to be specifically related to this body of research. An increasing number 
of writers are also working on long-range cycles. This work has identified a 
number of these persons and their ideas, but a systematic search followed by 
some empirical testing could be a helpful line of inquiry. In a related sense, since 
Frank L. Klingberg's U . S . foreign policy moods research proved to be crucial in 
the development of the mood/interest theory, a detailed analysis of some of his 
other works could be productive. 
The application of the moodlinterest theory in Chapter 1 subdivided phases 
into three subphases. Klingberg divides phases into liberty and union segments. 
'Ihe moodlinterest analysis itself indicates that there are certain years where 
mood is outside the interest zone, but that these probably vary by individual 
situations. Research into possible ways to construct and document subphases 
could advance knowledge in what the mood/interest analysis indicates is an 
important area. 
Important research possibilities exist for the Extreme Introversion Proposi- 
tion. The empirical verification done in Chapter 2 indicated that there can be a 
lead time between the period when the United States might be quite unlikely to 
act and the time when it actually is not doing enough to protect its interests. How 
does lead time work? Does it mean that we are locked into extreme introversion 
around the mid-introvert stage? Do extrovert moods work in the same manner? 
In general, lead time makes prevention of extremes even more difficult. 
SPECULATIONS: THE COMING DECADE 
The challenge of the next decade will be to realize that the United States might 
now be almost locked into a path toward extreme introversion, due to the 
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directions established in the past decade and a half, and that this path must be 
discouraged. One measure which could help prevent extreme introversion 
would be to minimize unrealizable rhetoric. Extreme introversion can feed on 
unrealized expectations. Some policy makers might be able to combine a strong 
introvert rhetoric with realist policies in order to realize the best of both worlds. 
Historically, however, the public soon expects the rhetoric to be enacted into 
policy. Frustration with American actions in the world could result whether or 
not rhetoric becomes policy. If it becomes policy, policy becomes more unw- 
alistic and likely to experience problems. If it does not become policy, America 
can be seen as betraying its ideals. In essence, policy makers should enunciate 
realistic policy objectives that recognize American interests of the next decade 
as well as those of the next few years. Introvert rhetoric that satisfies the public 
today could endanger United States interests in the coming decade. At least 
some policy makers should view policies in terms of the overall introvert- 
extrovert cycle involving approximately fifty years. 
The next ten years will probably find the United States under great public 
pressure to avoid military measures which could result in another Vietnam-type 
situation. Whenever feasible, the United States will tend toward a solution not 
involving decisive United States military action or even semimilitary intel- 
ligence operations. Most often this pressure could be expected to produce a 
nonviolent solution to problems. A series of nonmilitary responses by the 
United States should not be mistaken for a normal pattern. If the United States 
realizes that it is failing to meet interests, it could become more inclined toward 
strong military response after repeated frustrations, thus heralding a return to 
extroversion. 
In fact, since mood change is a multiyear process even though the overall 
change occurs in a single year, the beginnings of the next extrovert phase could 
surface soon. In one sense, these beginnings will set the stage for a future 
extreme. However, in the most immediate sense, mood change is a valuable 
force which prevents an even greater extreme in the previous direction. 
Speculation on expectations of American policy by other governments 
based upon previous cycles offer both opportunities and dangers. In the realm of 
opportunities, internal forces checking excessive American politico-military 
actions are likely to be strong over the next decade. This should produce 
opportunities for the reduction of tension. Economic and humanitarian concerns 
of American policy probably will remain, and Congress will continue to be 
assertive. As the decade progresses, American policy is likely to become less 
realistic and more unilateral, particularly in a politico-military sense. 
Conclusions regarding the next ten years also can be drawn in terms of 
worldwide and geographic interests. The following section will emphasize 
dangers of extreme introversion. This does not mean that the author advocates 
extreme extroversion, which would be equally dangerous. However, this danger 
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is known by a public which has experienced Vietnam. Creative solutions within 
the American interest zone are needed, as defined by world events rather than 
American moods. 
The American interest in the prevention of a nuclear exchange will proba- 
bly be increasingly difficult to maintain if nuclear proliferation continues over 
the course of the coming decade. Perhaps nuclear weapons will make each 
possessor part of a cautious balance of terror. However, proliferation could also 
require an increased United States role if military super-powers must provide 
restraint. Even if problems of proliferation are solved, relations between the 
United States and its fellow military superpower, the U.S.S.R., will remain of 
crucial importance. In particular, the United States will have to maintain an 
appropriate strategic balance with the Soviet Union and must be aware that 
changing mood could precipitate Soviet miscalculation. Recent calls for a freeze 
on production and deployment of nuclear weapons are obviously indicative of 
the magnitude of the current introversion. While such goals are indeed valuable, 
Americans need to recognize that, at a time of strong introversion, moves toward 
reduction in American strategic capability could be detrimental. 
Maintenance of freedom of the seas will require a strong role for the 
American navy. This is important not only for American access to the rest of the 
world, but also for major United States allies whose dependence on freedom of 
the seas is often greater than that of the United States. The United States faces a 
challenge in maintaining naval strength and competence at a level equal to the 
demands of the coming decade. 
One of the most difficult challenges facing the United States in the next 
decade will be retention of a realistic set of geographic priorities. The American 
position is complicated by a number of considerations in addition to the basic 
moodlinterest conflict. First, Americans do not have a fine sense of geography 
since they have been privileged, being protected from other major powers by the 
Atlantic to the east and the Pacific to the west. Second, ethnic groups tradi- 
tionally have had a stronger voice during introvert phases in the absence of a 
general interest in foreign policy than they have had in extrovert phases, when 
this general interest is quite high. Thus, the United States can adopt a tough 
stance regarding Eastern Europe, Cyprus, and Israel in response to various 
ethnic pressures. At the time, however, general NATO strength, vital to a 
military posture in each of these three areas, may be barely maintained in the 
face of increasing Soviet capabilities. Third, the priority of Europe over Asia in 
American policy could result in another underestimation of an Asian security 
threat should a changing balance of power require an increased American role in 
the region, or economic relations with Japan deteriorate. Finally, the United 
States has not placed as high a priority on Latin America in relation to other less 
developed countries as a geographically-oriented interest strategy would indi- 
cate is wise. Any one or combination of the above considerations could cause 
serious difficulty for the United States in the next ten years. 
Speculations: The Coming Decade 167 
If the lessons of American diplomatic history prove reliable for the future, 
the United States can expect a return to extroversion within the next decade, 
perhaps as early as the late 1980s. Looking back to the beginnings of past 
extrovert phases, it is obvious that such changes are characteristically signifi- 
cant events. The beginnings of the first two extrovert phases (1798-1824 and 
1844-1871) were marked by enormous land acquisitions, both doubling the 
former land area of the nation and including the Mexican-American War in the 
annexation of Texas. The first few years of the third and fourth extrovert periods 
as well were occupied by the Spanish-American War, indicating a move toward 
overseas possessions, and World War 11, indicating a move toward major world 
power. Thus, one can speculate that another switch from extreme introversion to 
extroversion is likely to be equally significant, and the author will leave it to the 
imagination of the reader to determine what this change might involve. At least 
it is safe to say that in a nuclear age, Americans can hardly afford to wait and see 
if the moodlinterest pattern proves reliable. If Americans refuse to accept this 
possibility of a moodinterest conflict and don't try to avoid it, one can only hope 
that some of the violent energy of mood shifts will. be channeled into con- 
structive use. Indeed, because half of the coming decade could feature the 
beginning of an extrovert phase, it is important to consider the workings of early 
extrovert phases in detail. Knowledge of past patterns should be used to avoid 
moves which could undermine international peace. 
What can harness the fluctuation of American liberal public moods? The 
importance of governmental leaders and institutions in this regard has already 
been noted. The ambiguous stances of national-level politicians indicate that 
leaders are still attempting to cater to the mass public in order to win or retain 
public office and therefore cannot be the reforming influence. Indeed, since 
major policy makers in a democracy are subject to the direction of elected 
politicians, the policy maker is not in a good position to formulate a long-term 
solution. Recognition of the problems is probably the limit of the policy makers' 
contribution. If a change is going to come, the public must be made aware of and 
accept the need for consistency in American foreign policy. Who, then, is in a 
viable position to undertake this formidable task? 
The educational community, especially higher education, could provide 
needed leadership if some of its preferences are changed. Foreign policy 
teaching has tended to correspond to public mood fluctuations, though gener- 
ally preceding them slightly, and often reacts to a particular phase just before it 
has run its course. Most often, an academician reacting to a phase falsely 
assumes that his or her students understand the events which sparked it, an 
assumption which usually complicates matters. About the time students com- 
plete their education, they are well equipped to support the current foreign 
policy mood, which eventually is camed to an extreme in terms of foreign 
policy interests. Educators then attempt to correct this mood excess in the next 
generation of students; again, mistakenly, without a meaningful explanation of 
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events which had originally sparked that mood phase. Thus, the educational 
community, which has some potential elites among its members, influences the 
public which chooses the exact elite in control. This at least has the potential to 
stimulate positive change. 
Another significant shortcoming, especially in higher education, is that 
courses in political science tend to concentrate on contemporary events. While 
there is value in this, a distorted picture results if it is not tempered by a balanced 
historical perspective. Such concentration on the present, as viewed in terms of 
the immediate past and periods similar to the immediate past, has reinforced the 
mood fluctuations that are apparent in American foreign policy history. 
The broad historical approach is not always the easiest nor the most 
interesting to students. One can be tempted to cover current concerns and state 
that background can be acquired by interested students who choose to take 
advanced courses. Such statements do little for most students who take only 
introductory courses. By concentrating on the present while failing to take a 
broad, historical perspective, an educator loses the advantage of historical 
comparison and contrast and the additional benefit of long-term relevance. 
Educational community effectiveness is limited by the elitist view of 
American foreign policy taken by many scholars. Contending that an elite 
determines foreign policy and the mass public, therefore, has little power, these 
elitist educators erringly believe that educating average people cannot lead to 
meaningful change, thereby limiting their own influence. 
A greater public awareness of the foreign policy problems caused by 
extreme moods would probably make the public more conscious of and less 
prone to extreme shifts in mood. Such an increase in awareness can only be 
accomplished over a long period of time, particularly since it takes approx- 
imately fifty years for a complete introvert-extrovert cycle. The educational 
community has the tools, the flexibility, the freedom from inhibitions, and the 
talent to take on the task of alerting the American liberal public to this problem. 
At a minimum, educators should explain the reasons for past policy overreac- 
tions and work at presenting a balanced, historical picture, emphasizing the 
influence and dangers of long-term moods. 
The problem exists. Scholars continue to discover the wisdom of a less 
active world role for the United States and communicate their discovery to 
students who have not been exposed to the opposite arguments, just as a few 
decades ago intellectual leaders were advancing the need for active involvement 
in world affairs to students who had little exposure to the need for restraint. 
Modem weapons of mass destruction cannot be combined with the past degree 
of American foreign policy shifts. Thus, for the future we must decide: will we 
meet our problem head-on or will we continue to be singularly predictable? 
Perhaps this is the ultimate question raised by the moodlinterest theory. 
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Table 1. Wars and Annexations of Territory in Introvert and Extrovert 
Phases, 17761967 
Cycle 
- - -  
Mood Wars Annexations Wars Annexations Wars Annexations Wars Annexations 
Int. 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Ext. 1 3 1 5 2 8 3 1 
Source: U.S. Bureau of the Census, Historical Statistics of the United States--Colonial Times 
to 1970, Bicentennial Edition, House Doc. 93-78 (Washington, D.C. : G.P.O., 1975), Part I, p. 428 
and Part 11, p. 1140. 
Note: Wars included are: War of Independence, War of 1812, Mexican-American War, Spanish- 
American War, World Wars I and 11, Korean war, and Vietnam war. The Civil War was excluded 
because it was not an international war. 
Table 2. Uses of Force Abroad in Introvert and Extrovert Phases, 1798-1967 
Cycle 
1st 2nd 3rd 4th Average 
Mood 17761823 1824-1870 1871-1918 1919-1967 Total Average Per Year 
Int. Data not 
in study 15 12 15 42 14.0 0.69 
Ext. 23 38 56 21 138 34.5 1.27 
Sources: Information in this table comes from Foreign Affairs Division, Legislative Reference 
Service, Library of Congress for Subcommittee on National Security Policy and Scientific Develop- 
ments of the House Committee on Foreign Affairs, Background Information on the Use of U.S. 
Armed Forces in Foreign Countries (Washington, D.C.: G.P.O., 1970), Appendix 11, pp. 50-57; 
and J. David Singer and Melvin Small, The Wages of War: 18161965: A Statistical Handbook (New 
York: John Wiley & Sons, Inc., 1972), pp. 17-39 and 59-75. 
Note: Criteria for counting uses of force abroad are listed on p. 191. 
Table 3. Introvert and Extrovert Uses of Force Abroad, by Mood Stage 
Stage 
-- 
Mood Phase 1st 2nd 3rd Total 
Introvert Phases 
1824-30 1831-36 183743 
2nd (1824-43) 4 5 6 15 
187 1-77 1878-83 188490 
3rd (1871-90) 5 1 6 12 
1919-25 1926-32 1933-39 
4th (1919-39) 11 3 1 15 
Total (intmvert) 20 9 13 42 
Extrovert Phases 
Total (extrovert) 37 
- -- 
Sources: Information in this table comes from the Committee on Foreign Affairs, Appendix 11, 
pp. 50-57; and Singer and Small, Wages of War, pp. 17-39 and 59-75. See page 191 for counting 
criteria. 
Table 4. Uses of Force Abroad by Mood Cycle and Stage, 1798-1967 
Introvert Stages Extrovert Stages Cycle 
Mood Cycle 1st 2nd 3rd 1st 2nd 3rd Total 
1st (1776-1823) Not in study 
1824-30 1831-36 1837-43 
2nd (182470) 4 5 6 
1871-77 1878-83 1884-90 
3rd (1871-1918) 5 1 6 
1919-25 192632 1933-39 
4th (1919-67) 11 3 1 
Stage Totala 20 9 13 
Source: Adapted from table 3. 
a Figures in parentheses are totals without the first extrovert phase. 
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Table 5. Introvert and Extrovert Second-Stage Dates and McClelland High 
PowerILow Power Years 
McClelland 
Mood Curve High PowerILow Power Fit or 
Second Stages Yearsa No Fit 
1783-89 1785 Low Fit 
1807-14 1805 High No Fit 
1831-36 1835 Low Partial Fit 
1853-61 1855 Low Fit 
1878-83 1875, 1885 Low Fit 
19OGO8 1905 Low Fit 
192632 1925 Low Fit 
194P-57 1945, 1955 Low Fit 
Sources: 'lhe McClelland years of high and low power are adapted from David McClelland, 
"Love and Power: The Psychological Signals of War," Psychology Today 8 (January 1975), chart, p. 
46. See table 3 for stage dates. 
a When affiliation is high in relation to power, McClelland defines these years as low power. 





High PowedLow Power Fit or 
Years No Fit 
1793-1803 1795 High Fit 
1819-29 1825 High Fit 
1839-49 1845 High Fit 
18&76 1875 Low No fit 
188696 1895 High Fit 
1914-24 No data No data 
193545 1935 High Fit 
1963-73 1965 High Fit 
Source: Adapted from McClelland, "The Psychological Signals of War," chart, p. 46. 
a Within five pars of a transition year. 
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Table 7. Motive and Power Divergence Scores (PDS) for Second-Stage-Only 
(SSO) and Non-SSO Presidents (Polk-Reagan) 
Mood Resident and Motive Scoresb Ave. PDS for Phase Residents 
Phase Years in OfficeP Achievement Pbwer Affiliation PDS AU SSO Non-SSO 
2nd hlk 1845-48 
Ext Taylor 184!%9 
1844-70 Pienx18556  
Buehanan 1 8 5 7 4  
L i I n  1861-65c 
3rd Grant 186%76 
Int. Hayeslrn-80 
1871-90 Cleveland 1885-88 
B. Hanison 188%92 
3rd Cleveland 1893-% 
Extrovert McKinley 1897-190Ic 
1891-1918 T. Wdt 1 9 0 1 4  
Taft 1909-12 
Wilson 1913-20 
4th Harding 1921-23' 
Introvert Coolidge 1923-28 
191!%39 Hoover 1-32 
F. Rcme~I td  193W5C 
F. Roosever 193349 
4th Truman 1945-52 
Extrovert ~ 0 w e r 1 9 5 3 - 6 0  
1 W 7  K e d y  l%l-63c 
L. Johnson 1%3-68 
5th Nion l%!%74c 
Introvert Carter 1977-80 
1968- Reagan 1981- 
55.3 16.3 39.0 
45.5 18.2 27.3 
44.3 22.8 21.5 
23.7 28.9 -5.2 
57.4 20.3 37.1 
43.0 28.5 14.5 
27.8 41.7 -13.9 
33.4 38.8 -5.4 
37.5 33.3 4.2 
62.5 10.7 51.8 
18.2 28.6 -10.4 
50 12.5 37.5 
54.9 20.1 34.8 
56.2 12.5 43.7 
41.9 32.2 9.7 
50 23.1 26.9 
33.3 22.2 11.1 
50 8.3 41.7 
M 8.3 41.7 
48.6 24.3 24.3 
35.7 39.2 -3.5 
40.7 25.9 14.8 
41.7 12.5 29.2 
27.5 27.5 0 
30.3 33.3 -3 
32.7 21.5 11.2 
Average of all presidents 
Average of exbwml presidents 
Average of inlmefi presidents 
Sources: Statistics in table 7 are adapted from David G. Winter and Abigail J. Stewart, "Content 
Analysis as a Technique for Assessing Political Leaders," in A Psychological Examination of Political 
Leaders, ed. Margaret G .  Hermann (New York: The Free Press, 1977). table 2.3, p. 53. Scores from 
Polk through McKinley and Carter and Reagan are derived from our own coders, who follow the Winter 
Manual in Appendix I of David G. Winter, The Power Motive (New York: The Free Press, 1973), pp. 
247-66. 
a Elected presidents with one or more years in office. Second-stage-only presidents are listed in 
boldface type. For stage classification criteria, see page 191. 
b Achievement, power, and affiliation scores, the three components of the total motive score, may 
not add up to 100 because of rounding. 
These presidents died or resigned while in office, and their successors took over in mid-year. 
d F. Roosevelt is included in both the fourth introvert phase and the fourth extrovert phase according 
to the rules of classification. Therefore, his score is used once when finding the average of all presidents 
and once in each average when finding the average of introvert and extrovert presidents. 
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Table 8. Ratio of Affiliation Motive to Total Motive Score (Polk-Reagan) 
Affiliation Average Ratio for 
Phase and President Ratio Phase a 





















E Rooseveltb 1:12.05 
4th Extrovert 




L. Johnson 1:8 




Source: Ratios were found by dividing 100, the total motive score, by the affiliation score (from 
table 7) for each president. The average ratio for each phase was derived by dividing the sum of the 
total motive scores by the sum of the affiliation scores. 
a To nearest hundredth. 
b F. Roosevelt was president for twelve years during the fourth introvert and extrovert periods. It 
might be expected that Roosevelt's third inaugural in 1941 would have an even lower ratio than his 
first one in 1933, since the 1941 mood was extrovert. We checked and found the third inaugural 
devoid of affiliative imagery. However, in accord with Winter's view that only first inaugurals show 
the motives, we used the 1933 score in both the 191940 introvert and 1 9 4 M 8  extrovert phases. 
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Table 9. Presidential Power Divergence Score (PDS) and McClelland High Power1 
Low Power Years (Polk-L. Johnson) 
Mood McClelland 
Stage of President and PDS and High Power1 CorrelationINo 














- - - 
Polk 184548 
Buchanan 1857-60b 




McKinley 1897-1 90 1 
T. Roosevelt 1901-08 
Wilson 1913-20 
Coolidge 1923-28 
F. Roosevelt 1933-45 
Truman 1945-52 
Eisenhower 1953-60 



























Sources: Stage information in table 9 is adapted from table 3. Presidential power divergence scores 
come from table 7. McClelland years are found in McClelland, "The Psychological Signals of War," 
chart, p. 46. 
a 'Ihe average power divergence score (Polk-L. Johnson) is 19.58. For comparison with McClelland's 
data, we designated power divergence scores below that average as low and those above the average as 
high. 
b These presidents' first inaugurals are closest to the McClelland years specified, although they were 
not in office in those years. 'This analysis assigned McKinley to the McClelland high power year of 1895, 
but it is interesting also to note Cleveland's second inaugural of 1893. In this speech Cleveland's power 
divergence score was 51.8, the highest of any president. This correlation between high power divergence 
and a high power year supports our hypothesis, because there is a marked difference in the power 
divergence scores of Cleveland's first and second inaugurals. These two speeches both conelate with 
McClelland's data, and the change in Cleveland's dominant motive seems attributable to the change in the 
general public mood. 
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Table 10. Presidential Power Divergence Scores and Uses of Force 
(Polk-L. Johnson) 
Power Divergence Uses of Years in Uses of Force 

























Ten Highest Power Divergence Presidents 
Ten Lowest Power Divergence Presidents 
Averaged 1.59 - - .87 
Total - 40 46 - 
Sources: Information on power divergence scores is derived from table 7. Information on uses of 
force comes from the Committee on Foreign Affairs, Appendix 11, pp. 50-57. 
a In years when a president died in office or a new president was inaugurated, a use of force is 
credited to the president who initiated it; if a major war was in progress, the use of force is attributed 
to the president who served the greater part of the year. 
b Rounded to the nearest full year. A president must serve at least one-third of a year in order for 
that year to be counted as a year in office. 
Although earlier tables give the V~emam war only four force counts, L. Johnson is given five 
for the war. This is because the earlier tables ended with the conclusion of the fourth extrovert phase 
(1967), whereas Johnson's term ended in 1968. 
d Average is found by dividing total uses of force by total years. 
176 Tables 
Table 11. Power Divergence Scores (PDS) and Uses of Force by Second-Stage- 






Years in Officea 
years in Office Uses of Force During Stage 
PDS During Stage Number Per Year in Office 
2nd-Stage-Only Presidentsb 















7.92 - - 1.21 
- 28 34 - 
1st- and 3rd-Stage-Only Exhwert hsidentsb 
2nd Ext. 
Polk 1845-48 39.0 4 (184548) 2 .5 
Taylor 184950 27.3 2 (184950) 1 .5 
3rd. Ext 
Cleveland (2nd term) 
1 893%b 51.8 4 (1893%) 7 1.75 
McKinley 
1897-1901 - 10.4 3 (1897-99) 6 2 
4th Ext. 
Kennedy 196143 14.8 3 (1%1-63) 2 .67 
L. Johnson 
I%= 29.2 4 (1%4-67)a 5 1.25 
Awragec 
Total 
Sources: Stages in extrovert and introvert mood phases are shown in tables 2-4. Presidential power 
divergence scores are from table 7; for mles of Presidential classification see page 191. Information on 
uses of force is from Committee on Foreign Affairs, Appendix 11, pp. 5C.57. 
a President Lincoln was not counted as serving in 1865 because he died April 15, after serving less 
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Table 11, continued 
than one-third of the year. President Franklin Roosevelt was not counted as serving in 1945 for the same 
reason. Likewise, President Lyndon Johnso? was not counted as serving in 1963 because he did not take 
office until November of that year. 
b Presidents from the first mood cycle and the second introvert period are omitted because not 
covered by our power divergence analysis. Presidents from the fifth introvert period (1968- ) are omitted 
because a count of uses of force was not available for this period. 
Average is found by dividing total uses of force by total years. 
d F. Roosevelt served longer than any other president, and dominated both a third-stage introvert and 
a first-stage extrovert period. Under these unique circumstances, we thought that assigning him an 
"only" classification for both stages would be most appropriate for comparative purposes. 
Table 12. Power Divergence Scores (PDS) and Uses of Force by Introvert 
Second-Stage-Only and Extrovert First- and Third-Stage-Only Presidents 
President PDS 
Uses of Force 
Per Year in Office 
During Stage 
















Source: Data selected from table 11. 









John E Kermedy 
Zachary T w h  
JamesBuchanan 
AndEwJohnson 
wooctrow W W  
HeltmtHoc7ver 
Lyndon - 
Richard N i  




Chester A. Aahw 
W h  McKinley 
W h  H. TaA 
Wanen G. Harding 
Gaald R. hic 













%o (70%) Exlmelt 









% (62.5%) Extrovert 
Ys (37.5%) I n m  
Exlmelt 
Extrovert 





n (57%) Extrovert 





% (75%) In- 









% (62.5%) Democrat 









% (62.5%) Democrat 









95 (86%) Republican 
or Whigb 





% (100%) Republican 
% (0%) Democrat 
- - - 
Sources: IntroverVextrovert classifications are from table 7. Information on presidential charac- 
ter is from James David Barber, The Presidential Character: Predicting Performance in the White 
House (Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall, Inc., 1977). Presidents T. Roosevelt-Nixon were 
rated by Barber; the rest were classified by the authors, using Barber's criteria. 
a Roosevelt and Cleveland were counted in both an introvert and an extrovert phase according to 
the three-year rule. See page 191. 
b Whigs are classified with Republicans because their beliefs were similar. 
Ford and Carter took office after Barber's theory was published. Because the theory has been 
Table 13, continued 
popular, we believe presidents and their staffs sometimes tried to conform to Barber's preferred 
active-positive category. We recognize that we differ from Barber on Ford and Carter. 
d Klingberg lists 1891 as a transition year. In this study we have arbitrarily assigned transition 
years to the later mood phase for reasons of clarity. 'Ihis left Harrison with two years in an extrovert 
phase and two years in an introvert phase. We assigned Harrison to the third introvert phase because 
according to Klingberg his term falls two years in the third introvert phase, one year in transition, and 
one year in the third extrovert phase. 
Table 14. Presidents' Years in Office and Stage@) Occupied in Mood Period 
(Polk-Reagan) 
President and 
Years in Office 
Classification by 
Stage and Mood Years of Stage 
Polk 184548 1st Stage Extrovert 1844-52 
Taylor 1849-50 1st Stage Extrovert 
Fillmore 1850-52 1st Stage Extrovert 
Pierce 1853-56 2nd Stage Extrovert 1853-61 
Buchanan 1857-60 2nd Stage Extrovert 
Lincoln 186145 3rd Stage Extrovert 1862-70 
A. Johnson 186548 3rd Stage Extrovert 
Grant 1869-76 1st Stage Introvert 1871-77 
Hayes 1877-80 2nd Stage Introvert 1878-83 
Arthur 1881-84 2nd Stage Introvert 
Cleveland 1885-88 3rd Stage Introvert 1884-90 
B. Harrison 1889-92 3rd Stage Introvert 
Cleveland 1893-96 I st Stage Extrovert 1891-99 
McKinley 1897-1901 I st Stage Extrovert 
T. Roosevelt 1901-8 2nd Stage Extrovert 1 W 8  
Taft 1-12 3rd Stage Extrovert 1909-18 
Wilson 1913-20 3rd Stage Extrovert 
Harding 1921-23 1st Stage Introvert 1919-25 
Coolidge 1923-28 1st Stage Introvert, 
2nd Stage Introvert 1926-32 
Hoover 1929-32 2nd Stage Introvert 
F. Roosevelt 1933-45 3rd Stage Introvert, 193?-39 
1 st Stage Extrovert 1940-48 
Truman 1945-52 1st Stage Extrovert, 
2nd Stage Extrovert 194!&57 
Eisenhower 1953-60 2nd Stage Extrovert 
Kennedy 1961-63 3rd Stage Extrovert 195847 
L. Johnson 1963-68 3rd Stage Extrovert 
Nixon 1969-74 1st Stage Introvert 1968-74 
Ford 1974-76 2nd Stage Introvert 
Carter 1977-80 2nd Stage Introvert 1975-81 
Reagan 1981- 3rd Stage Introvert 1982- 
Sources: Information on stage years in table 14 is derived from table 3. See table 7 for presidents 
and years in office and page 191 for stage classifications. 
a Because the fifth introvert phase is still in progress, the end years of stages in this phase are 
tentatively selected, relying on the average twenty-one-year pattern of introvert phases and assuming 
seven-year stages. 
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Table 15. Bridgepoint Presidencies and Barber Categories 
President and 
Years in m i c e  Barber Category Bridgepoint Years 
J. Adams 1797-1800 AN 1797-99 
M o m  1817-24 PP 1823-25 
J. Q. Adams 1825-28 AN 182S25 
'Qler 1 8 4 1 4  AN 1843-45 
Polk 184548 AP 1843-45 
Grant 1869-76 PN 1870-72 
B. Hanison 1889-92 PN 1890-92 
Wilson 1913-20 AN 1918-20 
F. Roosevelt 1933-45 AP 1939-41 
L. Johnson 1963-68 AN 196749 
Nixon 1969-74 AN 1967-69 
8/11 (73%) Active; %I (27%) Passive 
8/11 (73%) Negative; (27%) Positive 
Sources: Derived from table 13 and mood cycle transition years. 
Note: A bridgepoint president is defined as one who is in office within a year of a transition year. 
For example, to be a bridgepoint president for 1798, one would have to be in office in 1797,1798, or 
1799. Presidents J. Adams through B. Harrison were coded by the authors according to Barber's 
criteria. Barber categories are abbreviated as follows: A = active, P = passive; N = negative, P = 
positive. 
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Table 16. Barber Category and Party Affiliation of Presidents, Divided by 
Stage (Polk-Carter) 
President Barber Category Party Affiliation 



























'Oh3 (77%) Active; %3 (23%) Passive % s  (62%) Democrat 
9/19 (69%) Positive; %3 (31%) Negative %3 (38%) Republican 
or Whig 




B. Harrison PN 
Harding PP 
Coolidge PN 
F. Roosevelt AP 
Nixon AN 
H (43%) Active; % (57%) Passive 









2/7 (29%) Democrat 























6/11 (55%) Active; % I  (45%) Passive 












% I  (36%) Democrat 
7/11 (64%) Republican 
- -  
Sources: Derived from tables 13 and 14. 
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Table 17. Barber Categories Related to Winter Ratings, IntroverVExtrovert 
Phases, and Force Indicators (Polk-Carter) 
Active- Active- Passive- Passive- 
Positives Negative Positive Negative 
Wmter ratings 




Force indicators @er 
year in office) 


























- -  
Sources: Derived from tables 7 and 13. Data for force indicators was obtained from Committee 
on Foreign Affairs, Appendix 11, pp. 50-57; Melvin Small and J. David Singer, Resort to A m :  
International and Civil Wars, 18161980 (Beverly Hills: Sage Publications, 1982), pp. 82-95; and 
The WorkiAlmamc and Book of Facts, 1983 (New York: Newspaper Enterprise Association, Inc., 
1982), pp. 337. Those wars defined in Small and Singer as "interstate" were counted as major wars, 
and casualty counts were obtained from The World Almanac. 
Note: Some presidents were omitted when data were inapplicable or unavailable. 
a Cleveland's addresses were both coded and included in the Active-Positive averages. 
b The length of major wars was calculated in months in order to obtain a more accurate picture of 
their duration. Ihe Boxer Rebellion was not included in our analysis because of its short duration 
and because American battle deaths numbered only twenty-one. 
c The Civil War is not included. If it were, major wars and major war casualties for active- 
positive presidents would be considerably higher. 
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Table 18. Presidential Rankings: Schlesinger (1948 and 1963) and Murray 
and Blessing (1983) 
President Rank President Rank President Rank 
Washington 2 Pierce 32 Wilson 4 
J. Adams 10 Buchanan 33 Harding 36 
Jefferson 5 Lincoln 1 Coolidge 3 1 
Madison 15 A. Johnson 27 Hoover 22 
Monroe 16 Grant 35 F. Roosevelt 3 
J. Q. Adams 14 Hayes 17 Truman 8 
Jackson 6 Arthur 23 Eisenhower 18 
Van Buren 2 1 B. Hanison 26 Kennedy 12 
Qler 28 Cleveland 13 L. Johnson 9 
Polk 11 McKinley 20 Nixon 34 
Taylor 29 T. Roosevelt 7 Ford 24 
Fillmore 30 Taft 19 Carter 25 
Source: These calculations are taken from Bernard J. Vonk and Kimberly L. Japinga, "Popular 
Moods and Presidential Posterity: The Influence of American Foreign Policy Mood Shifts on 
'Presidential Greatness' " (a paper presented to the Political Science Section, Michigan Academy, 
Eastern Michigan University, Ypsilanti, Michigan, March 25, 1983). 
Table 19. Rankings Summary (Polk-Carter) 
Power 
Ranking by Divergence pa* 
Barber Category Historians Scorea Affiliation Mood 
Active-Positive 9.0 25.21 Democrat 5 Extrovert 70% 
Republican 3 Introvert 30% 
Active-Negative 22.88 14.73 Democrat 5 Extrovert 62.5% 
Republicanb 3 Introvert 37.5% 
Passive-Positive 26.29 13.9 Democrat 1 Extrovert 57% 
Republicanb 6 Introvert 43% 
Passive-Negative 27.5 10.53 Democrat 0 Extrovert 25% 
Republican 4 Introvert 75% 
Sources: Derived from tables 13, 17, and 18. 
a Power divergence scores and other Winter material were calculated for elected presidents only. 
b Including Whigs. 
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Table 20. Historians' Ranking, Power Divergence Scores, and Uses of 
Force, by Mood Stage 
Mood Stage 
Uses of Forceb 
Average Total 
Ranking by Average Years in Average 
Historiansa PDS Officeb Total per Year 
1st stage introvert 
2nd stage introvert 
3rd stage introvert 
1 st stage extrovert 
2nd stage extrovert 
3rd stage extrovert 
Introvert phases 
Extrovert phases 
Sources: Average historians' rankings are derived from table 18. Power divergence scores are 
from table 7, and uses of force are found in table 3. 
a Averages, by stage, for presidents from Polk through Carter. Ranks in parentheses are averages 
by stage from Washington through Carter. Classifications of presidents before Polk are: Washington 
3rd stage introvert; J. Adams 1st stage extrovert; Jefferson 1st stage extrovert; Madison 2nd stage 
extrovert; Monroe 3rd stage extrovert; J.Q. Adams 1st stage introvert; Jackson 2nd stage introvert; 
Van Buren 3rd stage introvert; Qler 3rd stage introvert. 
b 1798-1967. 
Table 21. Public Policy Cycles (Elected Presidents, Polk-Carter) 
Average Uses 
Mood Phase Ranking by Barber Policy of Force 
and Stage President Historiansa PDSa Category Cycle Points per Yea+ 
2nd Extrovert 
1st stage Polk~Taylor 20 33.15 APIAN War .78 
2nd stage Pierce1 
Buchanan 32.5 8.15 PPIAN Reform 2.11 
3rd stage Lincoln 1 37.1 AP Reform/war 1.33 
Average 21.2 23.94 80% A 1.41 
3rd Introvert 
1st stage Grant 35 14.5 PN Scandal .71 
2nd stage Hayes 17 -13.9 AP Reform .17 
3rd stage Cleveland! (Propriety) 
B. Hanison 19.5 - .6 APIPN Quiescence .86 
Average 22.8 -.15 50% A .6 
3rd Exzrmert 
1st stage Cleveland/ 
McKinley 16.5 20.7 APIPP Reform/War 1.89 
2nd stage T. Roosevelt 7 37.5 AP WarIReform 1.89 
3rd stage TaftlWilson 11.5 39.25 PPIAN War 2.2 
Average 12.6 31.48 60% A 2 
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Table 21, continued 
Average Uses 
Mood Phase Ranking by Barber Policy of Fbrce 
and Stage President Historiansa PDSa Category Cycle Points per Yearb 
4th Introvert 
1st stage Hardingl 
Coolidge 33.5 18.3 PPIPN Scandal 1.57 
2nd stage Coolidgel 
Hoover 26.5 19 PNlAN Reform .43 
(Propriety) 
3rd stage F. Roosevelt 3 41.7 AP Reform .14 
Average 23 22.35 50% A .71 
4th Extrovert 
1st stage F. RoosevelV 
Truman 5.5 33 APlAP War 1 
2nd stage Truman1 
Eisenhower 13 10.4 APIPN War/ .44 
Quiescence 
3rd stage Kennedy1 
L. Johnson 10.5 22 APIAN Refordwar .8 
Average 10 21.3 80%A .75 
5th Introvert 
1st stage Nixon 34 0 AN Scandal - 
2nd stage Carter 25 - AN Reform 
(Propriety) 
Average 29.5 -1.5 100% A 
Sources: Presidents and mood phase stages are adapted from table 14. Rank numbers are from 
table 18 and power divergence scores from table 7. Barber categories are taken from table 13 and 
uses of force from data summarized in table 3. 
a In both historians' ranking and power divergence score, the phase average is obtained by taking 
each president's rank or score separately and dividing by the total number of presidents per mood 
phase. 
b Average for each stage is determined by the number of uses of force divided by the number of 
years in the stage regardless of presidents. Average for the entire phase is calculated in the same 
manner. 
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Average Average Uses 
Ranking by Average Policy of Force 
Mood Phase Historians PDS Cycle Points per Year 
2nd extrwert 21.2 23.94 War 1.41 
Reform 
war 
3rd intmvert 22.8 - . I5  Scandal .6 
Reform (Propriety) 
Quiescence 












5th introvert 29.5 - 1.5 Scandal - 
Reform (Propriety) 
Source: Data selected from table 21. 
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Table 23. Senate Votes of Sparsely Populated Great Plains and Western 
States 
Actual 
Senate Comparable Actual G.P. Dominant 
Vote G.P. & W. & W. Public Significance for Perceptions 
Issue Y-N Votea Vote Moodb of Pragmatism 
1930s As extreme position, made 
Isolationist slightly less introvert position 
Leadersc 12 4 7 Introvert appear pragmatic. 
1949 By contrast, made extrovert 
NATO 82-13 N = 4 N = 8 Extrovert NATO votes appear more 
pragmatic. 
1954 Support of introvert amendment 
Bricker made extrovert mood appear 
Amendment 60-31 N = 10 N = 5 Extrovert more pragmatic. 
1%4 Gulf Only opposing votes made sharp. 
of Tonkin extroversion appear more 
Resolution 88-2 N = 1 N = 2 Extrovert pragmatic. 
1969 National By contrast, made introvert votes 
Commitments 70-16 N = 5 N = 9 Introvert appear more pragmatic. 
1978 Panama 
Canal By contrast, made introvelt votes 
Treatiesd 68-32 N = 10 N = 17 Introvert appear more pragmatic. 
1981 Sale of Significantly carried extrovert 
AWACS to vote; allowed President to act 
Saudi Arabiae 52-48 Y = 17 Y = 24 Introvert pragmatically outside of 
dominant mood. 
Sources: The Congressional Record, Congressional Quarterly Weekly Report, and Manfred 
Jonas, Isolationism in America, 1935-1941 (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1966). For 
specific references, see notes to chapter 2. 
a This column lists what G.P. & W. votes would have been if they were proportionate to these 
states' percentage of the total Senate vote. These percentages are: 1930s, 1949, and 1954--31% (30 
G.P. & W. votes out of 96); 1964, 1969, 1978, and 1981-32% (32 G.P. & W. votes out of 100). 
b This column refers to the long-range mood phases as developed in this text, which are not to be 
confused with temporary public opinions on the particular issues. 
c This issue did not, of course, have a direct vote, so vote counts cannot be listed. Rather, the 
numbers are of the isolationist leaders; of twelve such leaders in the Senate, four should have come 
from G.P. & W. states by proportion, whereas seven actually were from these states. 
d There were two treaties, but the votes were identical. 
The actual resolution was opposed to the sale; 52 votes supported the sale, 48 votes opposed the 
sale. 
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Years War Under Wayb per Year 
- -- - 
2nd Int. 1824-43 20 
2nd Ext. 1 8 6 7 0  27 
3rd Int. 1871-90 20 
3rd Ext. 1891-1918 28 
4th Int. 1919-39 2 1 
4th Ext. 1940-67 28 
Sources: Mood phases taken from table 3. Information regarding nation-months of war under 
way taken from Small and Singer, Resort to Arms, pp. 151-54. 
a For the purposes of data comparison, divisions between mood phases were set at the beginning 
of transition years, rather than trying to pinpoint a specific date. Transition years are counted in each 
new phase on the assumption that elements of the new mood begin having some effect prior to the 
full mood shift. 
Nation-months of war are adjusted by Small and Singer to account for the number of nations in 
the international system each year. 
Table 25. American Moods and Van Duijn's Divisions of Kondratieff, 
1782-1973 
Prosperitya Recession Depression Recovery 
Introvert 
Extrwert 
Source: Jacob J.  van Duijn, "Fluctuations in Innovations Over Time," Futures (August 1981), p. 
268. 
Note: For statistical counting reasons, transition years have been included in the new phase for 
both the moodJinterest and van Duijn analyses. 
a Van Duijn includes two war periods in his analysis. 'llese periods are presented in a manner 
that suggests they extend prosperity and should therefore be considered part of that category. 
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Table 26. American Diplomatic Action in Introvert and Extrovert Phases, 
1776-1967, by Region 
S. Asia 
Mid-East and Sub- Total Average 
North Latin and Saharan by Actions 
Phase America America Europe East Asia N. Africa Africa Phase Per Year 
1st Int. 
177697 74 0 5 1 3 5 0 133 6.05 
1st Ext. 
1798-1823 61 12 33 I 5 0 112 4.31 
2nd. Int. 
182-3 36 11 6 8 0 0 61 3.05 
2nd Ext. 
184470 49 62 1 11 0 0 123 4.56 
3rd Int. 
1871-90 18 10 2 13 0 0 43 2.15 
3rd Ext. 
1891-1918 41 86 56 48 2 0 233 8.32 
4th Int. 
191S39 23 17 80 35 2 0 157 7.48 
4th Ext. 
1 9 4 M 7  40 43 130 109 4 1 24 387 13.82 
Total by 
Region 342 241 359 228 55 24 1249 
Source: Fred W. Wellborn, Diplomatic History of the United States (Totowa, N.J.: Littlefield, 
Adams, & Co., 1970) 
Note: All important events listed by Wellborn are included; multiple year or extended actions were 
counted only once, in the year of initiation. Generally, events were tabulated in the region of primary 
impact. Certain events deemed to be of major international importance-world conferences, major 
treaties, multinational negotiation-are counted in more than one geographic region. U.S. activity in 
multinational negotiations has increased since 1890. Mexico is included in Latin America. South Asia 
includes India, Pakistan, Bangladesh, and Sri Lanka. Southeast Asian countries are included under East 
Asia. Events were initially tabulated by the author's research assistants and independently verified by 
Tamra Avritt and David Hendershott. 
a For statistical counting reasons, the transitional year is always included in the new phase. 
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Table 27. Public Concern About Foreign Policy, 1974-1982 
Respondents concerned about 
Our relations with foreign Getting into another 
countries war 









Source: "Envimnmental Update," in "Opinion Roundup," Public Opinion 5 (Februaty/March 
1982), p. 33. 
a Out of 12--the other 10 concerns were domestic. 
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Note on the Compilation of the Tables 
Uses @Force Abroad 
Counts of uses of force, which appear in tables 2,3,4,10,11,12,17,20,21, and 22 are based on 
the following criteria: 
Actions listed in Committee on Foreign Affiirs, Background Information, receive one count. 
Major wars (those classified as "interstate" or "extra-systemic" wars in Singer and Small, Wages q f  
War) continuing for more than one year, according to dates given in Committee on Foreign Affairs, 
are given one additional count for each year beyond the first in which the United States was involved 
for four months or longer. (Criteria for inclusion and data on major wars are in Singer and Small, pp. 
17-39 and 59-75.) 
In addition to the interstate and extrasystemic wars covered in Singer and Small, two wars 
outside the time span of that study were classified as major wars. The War of 1812 (1812-14) was 
given a force count of three and the Vietnam War (1964-67) a count of four. Also not included in 
Singer and Small are the undeclared naval war with France (1798-1800) and the two U.S. conflicts 
with the Barbary pirates (1801-05, 1815); these were counted as single instances because they did 
not meet the Singer and Small criteria for major wars. 
Actions not classified as major wars but listed in Committee on Foreign Affairs as continuing for 
more than one year receive one count in the year of initiation, unless force is indicated as peaking in a 
later year, in which case both year of initiation and peak year are counted. 
Major wars receiving multiple counts and bridging division years are divided proportionately: 
years of a war prior to division are included in the earlier phase or stage, and years of a war following 
a division are included in the later phase or stage. 
Actions listed in Committee on Foriegn Affairs under a single year entry are counted as single 
instances (e.g. 1823-Cuba-April 8, April 16, July 11, July 21, and October 2 h n e  count). But 
separate year entries for the same year and same country are counted separately (e.g., 1864-Japan 
and 1864-Japan-two counts). 
Transition years are included in the new phase (e.g., 1940 in the fourth extrovert phase). 
Presidential Classification 
Stage classifications of presidents, used in tables 7, 9, 11, 12, 14, and 21 are based on the 
following criteria: 
Presidents who spent two full terms or more in office must spend more than three years in the 
stage to be put in that stage. Presidents spending more than one full term, but less than two full terms 
must spend more than two years in a stage to be so classified. A president with one term or less is 
placed in the stage where he spent most of his time in office; a president who served equal time in 
two stages is included in the stage during which he was elected. A year of elected succession is 
counted in only one stage, but a year in which a president dies in office or resigns is allowed to 
overlap. President Garfield, who served less than seven months, is not included in our analysis. 
A second-stage-only president is one who is classified exclusively in a second stage. Presidents 
Coolidge and Truman are classified as second-stage presidents but not as second-stage-only 
presidents because they are also classified in other stages. 
For the fifth introvert phase, which is still in progress, we assume the average twenty-one-year 
pattern of introvert phases, divided into seven-year stages. 
For a complete listing of presidents by stage of mood phase see table 14. 
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eds. Charles W. Kegley, Jr., and Patrick J. McGowan (Beverly Hills: Sage Publications, 1979), p. 43. 
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44-57. 
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meet and fuse in a dominant channel." Harold D. Lasswell, "The Climate of International Action," 
in International Behavior: A Social-Psychological Analysis, ed. Herbert C. Kelman (New York: 
Holt, Rinehart and Winston, 1965), p. 352. 
1. Liberalism, Moods, and American Foreign Policy 
1. See John Locke, Two Treatises of Government, 2nd ed., ed. Peter Laslett (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 1967), especially the "Second Treatise of Government," pp. 285-446. 
2. Edward Weisband, in his 1973 study, maintains that "Lockean liberalism . . . is as relevant 
to American society today as it was in Jefferson's time despite the many changes in culture and 
belief." Edward Weisband, The Ideology of American Foreign Policy: A Paradigm of Lockean 
194 Notes to pages 11-17 
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discussion indicating the continuing underlying presence of American liberalism, see Everett C. 
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3. Louis Hartz, The Liberal Tradition in America (New York: Harcourt, Brace &World, Inc., 
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Inaugural Addresses of the Presidents of the UnitedStates (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing 
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pp. 276-79. 
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American liberalism, see Samuel P. Huntington, American Politics: The Promise of Disharmony 
(Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1981). 
11. Hartz, Liberal Tradition, p. 308. 
12. Huntington, Soldier and the State, pp. 90-91 (quotations), 149-50 and 289-94. 
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Ottawa, Ontario, Canada, 1983), pp. 1-55. 
34. Klingberg, "Historical Alternation," pp. 239-73. 
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In his 1952 WorldPolitics article, Klingberg dates 1919 as the end of the third extrovert phase and the 
beginning of the fourth introvert phase. However, in a 1979 publication, Klingberg cites 1918 as the 
end of the third extrovert phase and the beginning of the fourth introvert phase. In his 1952 article he 
lists 1940 as the end of the fourth introvert phase and beginning of the fourth extrovert phase, but he 
also notes that 1941 may be the correct date. In his latter publication Klingberg cites 1966 or 1967 as 
the end of the fourth extrovert phase and beginning of the fifth introvert phase. "Cyclical Trends, 
1979," p. 38; "Historical Alternations," pp. 240and 250. The moodlinterest analysis uses the dates 
chosen by Klingberg in his 1952 article and bases a 1968 introvert phase start on research in Ch. 5. 
36. Klingberg, "Historical Alternation," pp. 250-60. 
37. Ibid., p. 241. 
38. Short-term indicators such as Gallup polling data, available since 1935, were gathered for 
the moodlinterest analysis, and the "Most Important Issue Polls" were of particular interest. See 
George H. Gallup, The Gallup Poll, Public Opinion, 1935-1971, vols. 1, 2, and 3 (New York: 
Random House, 1972); and George Gallup, ed., Public Opinion: 1972-1977, vols. 1 and 2 
(Wilmington, Del.: Scholarly Resources, Inc., 1978). The Gallup Opinion Index. Gallup Report, 
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39. George Washington, "Farewell Address," A Compilation of Messages and Papers ofthe 
Presidents, 1789-1897, vol. 1, ed. James D. Richardson (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing 
Office, 1896), p. 222. 
40. Frank Klingberg also suggests that mood phases grow over time, as he notes two distinct 
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stages of growth within each phase: "liberty" (characterized by individual, group, and local 
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